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HomeMy WebLinkAboutZOA 98-5 POLITICALS SIGNS 2000 POLITICAL SIGNS The placement of political signs is subject to regulation by the state, county, and/or cities. STATE: Reference: Business and Professions Code Section 5405.3. The California Department of Transportation is prepared to answer questions about state regulation of campaign signs. Call (916) 654-4790. The following two pages contain a copy of their informational letter and "Statement of Responsibility" form. If you would like a copy of this letterfform mailed to you, please call the Elections Office at 251-8217. COUNTY: Reference: Lassen County Code Section 9.36.030. The Lassen County Road Department is responsible for issuing permits for the placement of political signs within the county road right-of-way. The signs must be set back 15' from the edge of the pavement and shall not be set higher than 3.75' above the road surface adjacent to the sign. Signs shall not obstruct the vision of a driver at any intersection, school, pedestrian walkway or driveway, and shall not be attached to any County road sign. All signs shall be removed from the County Road right-of-way no later than 10 days after the election to which they pertain. Contact the Road Department at 251-8288 for further information. General rules: Lassen County Code Section 18-106-040(11): Political signs or posters may be allowed in any district and shall conform with the size standards, of this title and shall be located in a manner that will not block sight distance or impair traffic safety. A certificate of conditional use shall not be required for political campaign signs or posters. Such signs shall be removed immediately following the termination of time intended therefor. CITY: Consult the City of Susanville Public Works Department at 257-1000 ext. 5117, for information concerning sign placement within the city. 5- 2 M CO O N y O LAW a � i ? = d 0 o { L 2to cc a z 6 o fhl 00 '3 Wec 2'+ Q+ .«C+ n _ N >. coO p ula aa0 d N ' v � d to dp ca N p 8 4. a o A O rn ,Ov> O •c as '� O O I d co �' a p y oCZ) a �!* f C N W Q .y W p 5 y � v, S � N rLIU qq m _ A x Oq O '. m O W C1. _O m ;p' d a •� $ 6 F b N Cl [ 3 LL O V y v O O N N N a It y = 2 o o � o� o o `: a o o Y riy F W O U �' EiC y �' "' 0 �� E C7 O 'lam• r 'C .+ � � ~O ': N M 7 p O •:t-y' ' a p yr a4 d OI F-f m 'b rr E O _ G7 JEO !9mE rn z5z a O � a M 0 0 O N N O o N N 0 O y a � di Vi .a Z N N � C —yj > ^i el .1,I Q� J w �I 10 ., -c •a ;� � OI �i c � 1-0 am.` ¢� Cal El NN _i "d H a N 0 ® 41 �I 5 �I l �I I II I IF. ® O c d! �I t ._ ci w c O y b of �I _ �I N �� --1 ¢f Q Qi .-I al �I r. an c z z c E aci Y o H c E F z r. m c• c c a .sl .,2c! vi QL Cdi .D � � qq •> y •. . 3 Q N- -o H N, y^ S] o . p id L'� w � UI Ui .a P. OO..i Ci al CO..i „ N C o of olT, �! ¢! ¢, Aoolala, c�lH, o col ! '3 U O a G• O OA U aJ Vi O C TJ d0 F1 G 0 o � M LIS rn a of A 0 c S, 0 ° a ' E Q N N N O 7W L b0 N G •U CO N W cn Nm m ul ol E- 0 iC a m s rl � Ci •° M � O ea c! 'g a o of a sly � ° III ¢I 00 3 3 0 cc of Wi v� mi 0 Qi v,v E of G, ai Wi v ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ �. ♦ ♦ Q ♦ A. A. ♦ ♦ Q NI U_ a+ O b OL Q O W7 V wi m O C 'a C ti 6. 15 .0 CITY OF PALM DESERT DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT STAFF REPORT TO: Planning Commission DATE: July 18, 2000 CASE NO: ZOA 98-5 Amendment #2 REQUEST: Approval of amendments to the sign ordinance - political signs APPLICANT: City of Palm Desert I. BACKGROUND: In 1998 Planning Commission held two public hearings on amending the regulations of political signs and recommended the two ordinances to the City Council. The City Council did not act on either amendment. The City Attorney has been working with City Council over the last few months to draft ,an acceptable amendment. II. CURRENT PROPOSAL: This current amendment will repeal the current provisions of Section 25.68.620 Political Signs and replace it with provisions prohibiting political signs in the public right-of-way, shall require property owner permission to locate them on private property, shall not require a fee and said signs shall not be placed in a manner to create a hazard to public health or safety. III. RECOMMENDATION: That the Planning Commission recommend approval to the City Council of Case No. 98-5 Amendment #2. IV. ATTACHMENTS: A. Draft resolution B. Legal notice C. Comments from city departments and other agencies D. Plans and exhibits Prepared by e e mith Reviewed and Approved by P 'I ell /tm L PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. A RESOLUTION OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA, RECOMMENDING TO THE CITY COUNCIL APPROVAL OF A. ZONING ORDINANCE AMENDMENT RELATING TO POLITICAL SIGNS. CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 AMENDMENT #2 WHEREAS, the Planning Commission of the City of Palm Desert, California, did on the 18th day of July, 2000, hold a duly noticed public hearing to consider the amendment of Zoning Ordinance Section 25.68 relating to political signs; and WHEREAS, said application has complied with the requirements of the "City of Palm Desert Procedure for Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act, Resolution No. 00-24," in that the Director of Community Development has determined the amendment to be a Class 5 Categorical Exemption; and WHEREAS, at said public hearing, upon hearing and considering all testimony and arguments, if any, of all interested persons desiring to be heard, said Planning Commission did find the following facts and reasons to exist to recommend approval of the Zoning Ordinance text amendment: 1 . The proposed amendment relating to non-commercial signs is consistent with the intent of the Zoning Ordinance and will protect the community health, safety and general welfare. NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Planning Commission of the City of Palm Desert, California, as follows: 1 . That the above recitations are true and correct and constitute the findings of the Commission in this case. 2. That it does hereby recommend approval to the City Council Case No. ZOA 98-5 Amendment #2 as provided in the attached exhibit labeled "A". PASSED, APPROVED and ADOPTED at a regular meeting of the Palm Desert Planning Commission, held on this 18th day of July, 2000, by the following vote, to wit: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: PAUL R. BEATY, Chairperson ATTEST: PHILIP DRELL, Secretary Palm Desert Planning Commission PLANNING COMMISSION tiESOLUTION NO. EXHIBIT A SECTION 1 That Section 25.68.620 of the Code of the City of Palm Desert, California, being the same and is hereby amended to read as follows: "25.68.620 Political Sign Regulations. Applicants for political signs as defined in Section 25.68.020 shall comply with the following requirements: A. All said signs shall not be located in the public right-of-way. B. No fee or permits shall be required for the right to erect political signs. When the sign is proposed to be placed on private property, the applicant shall secure the permission of the property owner. C. Signs shall not be placed in any manner to create a hazard to public health or safety." 2 0 • • MEMORANDUM To: Buford A. Crites, Mayor Jim Ferguson, Mayor Pro-Tempore Jean M. Benson, Council Member Richard S. Kelly, Council Member Robert A. Spiegel, Council Member FROM: David J. Erwin DATE: June 6, 2000 RE: Political Signs We are entering another season of political signage now through November, 2000. We still have ordinances regarding political signs which because of questionable validity, have not been enforced in the past (Section 25.68.620). I have enclosed a copy of same for your reference. In order to remove any ambiguity, I recommend that we either(1)remove the regulation completely, or (2) modify to require that signs are out of the public right-of-way and, if on private property, to secure the consent of the property owner. The other regulation regarding size and location, removal dates (before and after the election) have substantial problems with enforceability. I ask the Council's direction with regard to this so we can eliminate some of the confusion that has existed in the past. If you have questions, please contact me. encl. cc: Carlos Ortega Sheila Gilligan Rachelle Klassen Phil Drell 25.68.607 i New Years Day the above noted lights may be dis- C. Such signs shall not be located in the public played without review and approval by the city. (Ord. right-of-way; 587§2(Exhibit A§ 19), 1989) D. All political signs shall be removed within ten days after the election date,except that in the case of a 25.68.610 Signs on awnings,marquees,canopies, general election,political signs shall not be required to arcades or similar structures or be removed between the primary and general elections, attachments. but shall be removed within ten days after the general A All awnings or awnings with a sign(s) must be election date.The applicant shall agree in writing to be review personally responsible for the removal of the political reviewed and approved by the architectural rev si commission.The awning(sign)must be architecturally gns compatible with the building and as a result an awning E. No political signs shall be posted earlier than ninety days prior to an election may not be appropriate for every building. B. Pursuant to Section 25.68.470 "Proper mainte- F. No fee or permit shall be required for the right awnings must be kept in good repair to erect political signs.Where the sign is proposed to Hance of signs" a and be clean and wnings be placed on private property,the applicant shall se- C. Awnings must nonfa substantially attached to the cure the permission of the property owner. (Ord. 422 Exhibit A§ 1, 1985:Ord. 129§4(part),1977:Ord.98 main building structure. D. Awning lettering and numbers as well as style §1 (part),1975:Exhibit A§2538 17.06) and colors must aesthetically blend with the building. E. Letter height shall not exceed one-third of the 25.68.630 Signs for public or quasi-public uses. awning height and in no event shall it exceed eight Directional and public convenience signs for public inches. and quasi public uses may be permitted on public F. Scalloping on awnings shall not be pronounced. property.The design must conform to standard direc- G. Where applicable, awnings shall contain street tional sign specifications promulgated by the director numbers four inches in height with the letter style of environmental services and approved by the design helvetica medium or equivalent. review board.The total number of signs allowed shall H. Awnings shall not contain phone numbers. be based on the minimum number necessary for ade- I. Street-drop type awnings(i.e.canvas-vinyl signs) quate public identification as determined by the direc- shall not be encouraged.(Ord.587§2(Exhibit A§17), for of environmental services. (Ord. 129 § 4 (part), 1989:Ord.129§4(part),1977:Ord.98§1(part),1975: 1977:Ord.98§1(part),1975:Exhibit A§25.38-17.07) Exhibit A§25.38-17.05) XL ENFORCEMENT AND AMORTIZATION 25.68.615 Open summer signs. Between June 1st and October 1st, restaurants,re- 25.68.640 Lawful nonconforming signs. tail and personal service businesses within the commer- A. Iawful existing on-premises signs at the time of cial zone may display a sign in addition to a main sign, the adoption of the ordinance codified in this chapter not to exceed five square feet, indicating if they will on February 24, 1977, which do not comply with the remain open during the summer.The design and loca- requirements of this chapter, as amended, shall be tion of the sign shall be compatible with other signs bn deemed lawful nonconforming uses and shall be made the building and must be approved by the department to comply,be removed or demolishedupon the transfer of environmental services.(Ord.272(part), 1981) of ownership of the business or upon the altering of sign,copy,size,color or the addition of new signage to 25.68.620 Politicnl sign regulation. the site or structure upon which the nonconforming Applicants for political signs, as defined in Section sign is located. 25.68.020, shall comply with the following require- B• Nonconforming signs may not be expanded,ex- ments: tended, rebuilt, altered or reconstructed in any way, A. Each sign shall not exceed five square feet in except for normal maintenance or to protect public area; safety. B. The signs shall not be located closer together C. It shall be the express responsibility of the ven- than fifty feet; dor to advise the vendee of the provisions of this section 452 MEMORANDUM To: Phil Drell, City of Palm Desert FROM: David J. Erwin DATE: June 12, 2000 RE: Zoning Ordinance Modification The attached is a modification of the zoning ordinance and needs a public hearing before the Planning Commission and City Council. If you would, please start the process to amend this particular section at the earliest possible time. If you have questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me. cc: Robert W. Hargreaves, Esq. w/encl. RVeLTB\DJE\167609 e ORDINANCE NO. AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA AMENDING SECTION 25.68.620 RELATING,TO POLITICAL SIGNS. The City Council of the City of Palm Desert, California, does hereby ordain as follows: Section 1. That section 25.68.620 of the Code of the City of Palm Desert, California being the same is hereby amended to read as follows: "25.68.620 Political Sign Regulations. Applicants for political signs as defined in section 25.68.020, shall comply with the following requirements: A. All said signs shall not be located in the public right-of-way. B. No fee or permits shall be required for the right to erect political signs. Where the sign is proposed to be placed on private property, the applicant shall secure the permission of the property owner. C. Signs shall not be placed in any manner to create a hazard to public health or safety." Section 2. City clerk shall certify the passage and adoption of this Ordinance shall cause same to be published once in a newspaper of general circulation printed within the City of Palm Desert, California. It shall be in full force and effect thirty (30) days after its adoption. RMBUSOJE1161608 N11/00 - i i , 1 PASSED, APPROVED AND ADOPTED this_day of 2000, by the City Council of the City of Palm Desert, California, by the following vote, to wit: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: Buford A. Crites, Mayor City of Palm Desert, California ATTEST: By: SBEILA R. GILLIGAN, City Clerk APPROVED AS TO FORM: By: DAVID J. ERWIN, City Attorney City of Palm Desert, California RNMUSOM167606 6112100 ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE M E M O R A N D U M TO: Robert W. Hargreaves FROM: Helene P. Dreyer DATE: January 27, 1998 RE: City of Palm Desert - Sign Ordinance: In-Depth Discussion of Current Status of Law Regulating Non-Commercial Speech. (P.D. Mun. C. 25 . 68 . 010 . ) DISCUSSION I. GOVERNMENTS MAY REGULATE SIGNAGE/SPEECH ON PUBLIC PROPERTY. A government may preclude advertising - including political advertising - so long as the prohibition is not "arbitrary, capricious or invidious. " (Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights (1974) 418 U.S . 298 , 94 S . Ct . 2714 , 2717 . ) However, with respect to public property, content-based regulation of a traditional or designated public forum is subject to strict scrutiny; content- neutral regulation is subject to heightened scrutiny. (Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n (1983) 460 U.S . 37 . ) Regulation of non-public forums on public property need only pass a reasonable relationship standard. (Id. ) All public property that is not a traditional public forum or a designated public forum is considered to be non-public forum. A government may impose a viewpoint-neutral exclusion of "speakers" (including advertisers, whether political or commercial) to avoid disrupting a non-public forum or avoid hindering its effectiveness for its intended purpose. (International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee (1992) 112 S . Ct . 2701 (public airport solicitation. ) Furthermore, even traditional or designated public forums (such as streets and parks) may be subject to reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions so long as the restrictions are content-neutral (not undertaken in an effort to suppress a particular speaker or viewpoint) , narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and there are ample alternative channels of communication. (Perry, supra, 460 U.S . at 45; City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984) 466 U. S. 789, 104 S .Ct . 2118 . ) ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE A. CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION ON PUBLIC PROPERTY. In Vincent, the Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance that prohibited all signs on public property, including the posting of political signs on utility poles along sidewalks . Because the restriction was content-neutral, it was not subject to a strict- scrutiny test . Citing a "captive audience" rationale,!/ the court found the regulation was related to a legitimate city interest (avoiding "visual clutter" ) and not overly burdensome since oral speaking and/or distribution of handbills was still permitted on public property. (Id. at 810 . ) Likewise upheld has been an ordinance restricting posting of political signs on city property to lamp posts and utility poles was found not to violate the First Amendment where a city has a legitimate interest in aesthetics, prevention of damage to public property and promotion of traffic safety; the restriction was reasonably related to that interest; and the restriction not overly burdensome because ample alternative forums of expression were available . (Candidates v. Outdoor Graphic Service v. City and County of San Francisco (N.D. Cal . 1983 ) 574 F.Supp. 1240 . ) "Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused. . . [T] he Government, no less than a private owner of property has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. . . . " (Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (1985) 473 U.S. 788, 799-800, 105 S .Ct . 3439 . ) A content-neutral regulation will survive First Amendment challenge so long as : (1) the ordinance is truly content-neutral; (2) the ordinance furthers a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of speech; (3) the ordinance is narrowly tailored to protect that interest; and (4) reasonable alternative channels of communication remain open. (Vincent, supra; Perry Educ . Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' 11 See also Women' s International League for Peace and Freedom (1986) 186 Cal .App. 3d 30 [total ban on political ads permissible on public transportation buses where there is a "captive audience"] . ) RMPUB\BPD1872 ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE Ass' n (1983) 460 U.S. 37, 45; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n (1980) 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 ; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights (1974) 418 U.S . 298 (sustained ban on political signs on buses] . ) 2/ II. REGULATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY. A. REGULATION AS EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. Surprisingly, it is in the realm of regulating private - rather than public - property where even content-neutral ordinances have run into the gravest difficulty. Regulation of speech on private property - including sign regulation - receives less latitude from the courts . In addition to First Amendment restrictions on regulation of speech, regulations restricting private property speech must be within the scope of a valid exercise of police power, i .e. , beneficial to the public health, safety and welfare. (City of Landue v. Gilleo (1994) 114 S .Ct . 2038 . ) Preservation of aesthetics is generally recognized as a valid exercise of police power and, thus, an important government interest . (See Berman v. parker (1954) 348 U. S. 26 . ) Furtherance of aesthetic values, however, has received varied treatment from the courts when it comes to regulation of signs on private property. V With respect to Palm Desert, however, an issue arose last year as to whether the RDA could lease property at the corner of Portola and Hwy 111 to persons desiring to erect political signs . If it did so lease, there may be an issue as to whether that act created a limited public forum of that property. A government may create a "limited" or "designated" public forum by opening up a particular property for expressive activity by part or all of the public. (See, e .g. , White v. City of Norwalk (9th Cir. 1990) 900 F. 2d 1421 . ) Content-based regulation of a designated public forum is subject to strict scrutiny. (Id. ) In fact, content-based restrictions of any sort are viewed as evidence that a government is impermissibly favoring one message over another. (See, e.g. , Carey v. Brown (1980) 447 U.S. 455 . ) If a total ban on signage on "public property" will be initiated, care should be taken not to lease the RDA property for that purpose . Though there may be a question as to its "public property" v. private character when under a lease agreement, and though the RDA probably could not refuse to lease based upon content of particular signs, it is free to refuse to lease for signage purposes, generally, and that would probably avoid a lot of issues. RMPUS\HPD1872 -3- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE In Metromedia, Inc . v. City of San Diego (1981) 453 U.S . 490, a plurality opinion implied that aesthetic preservation is not a "compelling" enough interest to survive strict scrutiny of content- based regulation banning off-site advertising. Furthermore, because preservation of "aesthetic values" is necessarily subjective, regulations based on aesthetics should be carefully scrutinized to be certain they are not really public- rationalizations for what is actually intended to regulate the content of speech. A determinative factor in ascertaining the "true" intent of a regulation is the extent to which the regulation is "overly inclusive" or broader than necessary to guard against aesthetic detriment . (Id. at 510 . ) Thus, even a seemingly content-neutral regulation violates the First Amendment if it is "too overinclusive" .-� Banning all signs in a city, including those on residential front lawns and windows, for example, is impermissible. (City of Landue v. Gilleo (1994) 114 S.Ct . 2038, 2044 [sign in home window speaking out against Gulf War] ; Spence v. Washington (1974) 418 U.S . 405, 409 [reversing conviction for displaying altered American flag from window of apartment building] . ) B. RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY RECEIVED SPECIAL DEFERENCE. Residential property is, by far, the most difficult type of private property to regulate with respect to signs . Courts have produced varied results, often not even following the analytical "rules" previously established. In City of Landue v. Gilleo, for example, a woman was convicted of violating an ordinance that banned all signs in residential districts with to limited exceptions (for sale, yard sale, etc . ) . The woman had placed a sign in the front window of her home protesting the Gulf War. The court did not analyze the case via the step-by-step test (set forth, above) for consideration of content-based regulation. Rather, it engaged in a generalized balancing test between the aesthetic interests of the community and 11 Likewise, the more "exceptions" a regulation contains, the more often it will be viewed by courts as content-based. This is especially true of lower and intermediary courts - though the U.S. Supreme Court appears to be moving away from that interpretation and the strict-scrutiny test and toward a more generalized balancing of interests . (See, e .g. , City of Landue v. Gilleo (1994) 114 S.Ct . 2038 ; Turner Broadcasting Sys . V. Federal Communications Comm'n. (1994) 114 S .Ct . 2445; Madsen v. Women' s Health Ctr. , Inc . (1994) 114 S.Ct . 2516 ; compare Loftus v. Township of Lawrence Park (1991) 764 F.Supp. 354 (W.D. Pa. ) [permitting only "garage sale" signs content-based] ; Tauber v. Town of Longmeadow (1988) 695 F.Supp. 1358 (D. Mass . ) [blanket ban that included narrow exceptions held to be content based] . ) RMPUB\HPD1872 -4- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE the First Amendment interests of individual residents .41 In the court' s view, the sweeping ban at issue effectively destroyed an entire and important mode of communication that rendered it impermissible. In reaching that conclusion, the Court gave "special respect (to] individual liberty in the home, " and suggested that regulation of home speech could almost never be warranted. (Id. at 2047 . ) Residential signs, especially, say much not only about the message imparted on the sign, but about the identity of the speaker as well . (An "end the war" sign on the lawn of a veteran, or a sign supporting socialism on the lawn of a mansion, for example, impart additional and special meaning. ) Furthermore, speakers were not left with reasonable alternative channels of communication, especially considering the practical ineffectiveness of public speaking or handbill distribution from a residential front lawn and the vast cost differences that may ultimately be involved with alternative methods of communication. Therefore, the ordinance was too overly inclusive to be considered truly content-neutral in intent .51 The court in Gilleo hinted that "more temperate" restrictions, such as a reasonable time, place and manner restriction on all types of temporary signs in residential areas - rather than a total ban - might survive challenge . However, while recognizing that citizens have an interest in preserving their property values and avoiding "visual clutter" in their neighborhoods, the court gives very little guidance as to what types specific regulation might be acceptable . At the same time, Gilleo makes clear that political yard and window signs in residential areas are of paramount importance - both in character and in availability - and that, especially for lower income citizens, may be the only method of expression reasonably available. Gilleo' s deference to residential speech carries echos of a similar attitude in Vincent, supra, where the court (interestingly) found political postings on public 4/ But court implied restrictions against signs erected in exchange for a fee may attain different result under balancing of interests . V Even though the ordinance in Gilleo did contain several exceptions, it was still not considered a content-based ordinance . The exceptions present were not aimed at a particular viewpoint but were tailored toward unique public needs for certain types of speech - such as directional signs, municipal signs, for sale or rental signs, church schedule signs, road and warning signs . (Gilleo, supra, 114 S. Ct . at 2044 . ) Although the ordinance found to be content-based in Metromedia also contained similar exceptions, that ordinance also contained a broad exception for on- site advertising - an entire form of commercial speech thus being permitted while others were not . RMPUBXHPD1872 -S- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE property were not a "uniquely valuable or important mode of communication" (466 U.S . 789 , 812) , while indicating that postings on residential property were a "venerable means of communication that is both unique and important" (114 S .Ct . 2038 , 2044-47 . ) C. THERE IS NO CLEAR-CUT STANDARD FOR REGULATION OF NON- COMMERCIAL SIGNAGE. As the foregoing demonstrates, U. S. Supreme Court treatment of sign regulation has been varied and conflicting and leaves no reliable guide for cities enacting regulations : * In 1981, the court in Metromedia invalidated an ordinance banning all "outdoor advertising signs" but with 12 specified exceptions . The exceptions included on-site advertising signs as well as temporary political signs . According to Metromedia, these exceptions reflected viewpoint or content- based regulation that could not be justified. Permitting on- site commercial advertising while excluding most on-site non- commercial messages favored commercial speech over non- commercial speech. At the same time, exempting temporary political signs while prohibiting other non-commercial signs impermissibly effected government control over public ideas and opinions . Because the city allowed certain types of signs, it did not have a compelling interest in prohibiting other types of signs . (453 U. S . 513 - 520 . ) * In 1984 , the court in Vincent upheld a total ban of signs on public property (other than those with a public/municipal purpose) , but would not have upheld content-based exceptions had any been present (i .e. , exception for some types of non- commercial opinion speech while prohibiting others. ) Thus, both Metromedia and Vincent indicate that total bans containing content-based exceptions are suspect and not likely to be upheld. Rather than allowing any such signs, these cases indicate that total bans on signage would bear the greatest likelihood of survival . * Then, in 1994, the court in Gilleo indicated that suppressing too much protected speech would likewise be impermissible (prohibiting some types of protected speech in residential areas . ) In sum, an ordinance is in danger of being struck down if it : (a) contains content-based exceptions, thus prohibiting "too little" speech; or (b) does not sufficiently exempt protected speech, thus prohibiting "too much" speech: RMPUBNHPD1872 -6- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE "Justice Stevens used Metromedia and Vincent to ' identify two analytically distinct grounds for challenging the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance regulating the display of signs . ' The first is that the ordinance in effect restricts too little speech because the exemptions discriminate based on the signs' message . Justice Stevens found an exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of speech could fit that definition if it represents a governmental attempt to give an advantage to one side of an issue of public debate, or to select the topics for public debate. That language mirrors the traditional definition of content- based discrimination, but Justice Stevens stated that simply removing the exemptions would not necessarily cure the defects in the regulation. " "The reasoning behind that conclusion relates to the second analytical basis identified in the opinion: that an ordinance could restrict too much protected speech. Justice Stevens found that even if the exemptions in the Ladue (v.Gilleol ordinance were free of viewpoint discrimination, the ordinance still restricted too much speech by almost completely banning signs from residential property. The broad sign prohibition struck down in Gilleo was distinguished from the broad sign prohibition approved in Vincent on the basis that residential signs, unlike signs placed on public property, are a unique and important means of communication. " (D. McPherson, Municipal Regulation of Political Signs : Balancing First Amendment rights Against Aesthetic Concerns, 45 Drake L. Rev. 767, 783 (1997) (citations omitted] . ) "The Gilleo decision appears to add a new wrinkle to the analysis of total sign bans, by looking not only at whether the regulation discriminates between different types of speech, but also at the relationship between the type of speech being regulated and the location of that speech. The ruling is viewed by some commentators as an indication that the Court is even willing to examine carefully - and sometimes invalidate - content-neutral speech restrictions . Other experts think the reach of the decision will be limited to residential property and will not affect the ability of cities to enact content- neutral exemptions for signs on public or non-residential private property. " (Id. at 784) (citations omitted] . ) The ambiguity resulting from these cases has produced a wide variety of disparate outcomes in the courts and provides little RMPUB\HP01872 -7- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE adequate guidance for local authorities endeavoring to protect the aesthetic qualities of their communities . As Justice Rehnquist observed in his dissent of the Metromedia plurality opinion: "In a case where city planning commissions and zoning boards must regularly confront constitutional claims of this sort, it is a genuine misfortune to have the Court' s treatment of the subject be a virtual Tower of Babel, from which no definitive principles can be clearly drawn. . . . " (453 U.S. at 569, 101 S .Ct . at 2924 . ) In sum, if an ordinance bans only some speech, based upon content, it will likely be struck down on the basis that aesthetic preservation is not a compelling enough government interest . Likewise, an ordinance banning all (or too many) signs in a particular area may be struck down as being overly-inclusive and destroying important forums or leaving inadequate alternative methods of expression. D. REGULATIONS PROTECTING "POLITICAL" OR "ELECTION" SPEECH BUT IGNORING OTHER FORMS OF PROTECTED OPINION SPEECH WILL NOT BE UPHELD. Though most cases that are ultimately litigated involve the posting of election or campaign-oriented political signs, it is important to remember that the restrictions on government regulation reflected in the U.S . Supreme Court cases are not limited to purely political/election speech. Gilleo, for example, concerned the posting of an anti-war sign in a residential window -not a candidate advertisement (114 S .Ct . 2038) ; and Spence involved the display of an altered flag - not a statement respecting a particular election issue (418 U. S . 405 . ) Likewise, in Vincent, Justice Stevens notes that , [a] n assertion that ' Jesus Saves' , that 'Abortion is Murder' , that every woman has the ' Right to Choose, ' or that 'Alcohol Kills, ' may have a claim to a constitutional exemption from the ordinance that is just as strong as ' Roland Vincent - City Council . "' (Vincent, supra, 466 U.S . at 816 . ) (See also Union City Bd. of Zoning Appeals et . al . v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc. (Sup. Ct . GA 1996) 467 S .E. 2d 875, 879 - 882 [ordinance limiting definition of on-site sign to messages relating to situs impermissibly impugns upon non- commercial protected speech; allowance for temporary political/election signs insufficient to cure defect in omission of allowance for permanent political or opinion signs; limitation requiring removal of temporary political signs within specified duration of election impermissible content-based regulation where other temporary signs had no such durational limitation and where city failed to justify restriction] . ) Thus, even if a specific exemption for election-related speech were clearly permissible (and that remains in question) , an RMPUB\BPD1872 -8- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE ordinance not also exempting other forms of non-commercial opinion speech would not likely survive constitutional scrutiny. Like election-related "political speech, " religious speech and speech directed toward issues of general public interest or importance are entitled to a significant level of protection. "Government may not set the agenda" for public debate via regulations limiting the types of non-commercial speech permitted. (See, e.g. , City of Lakewood v. Colfax (Colo. 1981) 634 P. 2d 52 . ) III. REGULATION OF NON-COMMUNICATIVE ASPECTS : SIZE, COLOR, LOCATION, DURATION The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that cities have a legitimate government interest in regulating the non-communicative aspects of signs . These aspects may, under some circumstances, include size, shape, color, number and duration. (See, e .cr. , Metromedia, supra, 453 U.S . at 502 ; Regan v. Time, Inc. (1984) 468 U.S. 641, 104 S .Ct . 3262 , 3270 [color and size limitations may exist without being content based; restrictions do not prevent expression of views or use of illustrations to express those views . ) Such restrictions may be permissible to the extent that sign limitations do not significantly deter the exercise of First Amendment rights . (Baldwin v. Redwood City (9th Cir. 1976) 540 F. 2d 1360 cert . denied sub. nom. Leipzig v. Baldwin, 431 U.S . 913 [comparing size restrictions to decibel restrictions upheld in noise ordinances] . ) However, if regulation of the non- communicative aspects impinges upon the communicative aspects of the sign, the ordinance will still be struck down. A. NO CLEARCUT STANDARDS . Unfortunately, cases in this area have likewise produced disparate results and there is no clearcut "minimum" size, spacing, or number limitation that is acceptable to the courts . For example : 1976 - Limiting Number of Signs "OK" : In Baldwin v. Redwood City, supra, (9th Cir. 1976) 540 F. 2d 1360, the court upheld a size limitation of 16 sq. ft . per sign and an aggregate total per lot of 80 sq. ft . But the court also expressly noted it was not addressing validity of duration limitation on temporary signs because the issue was not raised by the parties . 1977 - Limiting Number and Size Not "OK" : Then, in Verrilli v. City of Concord (9th Cir. 1977) 548 F. 2d 262, the court struck an ordinance restricting political signs to 4 sq. ft . and one sign per lot . (However, this appears to have been RMPUB\HPD1872 -9- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE based entirely upon the trial court Is conclusion that the city had not even attempted to justify its size restrictions . )p 7 y 1993 Limiting Number Not "OK" , but Limiting Duration "OK" : Then, in Arlington County Republican Committee v. Arlington county, Virginia (4th Cir. 1993) 983 F. 2d 587, 595, the court struck down an ordinance limiting the number of political signs on residential property to two (especially where governing authority failed to demonstrate any fact- specific need for such a limitation) , but suggesting regulation be accomplished via limitations on spacing and duration of the sign. (Accord Dimas v. City of Warren (E.D. MI 1996) 939 F.Supp. 554 . ) Limiting Number "OK, " but Limiting Duration Not "OK" : In Whitton v. City of Gladstone. Missouri (8th Cir. 1995) 54 F. 3d 1400, 1408 - 1409, an ordinance limiting size to 4 sq. ft . per sign and 64 sq. ft . aggregate was held unconstitutional because of durational limitation; lack of proof of necessity, coupled with less restrictive means of remedy already in place (including size limitations) rendered duration limitation impermissible and unnecessary. 1996 - Limiting Number "OK" , but Limiting Duration Not "OK" : But recently, in Union City Board of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc . (Sup. Ct . GA. 1996) 467 S . E. 2d 875, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld an unspecified number limitation, but struck a duration limitation as impermissible content- related regulation of temporary political signs . As these cases reflect, not only have the courts failed to reach a consensus as to limitations on number and, to some extent, duration, they establish no clear guidelines with respect to size . (One court did uphold an eleven inch height restriction for signs placed on public property, but this holding is not the norm and the facts of the case are limited to posters placed upon utility poles . It did not limit the size of signs placed on private property nor signs placed in more spacious areas . (Candidates Outdoor Graphic Service v. City and County of San Francisco (N.D. CA 1983) 574 F.Supp. 1240 . ) A sampling of ordinances from the California League of Cities likewise reveals a wide-range of size provisions in ordinances . B. AN EMERGING CONSENSUS. Nevertheless, some consensus does appear to be forming with respect to time, place and manner regulation.V V The confusion in this area of law has led to some interesting gymnastics by cities attempting to come up with a valid ordinance . (continued. . . ) RMPUB\HPD1872 -10- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 1. Limitations must be content-neutral: non-commercial speech should be afforded at least as great protection as commercial speech and political/election speech must not be arbitrarily discriminated from opinion speech or general temporary signs or permanent signs. First and foremost, any regulation imposed must be content neutral . That is, non-commercial speech must be afforded at least as great a freedom as commercial speech (more freedom is also acceptable) and the regulation may not distinguish different types of temporary signs, or non-commercial signs, based upon the content of the message . For example : McCormack v. Township of Clinton (1994) 872 F.Supp. 1320 (D.N.J. ) , an ordinance limiting the duration of temporary political signs in residential districts to a time period of ten days before until ten days after an election was found to be an unconstitutional content-based restriction. In this case, other types of temporary signs (yard sales, etc . ) were permitted to be erected up to 30 days in advance of the event . (Indeed, given the U.S . Supreme Court' s deference to residential signs in Gilleo, any regulation as to residential 6� ( . . .continued) By the time of trial in Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid (6th Cir. 1996) 88 F.3d 382, for example, a city had three times amended a challenged ordinance originally intended to stop a proliferation of real estate "for sale" signs on residential property (and concurrent drops in market values) . The first version of the ordinance restricted "for sale" signs to front windows . When the trial court issued a preliminary injunction to prohibit its enforcement, the city amended the ordinance to apply to all types of commercial signs in residential areas . Then, just days before trial, the ordinance was amended a third time - this time banning all yard signs in residential areas (except identification and temporary construction signs) . Because the first two versions of the ordinance had been amended, the court of appeals declined to consider whether they would have been valid. A reading of the remainder of its opinion, however, indicates that they would not have upheld the first two versions even had the issue not become moot . First, the court noted that Gilleo now prohibits a total ban on residential yard signs . Furthermore, the prohibition limiting signs to window display did not provide adequate alternative means of communication - especially for owners wishing to sell their own homes, for whom listings, mailers and other traditional real estate sales forums would not reasonably be available . RMPUB\RP01872 -11- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE political signs will now be under close scrutiny and may now be impermissible - including limitations as to duration. ) Collier v. City of Tacoma (Sup. Ct . Wash. 1993) 854 P. 2d 1046 [duration limitation of 60 days before election unconstitutional content-based regulation directed toward election materials . ] Whitton v. City of Gladstone (8th Cir. 1995) 54 F. 3d 1400 [durational limitation on political signs and imposition of vicarious liability on candidates for ordinance violations invalid content-based restrictions . ] Brayton v. City of New Brighton (Ct . App. Minn. 1994) 519 N.W. 2d 243 [ordinance upheld limiting number of non-commercial signs to one per property for entire year where sign could contain multiple messages; and where allowance during election periods for one additional sign per ballot measure and one additional sign per candidate; ordinance did not discriminate against content of non-commercial messages nor advocate particular viewpoint . 171 City of Waterloo v. Markham (App. Ct . Ill . 1992) 600 N.E. 2d 1320 [requirement that all temporary signs, regardless of message or content, be removed within 90 days of erection valid regulation; applied to all temporary signs and also provided adequate alternative channels in that persons free to re-erect sign at any time . ] In Rzadkowolski v. Village of Lake Orion (6th Cir. 1988) 845 F. 2d 653 , 654 , an ordinance limiting the number of billboards carrying commercial or non-commercial messages was found not to be regulative of content; limitations not directed toward specific message, only toward commercial v, noncommercial distinction. Outdoor Sys . , Inc . v. City of Mesa (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F. 2d 604 , 615 . ) Ordinances of two Arizona cities regulating size and location of both commercial and non-commercial speech were l� Authorities caution against too much reliance upon Brayton' s acceptance of the "one permanent, extra during elections" restrictions for several reasons : (1) it conflicts with Arlington, a case better reasoned and decided just one year prior to Gilleo but for which cert . was denied; (2) Brayton fails to distinguish between yard signs and window signs, despite Gilleo' s strong deference to residential, particularly in-home, use; and (3) Brayton relies too heavily upon implicit deference to local decision-making, rather than undertaking an in-depth analysis of the constitutional issues at stake. (See Zoning and Planning Commission Handbook (1997) sec . 12 . 05 [4] , p. 615 - 616 . ) RMPUB\HP01872 -12- l _. ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE upheld. Both Mesa and Tucson ordinances limited commercial signs to on-site locations and permitted non-commercial copy to be substituted for commercial copy. Tucson permitted off- site commercial messages in only specified locations, and Mesa prohibited off-site commercial messages altogether. But see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. (1993) 507 U.S . 410, 429 - 431 (city' s aesthetic and safety interest in limiting the total number of newsracks is not furthered by an ordinance banning all commercial newsracks, but not limiting the number of non-commercial newsracks . ] Gannett Outdoor Co. of Michigan v. City of Troy (Ct . App. Mich. 1986) 409 N.W. 2d 719, an ordinance permitting political signs in any virtually any area of the city, but limiting "non-accessory" signs of any nature to 12 ft . in height, 300 sq. ft . in area and 200 ft . set back from the right-of-way, was upheld as, inter alia, applying equally to commercial and non-commercial messages without exception (unlike the ordinance in Metromedia. ) Gannett was decided long before the U.S. Supreme Court' s decision in Gilleo, however, and it is unlikely it would still survive challenge to the extent that the definition of "non-accessory" signs may include residential signs unable to comply with the set-back requirements . Wilson v. City of Louisville (W.D. KY 1997) 957 F. Supp. 948, 950 - 952, a federal district court upheld a city' s ordinance amendment reducing the permissible size of small , freestanding signs from 32 sq. ft . to 8 sq. ft . ; and reducing their maximum height from 9 ft . to 4 ft . By the trial court' s analysis, the reductions did not violate standards of reasonable time, place and manner regulation. The decisive factors appeared to be both the city' s detailed findings with respect to safety hazard, aesthetic improvement, etc. , and the opposition' s failure to present adequate evidence that persons communicating via the larger signs would be unable to effectively communicate via the smaller ones . In other words, this "channel of communication" was potentially still open and usable. (However, the trial court' s analysis on this latter point is rather weak, and at no time is Gilleo or the effect on residential areas discussed. ) See also Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc . v. State of Oregon (Ct . App. OR 1997) 945 P. 2d 614, 620 - 621 [plaintiff' s argument that non-commercial speech treated more harshly than commercial where ordinance placed size (32 sq. ft . ) and duration (remove within 30 days of election) limitations on off-premise political signs is unfounded; commercial signs not permitted off-premises at all . RMPUB\RPD1872 -13- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 2 . Non-commercial speech, especially in residential areas, will receive favored treatment from the courts. Ultimately, the trend in the caselaw appears to favor liberal treatment of non-commercial signage/speech - especially in residential areas - absent a concrete and specific factual basis for limitation. The U.S. Supreme Court observed in Gilleo that : "individual residents themselves have strong incentives to keep their own property values up and to prevent 'visual clutter' in their own yards and neighborhoods . . . (A] resident' s self interest diminishes the danger of the ' unlimited' proliferation of residential signs that concerns the City. . . . " (114 S .Ct . at 2047 . ) That observation has been relied upon by at least one federal appellate court in further support of its conclusion that a city had inadequately demonstrated any need to impose durational limitations on election signs or impose liability upon candidates for removal of non-conforming signs . Whitton v. City of Gladstone. Missouri (8th Cir. 1995) 54 F. 3d 1400 , 1408 - 1409 . ) 3 . General standards for regulation. To be content-neutral, restrictions should not : * Place greater restrictions upon political/opinion temporary signs than upon other temporary signs; * Limit erection of political/opinion signs to non- commercial zones; * Place durational limitations upon political/opinion signs that do not exist for other temporary signs; * So restrict size, number or color/type size as to impede upon its reasonable use as a means of communication; single out political/opinion signs for such restriction when similar signs are not so restricted; Furthermore, a city cannot require the obtaining of a "permit" to engage in political/opinion speech; should not impose vicarious liability upon a candidate for office for payment of abating non- conforming signs; must make a reasonable attempt to locate the signs owner prior to summary removal (but thereafter may treat as abandoned) ; impose a deposit and/or inspection fee requirement that is not both reasonable and proportionately related to the actual cost of the services involved; nor require burdensome nor otherwise unreasonable "application" or registration for the posting of political/opinion signs, such that exercise of free speech is RMPUB\HPD1872 -14- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE discouraged, impeded, taxed or otherwise made unnecessarily burdensome. (Baldwin v. City of Redwood (9th Cir. 1976) 540 F. 2d 1360 ; see also, Verrilli v. City of Concord (9th Cir. 1977) 548 F. 2d 262 , 264 . ) Finally, and second in importance only to the avoidance of content-based limitations, a city must be prepared to backup its stated objectives with hard facts demonstrating the need to impose whatever limitations are imposed. It is not enough to state an aesthetic or safety purpose in limiting political or opinion signs where the existence of other temporary signs has caused no such problems or no trouble arose prior to enactment of the limitations . (In this instance, for example, the City' s size limitation for political signs is five square feet . The ordinance does not state that the City has a need for such a restrictive size provision, and the City could probably not demonstrate that need. ) IV. A COURT WOULD LIKELY DETERMINE THAT THE CITY OF PALM DESERT SIGN ORDINANCE IS NOT CONTENT-NEUTRAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DISCRIMINATES AGAINST NON-COMMERCIAL SPEECH. The City' s sign ordinance (Chapter 25 . 68 et . seq. ) is probably unenforceable in several respects . Section 25 . 68 . 080 lists six types of signs "allowed on all commercial, industrial , and residential zoned property without a sign permit being required. . . . " Though most are described in terms of their "public purpose, " rather than their content, and thereby probably permissible, section 25 . 68 . 080 (D) specifically exempts : "Religious, charitable, educational , or cultural posters not exceeding sixteen square feet in area, and temporary in nature . " Though "political signs" are also exempt from the permit requirement by virtue of a different section, (section 25 . 68 . 620 (F) ) , but are limited in size to 5 square feet . (Section 25 . 68 . 620 (A) . ) "Political sign" means any sign concerning candidates for political office or involving a ballot issue. " (Section 25 . 68 . 010 (P) . ) A. OPINION SIGNS ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM PERMITS. Non-commercial signs are exempt from the permit requirement, only so long as they contain a message pertaining to an election, or a message that is "religious, cultural, educational or charitable" in nature. Opinion signs, or signs relating to general topics of public debate, are not exempt . (Section 25 . 68 . 540 provides for a "special permit" for civil, patriotic or special events - but given that it is a "permit" process, it appear to be RMPUB\HP01872 -15- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE focused upon announcements of events rather than expressions of opinion. ) B. NO UNIFORM TREATMENT OF NON-COMMERCIAL SIGNS. Of the exempt non-commercial signage, political signs are singled out for a size restrictions that is nearly 1/3 the size of other exempt non-commercial signs . That is, political signs are limited to 5 sq. ft . while religious, charitable, educational and cultural posters are permitted 16 sq. ft . Additionally, political signs are (rightly) not limited to residential areas . What is the justification for limiting the size of political signs in commercial zones to 5 ft . even where existing signs therein are far larger? Finally, political signs "shall not be located closer together than fifty feet, " (sec. 25 . 68 . 620 (B) ) , but no such limitation exists for religious, charitable, educational or cultural posters. C. THE ORDINANCE MAY UNNECESSARILY INHIBIT THE EXERCISE OF FREE SPEECH BY AMBIGUOUSLY DESCRIBING WHAT IS NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH THE SIGN ORDINANCE. The ordinance states that : " ' Sign' means any thing of visual appearance primarily used for, or having the effect of, attracting attention from the streets, sidewalks or other outside public areas for identification purposes . . . . " (Sec. 25 . 68 . 010 (U) . ) Section 25 . 68 . 080 exempts religious, charitable, educational or cultural posters - an undefined term, and ostensibly not falling within the definition of "signs . " They are expressly exempt from the permit requirement and no further limitations are placed upon them, other than limiting size to 16 sq. ft . "Political signs, " as noted above, are defined as signs concerning a particular election or ballot issue . Yet, most political signs are not "signs" as that term is defined - that is, they do not "attract attention for identification purposes" . Defining "political signs" by using the pre-defined term "signs, " while calling the other exempted non-commercial articles "posters" creates a preliminary confusion that is only further muddied by the fact that "applicants" for political posters must comply with numerous additional requirements, including duration limitations, written affirmation of responsibility for removal (25 . 68 . 620 (D) , (E) , and written approval from the property owner where the sign will be placed (25 . 68 . 620 (F) , with which "poster" hangers need not comply. RMPUB\HPD1872 -16- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE Additionally, "applicant" is undefined. Both political signs and religious, etc . , "posters" are exempt from the permit requirement, yet those erecting such "posters" are not likewise referred to as "applicants . " Does "applicant" denote that political signs are subject to Section " IX. General Provisions" (25 . 68 . 420 et . seq. ) - including approval of the architectural review commission process - while posters are not? Furthermore, because of the requirements already contained in 25 . 68 . 620, political signs are clearly required to be submitted for some type of prior approval, yet no clear indication is given as to what information, specifically, is required to be presented; or within what timeframe approval will be completed. Finally, "temporary signs" are prohibited except as otherwise specifically allowed, (sec. 25 . 68 . 090 (D) , yet "temporary signs within window areas" are only allowed in commercial zones (sec . 25 . 68 . 340 . ) As with political signs, it could be argued that window displays in a residential district are not "signs, " but that rather begs the question and is, nonetheless, still ambiguous. Is a homeowner entitled to display a poster or sign in the window facing the street protesting a particular issue? D. COMMERCIAL SIGNS APPEAR TO RECEIVE GREATER PROTECTION THAN NON-COMMERCIAL SIGNS. Overall, the Ordinance appears to afford greater protection to commercial signs than to non-commercial signs, especially in commercial areas . For example, in many instances signs in commercial or industrial zones are afforded a greater signface area. While this may be a reasonable time, place and manner distinction from residential areas, it may difficult to justify the reason for restricting the size of political signs in commercial zones . E. THE SIZE RESTRICTION ON POLITICAL SIGNS IS PROBABLY TOO SMALL. Though no clear minimum size has been established by the courts, signface limitations smaller than 8 - 12 sq. ft . have rarely been approved. A size limitation for political signs of 5 sq. ft . is probably not large enough to be effectively read from the street . Furthermore, absent substantial justification, a prohibition against double-sided and/or corner side signs may be difficult to withstand scrutiny. On a related topic, the 3-color limitation applicable to all signs is probably enforceable as to non-commercial signs in like manner as to commercial signs. (Sec . 25 . 68 . 480) No case authority was located expressly addressing regulation of type size or font formatting - other than upon the general premise that any P.MPUB\HPD1872 -17- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE regulation imposed must (a) be content neutral; and (b) not unduly interfere with effective communication. V. RECOMMENDATIONS. Unless the contrary can be can be supported by significant factual evidence and findings : 1 . Amend 25 . 68 . 080 (D) to eliminate the ambiguity with "posters" and move that subsection to part "X. Special Purpose Signs" . The remainder of 25 . 68 . 080 is directed toward public use/informational signage that seems unrelated to the religious, educational, cultural , etc . "posters . " 2 . Set out explicitly what information is required to post non-commercial signs, how quickly they will be approved, and that such temporary signs will be considered abandoned (and thereby summarily abated) after reasonable attempts have been made to locate the owner. (Sec . 25 . 68 . 100 . ) 3 . Clarify that non-commercial opinion speech is also allowed without need of a permit . One possibility is the definition of "political sign" contained in Gannett Outdoor Co. of Michigan v. City of Troy (Ct . App. Mich. 1986) 409 N.W. 2d 719 . The ordinance therein stated that : " ' Political sign' means a sign whose message relates to: The election of a person to public office, or to a political party, or to a public issue, which shall be voted on at an election called by a public body. Signs relating to an expression of opinion may be included in this definition provided they are not signs as defined in [this chapter) . " "Signs" are then defined in terms of being "used as or is in the nature of an announcement, direction or advertisement by attracting attention to an object, place, activity, person, product, institution, organization or business . " The sole permissible uses for "political signs, " on the other hand, are to provide : "information relating to the election of a person to public office, or relating to a political party, or relating to a matter to be voted upon at an election called by a public body, or any other public issue or expression of opinion. . . . " (Gannett, 409 N.W. 2d at 129 - 130 . ) RMPUB\HPD1872 -18- 1 ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 4 . Expressly indicate that non-commercial signs may be placed in any zone, including residence windows and commercial/industrial zones (but you may provide that placement in commercial/industrial zones must be over existing copy. ) 5 . Specify that a non-commercial sign, whether permanent or temporary, is permitted off-site (i .e . , does not violate 25 . 68 . 090 (C) . ) 6 . Specify that permanent non-commercial signs are permitted in residential zones . 7 . Specify whether part "IX. General Provisions" applies to non-commercial signs and, if so, to what extent . 8 . Remove the duration limitations for political signs, or impose a uniform duration limit upon all temporary signs . 9 . 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N C 'C a .O W y ` L of u 15 �¢ p Eb.9 U oy "p" mo`o eVn; - v E= 5 Z K3 " E ° v - " wy °F�E'�yT .� ppm =$ ° v € 1 .% F O O m b V CRC . O m $a0 S O c a T Wy d 3 0v 6 O Ln A 9 CJ oU .� p �T O .SUO € ° €'O mQ �p OG 1� ICI O 6 EEC FbFb� a 6 y�.GGFGF..,, p {{.... o E $ EE ° c9°w` o: mo oYw. Q vi =�� .' ^>' C �^^. °„ o € v � N d' v�' .�. � � wC o .. Cio3E— v� cn,._ n U 3 a a 0 L Y ri d L L � 7 U ) k ) 9 ] t!2 | }k {(`! ,f ! §\)f{ § ! ! , z ) � \}{■ t � ) !) § \\ ƒ) \ $ k \*\ {\ 2 „zi#! ;f( ; o . a � B . 3 ) � } ; . ( % d e r U L 4 C O y R d a w U z os- Iz vvvp��� d FaC y n .2 F-r YO �ryJ O40. .Ww0 L 'N nb N T.nV6.� .3' •� L— � p 0w�c w n S _`.g _ $ d � 8 0>-. �o S 8 m H'� 'a QI a a C O 'y O L a Y ri d L L U p -1�QQ CITY OF PALM DESERT ' DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT STAFF REPORT 1. TO: Honorable Mayor and City Council II. REQUEST: Consideration of approval of amendment to the sign ordinance, noncommercial signs revis MEETING DATE III. APPLICANT: City of Palm Desert T t)N7INUEDTO -- - cl q� IV.. CASE NO: ZOA 98-5 (Modification N6. 1) SSED TO 29D REN= V. DATE: October 22, 199 .� MEETING DATE b - `1 VI. CONTENTS: �-CONTINUED TO A. Staff Recommendation [] PASSED TO 2ND READING B. Background C. Analysis D. Draft Ordinance No. 897 E. Planning Commission Minutes involving Case No. ZOA 98-5 (Revision No. 1 ) F. Planning Commission Staff Report dated October 61 1998 G. Related maps and/or exhibits MEETING DATE --------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------Q-----�-,-��-------- "TINUED TO l a A. STAFF RECOMMENDATION: PASSED TO.211DilEADING Waive further reading and pass 0rdina BACKGROUND: I S ptember 10, 1998 staff presented a first draft of the ordinance to City Council. � z C uncil rejected the ordinance as recommended because it contained too many o �- c egories and was too convoluted. Council directed staff to modify the ordinance c m t prohibit noncommercial signs in the public right-of-way and to require their removal z thin seven (7) days of the election (see City Council minutes of September 10, 1 98 attached). T e revised amendment was reviewed by ZORC September 7, 1998 and it agreed t at the first version of the ordinance would afford greater regulatory control but n ted that -the City Council can and should adopt an ordinance with which it is n c mfortable. ctober 6, 1998 the modified amendment.was presented to Planning Commission. anning Commission by minute motion endorsed the revised amendment on a 5-0 v te. CITY COUNCIL STAFF RCPORT CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 (MODIFICATION NO. 1) OCTOBER 22, 1998 C. ANALYSIS: The public hearing on this matter was held September 10, 1998. Pursuant to Municipal Code Section 25.82.060 this modification was referred to Planning Commission by Council for a report on the modified ordinance. The modified ordinance still contains 15 housekeeping sections to create the noncommercial sign section. Section 16 deletes the existing political sign regulations. Section 17 creates a new chapter to the zoning title, Chapter 112 "Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation" which prohibits noncommercial signs in the public right-of-way and requires removal of such signs within seven (7) days of the election for which they were erected. Prepared by: Sfeve Smith- Reviewed and Approved by. Philip Drell Am 2 I PASSED, APPROVED AND ADOPTED this_day of 2000, by the City Council of the City of Palm Desert, California, by the following vote, to wit: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: Buford A. Crites, Mayor City of Palm Desert, California ATTEST: By: SHEILAR. GILLIGAN, City.Clerk APPROVED AS TO FORM: By: DAVID J. ERWIN, City Attorney City of Palm Desert, California R,MUS\DJE\167608 dl2f00 FinaLaw: Cases and Codes Page I of 21 Find Law jJ�oG� For Leg al Profession a Is 5-2� ' VISA http://caselaw.findlaw.com U.S. Supreme Cour CITY COUNCIL v. TAXPAYERS FOR VINCENT, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) 466 U.S. 789 MEMBERS OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES ET AL.v. TAXPAYERS FOR VINCENT ET AL. APPEAL FROM UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 82-975. Argued October 12, 1983 Decided May 15, 1984 Section 28.04 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibits the posting of signs on public property. Appellee Taxpayers for Vincent, a group of supporters of a candidate for election to the Los Angeles City Council, entered into a contract with appellee Candidates' Outdoor Graphics Service (COGS) to fabricate and post signs with the candidate's name on them. COGS produced cardboard signs and attached them to utility pole crosswires at various locations. Acting under 28.04, city employees routinely removed all posters (including the COGS signs) attached to utility poles and similar objects covered by the ordinance. Appellees then filed suit in Federal District Court against appellants, the city and various city officials (hereafter City), alleging that 28.04 abridged appellees' freedom of speech within the meaning of the First Amendment, and seeking damages and injunctive relief. The District Court entered findings of fact, concluded that 28.04 was constitutional, and granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the ordinance was presumptively unconstitutional because significant First Amendment interests were involved, and that the City had not justified its total ban on all signs on the basis of its asserted interests in preventing visual clutter, minimizing traffic hazards, and preventing interference with the intended use of public property. Held: 1. The "overbreadth" doctrine is not applicable here. There is nothing in the record to indicate that 28.04 will have any different impact on any third parties' interests in free speech than it has on appellees' interests, and appellees have failed to identify any significant difference between their claim that 28.04 is invalid on overbreadth grounds and their claim that it is unconstitutional when applied to their signs during a political campaign. Thus, it is inappropriate to entertain an overbreadth challenge to 28.04. Pp. 796-803. 2. Section 28.04 is not unconstitutional as applied to appellees' expressive activity. Pp. 803-817. (a) The general principle that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas r466 U.S. 789, 790] at the expense of others is not applicable here. Section 28.04's text is neutral - indeed it is silent - concerning any speaker's point of view, and the District Court's findings indicate that it has been applied to appellees and others in an evenhanded manner. It is within the City's constitutional power to attempt to improve its appearance, and this interest is basically unrelated to the suppression of ideas. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 377 . Pp. 803-805. (b) Municipalities have a weighty, essentially esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression. The problem addressed by 28.04 - the visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property - constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City's http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.htm1 9/20/2006 FinilLaw: Cases and Codes Page 2 of 21 power to prohibit. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 . Pp. 805-807. (c) Section 28.04 curtails no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose of eliminating visual clutter. By banning posted signs,the City did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy. The rationale of Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 , which held that ordinances that absolutely prohibited handbilling on public streets and sidewalks were invalid, is inapposite in the context of the instant case. Pp. 808- 810. (d) The validity of the City's esthetic interest in the elimination of signs on public property is not compromised by failing to extend the ban to private property. The private citizen's interest in controlling the use of his own property justifies the disparate treatment, and there is no predicate in the District Court's findings for the conclusion that the prohibition against the posting of appellees' signs fails to advance the City's esthetic interest. Pp. 810-812. (e) While a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate, 28.04 does not affect any individual's freedom to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature in the same place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited. The District Court's findings indicate that there are ample alternative modes of communication in Los Angeles. P. 812. (f) There is no merit in appellees' suggestion that the property covered by 28.04 either is itself a "public forum" subject to special First Amendment protection, or at least should be treated in the same respect as the "public forum" in which the property is located. The mere fact that government property can be used as a vehicle for communication - such as the use of lampposts as signposts - does not mean that the Constitution requires such use to be permitted. Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication may be reserved by the government for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, if the regulation on speech (as here) is [466 U.S. 7897 7911 reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view. Pp. 813-815. (g) Although plausible policy arguments might well be made in support of appellees' suggestion that the City could have written an ordinance that would have had a less severe effect on expressive activity like theirs - such as by providing an exception for political campaign signs - it does not follow that such an exception is constitutionally mandated, nor is it clear that some of the suggested exceptions would even be constitutionally permissible. To create an exception for appellees'political speech and not other types of protected speech might create a risk of engaging in constitutionally forbidden content discrimination. The City may properly decide that the esthetic interest in avoiding visual clutter justifies a removal of all signs creating or increasing that clutter. Pp. 815-817. 682 F.2d 847, reversed and remanded. STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 818. Anthony Saul Alperin argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Ira Reiner and Gary R. Netzer. Wayne S. Canterbury argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. [ Footnote " ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the City of Antioch by William R. Galstan; and for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers by J. Lamar Shelley, John W. Witt, Henry W. Underhill, Jr., Benjamin L. Brown, Roy D. Bates, James B. Brennan,Roger F. Cutler, Clifford D. Pierce, Jr., Walter M. Powell, Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., William H. Taube, William I. Thornton, Jr., Max P. Zall, and Charles S. Rhyne. A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed by Alan L. Schlosser, Amitai Schwartz, Fred Okrand, and Neil H. http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.html 9/20/2006 Fin�Law: Cases and Codes Page 3 of 21 O'Donnell for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 28.04 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibits the posting of signs on public property. 1 The question presented [466 U.S. 789, 792] is whether that prohibition abridges appellees' freedom of speech within the meaning of the First Amendment. 2 In March 1979, Roland Vincent was a candidate for election to the Los Angeles City Council. A group of his supporters known as Taxpayers for Vincent(Taxpayers) entered into a contract with a political sign service company known as Candidates' Outdoor Graphics Service (COGS) to fabricate and post signs with Vincent's name on them. COGS produced 15- by 44-inch cardboard signs and attached them to utility poles at various locations by draping them over crosswires [466 U.S. 789, 7931 which support the poles and stapling the cardboard together at the bottom. The signs' message was: "Roland Vincent - City Council." Acting under the authority of 28.04 of the Municipal Code, employees of the city's Bureau of Street Maintenance routinely removed all posters attached to utility poles and similar objects covered by the ordinance, including the COGS signs. The weekly sign removal report covering the period March 1-March 7, 1979, indicated that among the 1,207 signs removed from public property during that week, 48 were identified as "Roland Vincent" signs. Most of the other signs identified in that report were apparently commercial in character. 3 On March 12, 1979, Taxpayers and COGS filed this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, naming the city, the Director of the Bureau of Street Maintenance, and members of the City Council as defendants. 4 They sought an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance as well as compensatory and punitive damages. After engaging in discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The District Court entered findings of fact, concluded that the ordinance was constitutional, and granted the City's motion. The District Court's findings do not purport to resolve any disputed issue of fact; instead, they summarize material in the record that appears to be uncontroverted. The findings recite that the principal responsibility for locating and removing [466 U.S. 789,7941 signs and handbills posted in violation of 28.04 is assigned to the Street Use Inspection Division of the city's Bureau of Street Maintenance. The court found that both political and nonpolitical signs are illegally posted and that they are removed "without regard to their content." 5 After explaining the purposes for which the City's zoning code had been enacted, and noting that the prohibition in 28.04 furthered those purposes, the District Court found that the large number of illegally posted signs "constitute a clutter and visual blight." 6 With specific reference to the posting of the COGS signs on utility pole crosswires,the District Court found that such posting "would add somewhat to the blight and inevitably would encourage greatly increased posting in other unauthorized and unsightly places . . . ." 7 In addition, the District Court found that placing signs on utility poles creates a potential safety hazard, and that other violations of 28.04 "block views and otherwise cause traffic hazards." 8 Finally, the District Court concluded that the sign prohibition does not prevent taxpayers or COGS "from [466 U.S. 789, 7951 exercising their free speech rights on the public streets and in other public places; they remain free to picket and parade, to distribute handbills, to carry signs and to post their signs and handbills on their automobiles and on private property with the permission of the owners thereof." 9 In its conclusions of law the District Court characterized the esthetic and economic interests in improving the beauty of the City "by eliminating clutter and visual blight" as "legitimate and compelling." 10 Those interests, together with the interest in protecting the safety of workmen who must scale utility poles and the interest in eliminating traffic hazards, adequately supported the sign prohibition as a reasonable regulation affecting the time,place, and manner of expression. http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.html 9/20/2006 FiridLaw: Cases and Codes Page 4 of 21 ` The Court of Appeals did not question any of the District Court's findings of fact, but it rejected some of its conclusions of law. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the ordinance was presumptively unconstitutional because significant First Amendment interests were involved. It noted that the City had advanced three separate justifications for the ordinance, but concluded that none of them was sufficient. The Court of Appeals held that the City had failed to make a sufficient showing that its asserted interests in esthetics and preventing visual clutter were substantial because it had not offered to demonstrate that the City was engaged in a comprehensive effort to remove other contributions to an unattractive environment in commercial and industrial areas. The City's interest in minimizing traffic hazards was rejected because it was readily apparent that no substantial traffic problems would result from permitting the posting of certain kinds of signs on many of the publicly owned objects covered by the ordinance. Finally, while acknowledging that a flat prohibition against signs on certain objects such as fire hydrants and traffic signals would be a permissible method of preventing [466 U.S. 789, 796] interference with the intended use of public property, and that regulation of the size, design, and construction of posters, or of the method of removing them, might be reasonable, the Court of Appeals concluded that the City had not justified its total ban. 1 I In its appeal to this Court the City challenges the Court of Appeals' holding that 28.04 is unconstitutional on its face. Taxpayers and COGS defend that holding and also contend that the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to their posting of political campaign signs on the crosswires of utility poles. There are two quite different ways in which a statute or ordinance may be considered invalid "on its face" - either because it is unconstitutional in every conceivable application, or because it seeks to prohibit such a broad range of protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally "overbroad." We shall analyze the "facial" challenges to the ordinance, and then address its specific application to appellees. I The seminal cases in which the Court held state legislation unconstitutional "on its face" did not involve any departure from the general rule that a litigant only has standing to vindicate his own constitutional rights. In Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), 12 and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. [466 U.S. 789,7971 444 (1938), 13 the statutes were unconstitutional as applied to the defendants' conduct, but they were also unconstitutional on their face because it was apparent that any attempt to enforce such legislation would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas. 14 In cases of this character a holding of facial invalidity expresses the conclusion that the statute [466 U.S. 789, 798] could never be applied in a valid manner. Such holdings 15 invalidated entire statutes, but did not create any exception from the general rule that constitutional adjudication requires a review of the application of a statute to the conduct of the party before the Court. Subsequently, however, the Court did recognize an exception to this general rule for laws that are written so broadly that they may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties. This "overbreadth" doctrine has its source in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). In that case the Court concluded that the very existence of some broadly written statutes may have such a deterrent effect on free expression that they should be subject to challenge even by a party whose own conduct may be unprotected. ]6 The Court [466 U.S. 789, 7991 has repeatedly held that such a statute may be challenged on its face even though a more narrowly drawn statute would be valid as applied to the party in the case before it. 17 This exception from the general rule is predicated on "a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). In the development of the overbreadth doctrine the Court has been sensitive to the risk that the doctrine itself might sweep so broadly that the exception to ordinary standing requirements would swallow the general rule. In order to decide whether the overbreadth exception is applicable in a particular case, we have weighed the likelihood that the statute's very existence will inhibit free expression. "[T]here comes a point where that effect- at best a prediction - cannot, with confidence,justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a [466 U.S.789, 800] statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.. at 615 http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.htm1 9/20/2006 FitidLaw: Cases and Codes Page 5 of 21 (citation omitted). 18 The concept of"substantial overbreadth" is not readily reduced to an exact definition. It is clear, however, that the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge. 19 On the contrary, the requirement of substantial overbreadth stems from the underlying justification for the overbreadth exception itself-the interest in preventing an invalid statute from inhibiting the speech of third parties who are not before the Court. "The requirement of substantial overbreadth is directly derived from the purpose and nature of the doctrine. While a sweeping statute, or one incapable of limitation, [466 U.S. 789, 801] has the potential to repeatedly chill the exercise of expressive activity by many individuals, the extent of deterrence of protected speech can be expected to decrease with the declining reach of the regulation."New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772 (1982) (footnote omitted). In short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975). See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 462 , n. 20 (1978); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 -761 (1974). The Court of Appeals concluded that the ordinance was vulnerable to an overbreadth challenge because it was an "overinclusive" response to traffic concerns and not the "least drastic means" of preventing interference with the normal use of public property. This conclusion rested on an evaluation of the assumed effect of the ordinance on third parties, rather than on any specific consideration of the impact of the ordinance on the parties before the court. This is not, however, an appropriate case to entertain a facial challenge based on overbreadth. For we have found nothing in the record to indicate that the ordinance will have any different impact on any third parties' interests in free speech than it has on Taxpayers and COGS. Taxpayers and COGS apparently would agree that the prohibition against posting signs on most of the publicly owned objects mentioned in the ordinance is perfectly reasonable. Thus, they do not dispute the City's power to proscribe the attachment of any handbill or sign to any sidewalk, crosswalk, curb, lamppost, hydrant, or lifesaving equipment. 20 Their [466 U.S. 789, 802] position with respect to utility poles is not entirely clear, but they do contend that it is unconstitutional to prohibit the attachment of their cardboard signs to the horizontal crosswires supporting utility poles during a political campaign. They have, in short, failed to identify any significant difference between their claim that the ordinance is invalid on overbreadth grounds and their claim that it is unconstitutional when applied to their political signs. Specifically, Taxpayers and COGS have not attempted to demonstrate that the ordinance applies to any conduct more likely to be protected by the First Amendment than their own crosswire signs. Indeed, the record suggests that many of the signs posted in violation of the ordinance are posted in such a way that they may create safety or traffic problems that COGS has tried to avoid. Accordingly, on this record it appears that if the ordinance may be validly applied to COGS, it can be validly applied to most if not all of the signs of parties not before the Court. Appellees have simply failed to demonstrate a realistic danger that the ordinance will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of individuals not before the Court. It would therefore be inappropriate in this case to entertain an overbreadth challenge to the ordinance. Taxpayers and COGS do argue generally that the City's interest in eliminating visual blight is not sufficiently weighty to justify an abridgment of speech. If that were the only interest the ordinance advanced, then this argument would be analogous to the facial challenges involved in cases like Stromberg and Lovell. But as previously observed, appellees acknowledge that the ordinance serves safety interests in many of its applications, and hence do not argue that the ordinance can never be validly applied. Instead, appellees argue that they have placed their signs in locations where only the esthetic interest is implicated. In addition, they argue that they have developed an expertise in not "placing signs in offensive manners which will alienate its own clientele [466 U.S.789, 803] or their constituencies," 21 and emphasize the special value of free communication during political campaigns, see Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, . 453 U.S. 490, 555 (1981) (STEVENS, J., dissenting in part); id., at 550 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). In light of these arguments, appellees' attack on the ordinance is basically a challenge to the ordinance as applied to their activities. We therefore limit our analysis of the constitutionality of the ordinance to the concrete case before us, and now turn to the http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.htm1 9/20/2006 FindLaw: Cases and Codes Page 6 of 21 arguments that it is invalid as applied to the expressive activity of Taxpayers and COGS. 22 II The ordinance prohibits appellees from communicating with the public in a certain manner, and presumably diminishes the total quantity of their communication in the City. 23 The application of the ordinance to appellees' expressive activities surely raises the question whether the ordinance abridges their "freedom of speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment, and appellees certainly have standing to challenge the application of the ordinance to their own expressive activities. "But to say the ordinance presents a [466 U.S. 789, 8041 First Amendment issue is not necessarily to say that it constitutes a First Amendment violation." Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S.. at 561 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting). It has been clear since this Court's earliest decisions concerning the freedom of speech that the state may sometimes curtail speech when necessary to advance a significant and legitimate state interest. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 52 (1919). As Stromberg and Lovell demonstrate, there are some purported interests - such as a desire to suppress support for a minority party or an unpopular cause, or to exclude the expression of certain points of view from the marketplace of ideas - that are so plainly illegitimate that they would immediately invalidate the rule. The general principle that has emerged from this line of cases is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 , 72 (1983); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 -536 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U_S. 455. 462 -463 (1980); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 -65, 67-68 (1976) (plurality opinion); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 -96 (1972). That general rule has no application to this case. For there is not even a hint of bias or censorship in the City's enactment or enforcement of this ordinance. There is no claim that the ordinance was designed to suppress certain ideas that the City finds distasteful or that it has been applied to appellees because of the views that they express. The text of the ordinance is neutral -indeed it is silent - concerning any speaker's point of view, and the District Court's findings indicate that it has been applied to appellees and others in an evenhanded manner. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court set forth the appropriate framework for reviewing a viewpoint-neutral regulation of this kind: [466 U.S. 789, 8051 "[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id., at 377. It is well settled that the state may legitimately exercise its police powers to advance esthetic values. Thus, in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 -33 (1954), in referring to the power of the legislature to remove blighted housing, this Court observed that such housing may be "an ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men turn." Ibid. We concluded: "The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary." Id., at 33 (citation omitted). See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1. 9 (1974); Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 -388 (1926); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 108 (1909). In this case, taxpayers and COGS do not dispute that it is within the constitutional power of the City to attempt to improve its appearance, or that this interest is basically unrelated to the suppression of ideas. Therefore the critical inquiries are whether that interest is sufficiently substantial to justify the effect of the ordinance on appellees' expression, and whether that effect is no greater than necessary to accomplish the City's purpose. III http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.htm1 9/20/2006 FindLaw: Cases and Codes Page 7 of 21 In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), the Court rejected the notion that a city is powerless to protect its citizens from unwanted exposure to certain methods of expression which may legitimately be deemed a public nuisance. [466 U.S. 789, 806] In upholding an ordinance that prohibited loud and raucous sound trucks, the Court held that the State had a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise. 24 In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), the Court upheld the city's prohibition of political advertising on its buses, stating that the city was entitled to protect unwilling viewers against intrusive advertising that may interfere with the city's goal of making its buses "rapid, convenient,pleasant, and inexpensive," id., at 302-303 (plurality opinion). See also id., at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S., at 209 , and n. 5. These cases indicate that the municipalities have a weighty, essentially esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, supra, dealt with San Diego's prohibition of certain forms of outdoor billboards. There the Court considered the city's interest in avoiding visual clutter, and seven Justices explicitly concluded [466 U.S. 789, 8071 that this interest was sufficient to justify a prohibition of billboards, see id., at 507-508, 510 (opinion of WHITE, J.,joined by Stewart, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ.); id., at 552 (STEVENS, J., dissenting in part); id., at 559-561 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting); id., at 570 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 25 JUSTICE WHITE,writing for the plurality, expressly concluded that the city's esthetic interests were sufficiently substantial to provide an acceptable justification for a content-neutral prohibition against the use of billboards; San Diego's interest in its appearance was undoubtedly a substantial governmental goal. Id., at 507-508. 26 We reaffirm the conclusion of the majority in Metromedia. The problem addressed by this ordinance - the visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property - constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City's power to prohibit. "[T]he city's interest in attempting to preserve [or improve] the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect." Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,. 427 U.S.. at 71 (plurality opinion). [466 U.S. 789, 808] IV We turn to the question whether the scope of the restriction on appellees' expressive activity is substantially broader than necessary to protect the City's interest in eliminating visual clutter. The incidental restriction on expression which results from the City's attempt to accomplish such a purpose is considered justified as a reasonable regulation of the time, place, or manner of expression if it is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See, e. g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 -648 (1981); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 -71 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 470 -471 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 -117 (1972); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98 . The District Court found that the signs prohibited by the ordinance do constitute visual clutter and blight. By banning these signs, the City did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy. 27 The plurality wrote in Metromedia: "It is not speculative to recognize that bill-boards by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be perceived as an 'esthetic harm."' 453 U.S., at 510 . The same is true of posted signs. It is true that the esthetic interest in preventing the kind of litter that may result from the distribution of leaflets on the public streets and sidewalks cannot support a prophylactic prohibition against the citizen's exercise of that method of expressing his views. In Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), the Court held that ordinances that absolutely prohibited handbilling on the streets were invalid. The Court explained that cities could adequately protect the esthetic interest [466 U.S. 789. 809] in avoiding litter without abridging protected expression merely by penalizing those who actually litter. See id., at 162. Taxpayers contend that their interest in supporting Vincent's political campaign, which affords them a constitutional right to distribute brochures and leaflets on the public streets of Los Angeles, provides equal support for their asserted right to post temporary signs on objects adjacent to the streets and sidewalks. They argue that the mere fact that their temporary signs "add somewhat" to the city's visual clutter is entitled to no more weight than the temporary unsightliness of discarded handbills and the additional street-cleaning burden that were insufficient to justify the ordinances reviewed in Schneider. The rationale of Schneider is inapposite in the context of the instant case. There, individual citizens were actively exercising their right to communicate directly with potential recipients of their message. The conduct continued only http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?pages/466/789.html 9/20/2006 FindLaw: Cases and Codes Page 8 of 21 while the speakers or distributors remained on the scene. In this case, appellees posted dozens of temporary signs throughout an area where they would remain unattended until removed. As the Court expressly noted in Schneider, the First Amendment does not "deprive a municipality of power to enact regulations against throwing literature broadcast in the streets. Prohibition of such conduct would not abridge the constitutional liberty since such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print or distribute information or opinion." 308 U.S.,at 160 -161. In short, there is no constitutional impediment to "the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets." Id., at 162. A distributor of leaflets has no right simply to scatter his pamphlets in the air- or to toss large quantities of paper from the window of a tall building or a low flying airplane. Characterizing such an activity as a separate means of communication does not diminish the State's power to condemn it as a public nuisance. The right recognized in [466 U.S. 789, s 101 Schneider is to tender the written material to the passerby who may reject it or accept it, and who thereafter may keep it, dispose of it properly, or incur the risk of punishment if he lets it fall to the ground. One who is rightfully on a street open to the public "carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion. This right extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word." Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 A_U.S. 559 578 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting in part). With respect to signs posted by appellees, however, it is the tangible medium of expressing the message that has the adverse impact on the appearance of the landscape. In Schneider, an antilittering statute could have addressed the substantive evil without prohibiting expressive activity, whereas application of the prophylactic rule actually employed gratuitously infringed upon the right of an individual to communicate directly with a willing listener. Here, the substantive evil -visual blight - is not merely a possible byproduct of the activity, but is created by the medium of expression itself. In contrast to Schneider, therefore,the application of the ordinance in this case responds precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately concerns the City. The ordinance curtails no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose. V The Court of Appeals accepted the argument that a prohibition against the use of unattractive signs cannot be justified on esthetic grounds if it fails to apply to all equally unattractive signs wherever they might be located. A comparable argument was categorically rejected in Metromedia. In that case it was argued that the city could not simultaneously permit billboards to be used for onsite advertising and also justify the prohibition against offsite advertising on esthetic grounds, since both types of advertising were equally unattractive. [466 U.S.789, 81 tI The Court held, however, that the city could reasonably conclude that the esthetic interest was outweighed by the countervailing interest in one kind of advertising even though it was not outweighed by the other. 28 So here, the validity of the esthetic interest in the elimination of signs on public property is not compromised by failing to extend the ban to private property. The private citizen's interest in controlling the use of his own property justifies the disparate treatment. Moreover, by not extending the ban to all locations, a significant opportunity to communicate by means of temporary signs is preserved, and private property owners' esthetic concerns will keep the posting of signs on their property within reasonable bounds. Even if some visual blight remains, a partial, content-neutral ban may nevertheless enhance the City's appearance. Furthermore, there is no finding that in any area where appellees seek to place signs, there are already so many signs posted on adjacent private property that the elimination of appellees' signs would have an inconsequential effect on the esthetic values with which the City is concerned. There is simply no predicate in the findings of the District Court for [466 U.S. 789. 8121 the conclusion that the prohibition against the posting of appellees' signs fails to advance the City's esthetic interest. VI While the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places, Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.. at 647 , a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate. See, e. g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. at 654 -655; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S., at 535 ; Linmark Associates, Inc. v. http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=rs/466/789.htm1 9/20/2006 FindLaw: Cases and Codes Page 9 of 21 Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85. 93 (1977). The Los Angeles ordinance does not affect any individual's freedom to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature in the same place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited. 29_To the extent that the posting of signs on public property has advantages over these forms of expression, see, e. g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 -65 (1960), there is no reason to believe that these same advantages cannot be obtained through other means. To the contrary, the findings of the District Court indicate that there are ample alternative modes of communication in Los Angeles. Notwithstanding appellees' general assertions in their brief concerning the utility of political posters, nothing in the findings indicates that the posting of political posters on public property is a uniquely valuable or important mode of communication, or that appellees' ability to communicate effectively is threatened by ever-increasing restrictions on expression. 30 [466 U.S.789,8131 VII Appellees suggest that the public property covered by the ordinance either is itself a "public forum" for First Amendment purposes, or at least should be treated in the same respect as the "public forum" in which the property is located. "Traditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection," United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 180 , and appellees maintain that their sign-posting activities are entitled to this protection. In Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 -516 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.), it was recognized: "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and inconsonance with peace and [466 U.S.789, 814] good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.. at 115 ; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 293 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.. at 163 . Appellees' reliance on the public forum doctrine is misplaced. They fail to demonstrate the existence of a traditional right of access respecting such items as utility poles for purposes of their communication comparable to that recognized for public streets and parks, and it is clear that "the First Amendment does not guarantee access to government property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government." United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981). Rather,the "existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at issue." Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983). Lampposts can of course be used as signposts, but the mere fact that government property can be used as a vehicle for communication does not mean that the Constitution requires such uses to be permitted. Cf. United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S.. at 131 . 31 Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for [466 U.S. 789, 8151 public communication may be reserved by the State "for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S.,at 46 . Given our analysis of the legitimate interest served by the ordinance, its viewpoint neutrality, and the availability of alternative channels of communication, the ordinance is certainly constitutional as applied to appellees under this standard. 32 VIII Finally, Taxpayers and COGS argue that Los Angeles could have written an ordinance that would have had a less http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466n89.html 9/20/2006 FindLaw: Cases and Codes Page 10 of 21 severe effect on expressive activity such as theirs, by permitting the posting of any kind of sign at any time on some types of public property, or by making a variety of other more specific exceptions to the ordinance: for signs carrying certain types of messages (such as political campaign signs), for signs posted during specific time periods (perhaps during political campaigns), for particular locations (perhaps for areas already cluttered by an excessive number of signs on adjacent private property), or for signs meeting design specifications (such as size or color). Plausible public policy arguments 1466 U.S. 789.. 816] might well be made in support of any such exception, but it by no means follows that it is therefore constitutionally mandated, cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 -35 (1965), nor is it clear that some of the suggested exceptions would even be constitutionally permissible. For example, even though political speech is entitled to the fullest possible measure of constitutional protection,there are a host of other communications that command the same respect. An assertion that "Jesus Saves," that "Abortion is Murder," that every woman has the "Right to Choose," or that "Alcohol Kills," may have a claim to a constitutional exemption from the ordinance that is just as strong as "Roland Vincent - City Council." See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 231 -232 (1977). 33_To create an exception for appellees' political speech and not these other types of speech might create a risk of engaging in constitutionally forbidden content discrimination. See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Moreover, the volume of permissible postings under such a mandated exemption might so limit the ordinance's effect as to defeat its aim of combating visual blight. Any constitutionally mandated exception to the City's total prohibition against temporary signs on public property would necessarily rest on a judicial determination that the City's traffic control and safety interests had little or no applicability within the excepted category, and that the City's interests in esthetics are not sufficiently important to justify the prohibition in that category. But the findings of the District Court provide no basis for questioning the substantiality of the esthetic interest at stake, or for believing that a uniquely important form of communication has been abridged for the categories of expression engaged in by Taxpayers and COGS. Therefore, we accept the City's position that it may decide that the esthetic interest in avoiding "visual clutter"justifies [466 U.S.789, 8171 a removal of signs creating or increasing that clutter. The findings of the District Court that COGS signs add to the problems addressed by the ordinance and, if permitted to remain, would encourage others to post additional signs, are sufficient to justify application of the ordinance to these appellees. As recognized in Metromedia, if the city has a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are unattractive, "then obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to solving the problems they create is to prohibit them." 453 U.S., at 508 . As is true of billboards, the esthetic interests that are implicated by temporary signs are presumptively at work in all parts of the city, including those where appellees posted their signs, and there is no basis in the record in this case upon which to rebut that presumption. These interests are both psychological and economic. The character of the environment affects the quality of life and the value of property in both residential and commercial areas. We hold that on this record these interests are sufficiently substantial to justify this content-neutral, impartially administered prohibition against the posting of appellees' temporary signs on public property and that such an application of the ordinance does not create an unacceptable threat to the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 34 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that Court. It is so ordered. Footnotes [ Footnote ] ] The ordinance reads as follows: "Sec. 28.04. Hand-bills, signs - public places and objects: "(a)No person shall paint, mark or write on, or post or otherwise affix, any hand-bill or sign to or upon any sidewalk, crosswalk, curb, curbstone, [466 U.S. 789,792] street lamp post, hydrant,tree, shrub, tree stake or guard, railroad trestle, electric light or power or telephone or telegraph or trolley wire pole, or wire appurtenance http://caselaw.1p,findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.html 9/20/2006 FindLaw: Cases and Codes Page 11 of 21 thereof or upon any fixture of the fire alarm or police telegraph system or upon any lighting system,public bridge, drinking fountain, life buoy, life preserver, life boat or other life saving equipment, street sign or traffic sign. "(b) Nothing in this section contained shall apply to the installation of terrazzo sidewalks or sidewalks of similar construction, sidewalks permanently colored by an admixture in the material of which the same are constructed, and for which the Board of Public Works has granted a written permit. "(c) Any hand-bill or sign found posted, or otherwise affixed upon any public property contrary to the provisions of this section may be removed by the Police Department or the Department of Public Works. The person responsible for any such illegal posting shall be liable for the cost incurred in the removal thereof and the Department of Public Works is authorized to effect the collection of said cost. "(d) Nothing in this section shall apply to the installation of a metal plaque or plate or individual letters or figures in a sidewalk commemorating an historical, cultural, or artistic event, location or personality for which the Board of Public Works, with the approval of the Council, has granted a written permit. "(e)Nothing in this section shall apply to the painting of house numbers upon curbs done under permits issued by the Board of Public Works under and in accordance with the provisions of Section 62.96 of this Code." [ ._-ote?_] The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." Under the Fourteenth Amendment, city ordinances are within the scope of this limitation on governmental authority. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). [ Footnote 3 ] The first 10 signs identified on the March 9 weekly report were: "Leonard's Nite Club 11 Raul Palomo, Jr. 12 Alamar Travel Bureau Inc. 5 Roland Vincent 48 The Item - Madam Wongs 13 The American Club 2 Salon Broadway 14 Rose Royce 11 Vernon Auditorium -Apache Total Experience 13" Jupiter 20 App. 73. [ Footnote 4 ] For convenience we shall refer to these parties as simply as the "City." [ Footnote 5 ] App. to Juris. Statement 17a. [ Footnote_6] Id., at 18a. "The Los Angeles Planning and Zoning Code was enacted in part to encourage the most appropriate use of land; to conserve and stabilize the value of property; to provide adequate open spaces for light and air; to prevent and fight fire; to lessen congestion on streets; to facilitate adequate provisions for community utilities and facilities and to promote health, safety, and the general welfare, all in accordance with a comprehensive plan." Finding 11, App. to Juris. Statement 17a. f Footnote 7 ] App. to Juris. Statement 18a. The District Court's Finding 14 reads, in full, as follows: "The large number of signs illegally posted on the items of public and utility property enumerated in Section 28.04 constitute a clutter and visual blight. The posting of signs on utility pole cross wires for which the plaintiffs [seek] authorization would add somewhat to the blight and inevitably would encourage greatly increased posting in other unauthorized and unsightly places by people not aware of the distinction the plaintiffs seek to make." [ Footnote 8_] Finding 17, App. to Juris. Statement 18a. [ Footnote 9] Finding 18, App. to Juris. Statement 18a. htip:Hcaselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.htm1 9/20/2006 Finhaw: Cases and Codes Page 12 of 21 [ Footnote.10 ] Conclusion of Law No. 5, App. to Juris. Statement 19a. [ Footnote 11_] Nevertheless,the court acknowledged that should subsequent experience with a less comprehensive prohibition prove ineffective in achieving the City's goals, it might reenact the very ordinance the court had just struck down. As authority for this procedure, the court cited Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, H 6 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1048, 1110-1111 (1968). [ Footnote 12 ] The question before the Court was whether Stromberg could constitutionally be convicted for displaying a red flag as a symbol of opposition to organized government. Stromberg was a supervisor at a summer camp for children. The camp's curriculum stressed class consciousness and the solidarity of workers. Each morning at the camp a red flag was raised and the children recited a pledge of allegiance to the "workers' flag." The statute [466 U.S. 789, 7971 under which Stromberg was convicted prohibited peaceful display of a symbol of opposition to organized government. The Court wrote: "The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system. A statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. The . . . statute being invalid upon its face, the conviction of the appellant . . . must be set aside." 283 U.S.. at 369 -370. [ Footnote 1 3 ] Lovell was convicted of distributing religious pamphlets without a license. A local ordinance required a license to distribute any literature, and gave the chief of police the power to deny a license in order to abate anything he considered to be a "nuisance." The Court wrote: "We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton directed his assault by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing.' And the liberty of the press became initially a right to publish 'without a license what formerly could be published only with one.' While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision." 303 U.S.. at 451 -452 (footnote omitted). [ Footnote 14 ] In Stromberg, the only justification for the statute was the suppression of ideas. In Lovell, since no attempt was made to tailor the licensing requirement to a substantive evil unrelated to the suppression of ideas, the statute created an unacceptable risk that it would be used to suppress. Under such statutes, any enforcement carries with it the risk that the enforcement is being used merely to suppress speech, since the statute is not aimed at a substantive evil within the power of the government to prohibit. [ Footnote 1 5 ] Subsequent cases have continued to employ facial invalidation where it was found that every application of the statute created an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas. See Saia v.New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (ordinance prohibited use of loudspeaker in public places without permission of the chief of police whose discretion was unlimited); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (ordinance required license to distribute religious literature without standards for the exercising of licensing discretion); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (ordinances prohibited distributing leaflets without a license and provided no standards for issuance of licenses); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (plurality opinion) (statute permitted city to deny permit for a public demonstration subject only to the uncontrolled discretion of the director of public safety). [ Footnote 16 ] It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion. One who might have had a license for the asking may therefor call into question the whole scheme of licensing when he is prosecuted for failure to procure it. A like threat is inherent in a penal statute, like that in question here, which does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.html 9/20/2006 FindLaw: Cases and Codes Page 13 of 21 an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press. The existence of such a statute, which readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure, I esults in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview." 310 U.S., at 97 -98 (citation omitted). [ Footnote 17 ] A representative statement of the doctrine is found in Gooding v. Wilson,405 U.S. 518 (1972). "At least when statutes regulate or proscribe speech and when 'no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution,' Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965), the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing 'attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity,' id., at 486. This is deemed necessary because persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression." Id., at 520-521 (citations omitted). See also, e. g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965). [ Footnote_1.8_] See also CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580 -581 (1973). [ Footnote 19 ] "We have never held that a statute should be held invalid on its face merely because it is possible to conceive of a single impermissible application, and in that sense a requirement of substantial overbreadth is already implicit in the doctrine." Broadrick, 413 U.S., at 630 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). "Simply put, the doctrine asserts that an overbroad regulation of speech or publication may be subject to facial review and invalidation, even though its application in the instant case is constitutionally unobjectionable. Thus, a person whose activity could validly be suppressed under a more narrowly drawn law is allowed to challenge an overbroad law because of its application to others. The bare possibility of unconstitutional application is not enough; the law is unconstitutionally overbroad only if it reaches substantially beyond the permissible scope of legislative regulation. Thus, the issue under the overbreadth doctrine is whether a government restriction of speech that is arguably valid as applied to the case at hand should nevertheless be invalidated to avoid the substantial prospect of unconstitutional application elsewhere." Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 Yale L. J. 409, 425 (1983) (emphasis supplied). However, where the statute unquestionably attaches sanctions to protected conduct,the likelihood that the statute will deter that conduct is ordinarily sufficiently great to justify an overbreadth attack. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U S 205 217 (1975). [ Footnote.201 Brief for Appellees 22, n. 16. In his affidavit in support of the motion for partial summary judgment, the president of COGS stated: "No COGS signs are posted on sidewalk surfaces, streetlamp posts, hydrants,trees, shrubs, treestacks or guards; vertical utility poles, fire alarm or police telegraph systems, drinking fountains, lifebuoys, life preservers, lifesaving equipment or street or traffic signs." [ Footnote 21 ] See App. 148. [ Footnote.2.2.] The fact that the ordinance is capable of valid applications does not necessarily mean that it is valid as applied to these litigants. We may not simply assume that the ordinance will always advance the asserted state interests sufficiently to justify its abridgment of expressive activity. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 844 (1978). See also Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 95 -98 (1983); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 433 -438 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. 45 -48, 68-74 (1976) (per curiam); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 -101 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 -567 (1969); United States v. http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.htmi 9/20/2006 Finkaw: Cases and Codes Page 14 of 21 Robel, 389 US, 258 264 , 267 (1967); Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217 222 -223 (1967); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 -465 (1958). [ Fogtngte 23 ] Although Taxpayers would presumably devote the resources now expended on posting political signs on public property to other forms of communication if they complied with the ordinance, we shall assume that the ordinance diminishes the total quantity of their speech. [ Footnote 241 Justice Reed wrote: "The unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take it. In his home or on the street he is practically helpless to escape this interference with his privacy by loud speakers except through the protection of the municipality. "City streets are recognized as a normal place for the exchange of ideas by speech or paper. But this does not mean the freedom is beyond all control. We think it is a permissible exercise of legislative discretion to bar sound trucks with broadcasts of public interest, amplified to a loud and raucous volume, from the public ways of municipalities. On the business streets of cities like Trenton, with its more than 125,000 people, such distractions would be dangerous to traffic at all hours useful for the dissemination of information, and in the residential thoroughfares the quiet and tranquility so desirable for city dwellers would likewise be at the mercy of advocates of particular religious, social or political persuasions. We cannot believe that rights of free speech compel a municipality to allow such mechanical voice amplification on any of its streets." 336 U.S., at 86 -87 (plurality opinion). A majority of the Court agreed with this analysis. See id., at 96-97 (Frankfurter,J., concurring); id., at 97-98 (Jackson, J., concurring). [ Footnote_25] The Court of Appeals relied on JUSTICE BRENNAN'S opinion concurring in the judgment in Metromedia to support its conclusion that the City's interest in esthetics was not sufficiently substantial to outweigh the constitutional interest in free expression unless the City proved that it had undertaken a comprehensive and coordinated effort to remove other elements of visual clutter within San Diego. This reliance was misplaced because JUSTICE BRENNAN's analysis was expressly rejected by a majority of the Court. Moreover, JUSTICE BRENNA14 was concerned that the San Diego ordinance might not in fact have a substantial salutary effect on the appearance of the city because it did not ameliorate other types of visual clutter beside billboards, see 453 U.S., at 530 -534, thus suggesting that in fact it had been applied to areas where it did not advance the interest in esthetics sufficiently to justify an abridgment of speech. [ Footnote 26_] Similarly, THE CHIEF JUSTICE wrote that a city has the power to regulate visual clutter in much the same manner that it can regulate any other feature of its environment: "Pollution is not limited to the air we breathe and the water we drink; it can equally offend the eye and ear." Id., at 561 (dissenting opinion). [ Footnote 27_] In Metromedia, a majority of the Court concluded that a prohibition on billboards was narrowly tailored to the visual evil San Diego sought to correct. See 453 U.S., at 510 -512 (plurality opinion); id., at 549-553 (STEVENS, J., dissenting in part); id., at 560-561 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting); id., at 570 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). [ Footnote..2-8 ] "In the first place, whether onsite advertising is permitted or not, the prohibition of offsite advertising is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety and esthetics. This is not altered by the fact that the ordinance is underinclusive because it permits onsite advertising." 453 U.S., at 511 . "Third, San Diego has obviously chosen to value one kind of commercial speech - onsite advertising - more than another kind of commercial speech - offsite advertising. The ordinance reflects a decision by the city that the former interest, but not the latter, is stronger than the city's interests in traffic safety and esthetics. The city has decided that in a limited instance - onsite commercial advertising - its interests should yield. We do not reject http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scfpts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.htmi 9/20/2006 FindLaw: Cases and Codes Page 15 of 21 that judgment." Id., at 512. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE STEVENS agreed with the plurality on this point. Id., at 541 (STEVENS, J., dissenting in part); id., at 563-564(BURGER, C. J., dissenting); id., at 570 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). [ Footnote 29 ] Cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. at 163 ("[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place"). [ I_ootno.te 30 ] Although the Court has shown special solicitude for forms of expression that are much less expensive than feasible alternative and hence may be [466 U.S.789,8131 important to a large segment of the citizenry, see, e. g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("Door to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people"), this solicitude has practical boundaries, see, e. g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 -89 (1949) ("That more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks . . . is not enough to call forth constitutional protection for what those charged with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means of publicity are open"). See also Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S., at 549 -550 (STEVENS, J., dissenting in part) (ban on graffiti constitutionally permissible even though some creators of graffiti may have no equally effective alternative means of public expression). [ Footnote 31] Any tangible property owned by the government could be used to communicate -bumper stickers may be placed on official automobiles - and yet appellees could not seriously claim the right to attach "Taxpayer for Vincent" bumper stickers to city-owned automobiles. At some point, the government's relationship to things under its dominion and control is virtually identical to a private owner's property interest in the same kinds of things, and in . such circumstances,the State, "no less than a private owner of property,has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966). [ FOQtil e_32 ] Just as it is not dispositive to label the posting of signs on public property as a discrete medium of expression, it is also of limited utility in the context of this case to focus on whether the tangible property itself should be deemed a public forum. Generally an analysis of whether property is a public forum provides a workable analytical tool. However, "the analytical line between a regulation of the 'time,place, and manner' in which First Amendment rights may be exercised in a traditional public forum, and the question of whether a particular piece of personal or real . property owned or controlled by the government is in fact a 'public forum' may blur at the edges," United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981), and this is particularly true in cases falling between the paradigms of government property interests essentially mirroring analogous private interests and those clearly held in trust, either by tradition or recent convention, for the use of citizens at large. [ Footnote—33 ] See generally Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967). [ Footnote.34 ] Taxpayers and COGS also argue that the ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because (1) it contains certain exceptions for street banners and certain permanent signs such as commemorative plaques, and (2) it gives property owners, who may authorize the posting of signs on their own premises, an advantage over nonproperty owners in political campaigns. These arguments do not appear to have been addressed by the Court of Appeals. [466 U.S. 789,8181 JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. The plurality opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), concluded that the City of San Diego could, consistently with the First Amendment, restrict the commercial use of billboards in order to "preserve and improve the appearance of the City." Id., at 493. Today, the Court sustains the constitutionality of Los Angeles' similarly motivated ban on the posting of political signs on public property. Because the Court's lenient approach towards the restriction of speech for reasons of aesthetics threatens seriously to undermine the protections of the First Amendment, I dissent. http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.htmi 9/20/2006 FindLaw: Cases and Codes Page 16 of 21 The Court finds that the City's "interest [in eliminating visual clutter] is sufficiently substantial to justify the effect of the ordinance on appellees' expression" and that the effect of the ordinance on speech is "no greater than necessary to accomplish the City's purpose." Ante, at 805. These are the right questions to consider when analyzing the constitutionality of the challenged ordinance, see Metromedia, supra, at 525-527 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640. 656 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), but the answers that the Court provides reflect a startling insensitivity to the principles embodied in the First Amendment. In my view, the City of Los Angeles has not shown that its interest in eliminating "visual clutter"justifies its restriction of appellees' ability to communicate with the local electorate. I The Court recognizes that each medium for communicating ideas and information presents its own particular problems. Our analysis of the First Amendment concerns implicated by a given medium must therefore be sensitive to these particular problems and characteristics. The posting of signs is, [466 U.S. 789, 8191 of course, a time-honored means of communicating a broad range of ideas and information, particularly in our cities and towns. At the same time, the unfettered proliferation of signs on public fixtures may offend the public's legitimate desire to preserve an orderly and aesthetically pleasing urban environment. In this case, as in Metromedia, we are called upon to adjudge the constitutionality under the First Amendment of a local government's response to this recurring dilemma - namely, the clash between the public's aesthetic interest in controlling the use of billboards, signs,handbills, and other similar means of communication, and the First Amendment interest of those who wish to use these media to express their views, or to learn the views of others, on matters of importance to the community. In deciding this First Amendment question, the critical importance of the posting of signs as a means of communication must not be overlooked. Use of this medium of communication is particularly valuable in part because it entails a relatively small expense in reaching a wide audience, allows flexibility in accommodating various formats, typographies, and graphics, and conveys its message in a manner that is easily read and understood by its reader or viewer. There may be alternative channels of communication, but the prevalence of a large number of signs in Los Angeles I is a strong indication that, for many speakers, those alternatives are far less satisfactory. Cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546. 556 (1975). Nevertheless, the City of Los Angeles asserts that ample alternative avenues of communication are available. The City notes that, although the posting of signs on public property is prohibited, the posting of signs on private property and the distribution of handbills are not. Brief for Appellants [466 U.S.789,820] 25-26. But there is no showing that either of these alternatives would serve appellees' needs nearly as well as would the posting of signs of public property. First, there is no proof that a sufficient number of private parties would allow the posting of signs on their property. Indeed, common sense suggests the contrary at least in some instances. A speaker with a message that is generally unpopular or simply unpopular among property owners is hardly likely to get his message across if forced to rely on this medium. It is difficult to believe, for example, that a group advocating an increase in the rate of a property tax would succeed in persuading private property owners to accept its signs. Similarly, the adequacy of distributing handbills is dubious, despite certain advantages of handbills over signs. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 14L 145 -146 (1943). Particularly when the message to be carried is best expressed by a few words or a graphic image, a message on a sign will typically reach far more people than one on a handbill. The message on a posted sign remains to be seen by passersby as long as it is posted, while a handbill is typically read by a single reader and discarded. Thus, not only must handbills be printed in large quantity, but many hours must be spent distributing them. The average cost of communicating by handbill is therefore likely to be far higher than the average cost of communicating by poster. For that reason, signs posted on public property are doubtless "essential to the poorly financed causes of little people," id., at 146, and their prohibition constitutes a total ban on an important medium of communication. Cf Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 233, 257. Because the City has completely banned the use of this particular medium of communication, and because, given the circumstances,there are no equivalent alternative media that provide an adequate substitute, the Court must examine with particular care the justifications that the City proffers for its ban. See Metromedia, supra, at 525-527 (BRENNAN, J., concurring [466 U.S. 789, 821] in judgment); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 93 (1977). http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.htm1 9/20/2006 Finhaw: Cases and Codes Page 17 of 21 II As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 805, when an ordinance significantly limits communicative activity, "the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation." Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). The Court's first task is to determine whether the ordinance is aimed at suppressing the content of speech, and, if it is, whether a compelling state interest justifies the suppression. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 5� 540 (1980); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92. 99 (1972). If the restriction is content-neutral, the court's task is to determine (1) whether the governmental objective advanced by the restriction is substantial, and (2)whether the restriction imposed on speech is no greater than is essential to further that objective. Unless both conditions are met the restriction must be invalidated. See ante, at 805, 808, 810. 2 My suggestion in Metromedia was that courts should exercise special care in addressing these questions when a purely aesthetic objective is asserted to justify a restriction of speech. Specifically, "before deferring to a city's judgment, a court must be convinced that the city is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic concerns with respect to its environment." 453 U.S.. at 531 . I adhere to that view. Its correctness - premised largely on my concern that aesthetic interests are easy for a city to assert and difficult for a court to evaluate - is, for me, reaffirmed by this case. The fundamental problem in this kind of case is that a purely aesthetic state interest offered to justify a restriction on speech - that is, a governmental objective justified solely [466 U.S.789, 8221 in terms like "proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression," ante, at 806 - creates difficulties for a reviewing court in fulfilling its obligation to ensure that government regulation does not trespass upon protections secured by the First Amendment. The source of those difficulties is the unavoidable subjectivity of aesthetic judgments -the fact that beauty is in the eye of the beholder." As a consequence of this subjectivity, laws defended on aesthetic grounds raise problems for judicial review that are not presented by laws defended on more objective grounds - such as national security, public health, or public safety. 3 In practice, therefore, the inherent subjectivity of aesthetic judgments makes it all too easy for the government to fashion its justification for a law in a manner that impairs the ability of a reviewing court meaningfully to make the required inquiries. 4 A Initially, a reviewing court faces substantial difficulties determining whether the actual objective is related to the suppression of speech. The asserted interest in aesthetics may be only a facade for content-based suppression. Of course, all would agree that the improvement and preservation [466 U.S.789, 823] of the aesthetic environment are me restrictions on speech may be necessary to carry out these functions. important governmental functions and that so p y ry rr'Y P g Metromedia supra, at 530. But a governmental interest in aesthetics cannot be regarded as sufficiently compelling to P justify a restriction of speech based on an assertion that the content of the speech is, in itself, aesthetically displeasing. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S-. 5 (1971). Because aesthetic judgments are so subjective, however, it is too easy for government to enact restrictions on speech for just such illegitimate reasons and to evade effective judicial review by asserting that the restriction is aimed at some displeasing aspect of the speech that is not solely communicative - for example, its sound, its appearance, or its location. An objective standard for evaluating claimed aesthetic judgments is therefore essential; for without one, courts have no reliable means of assessing the genuineness of such claims. For example, in evaluating the ordinance before us in this case, the City might be pursuing either of two objectives, 'v ted b two very di fferent judgments. One objective might be the elimination of visual clutter, attribu table in motivated y ry J g J g whole or in part to signs posted on public property. The aesthetic judgment underlying this objective would be that the clutter created by these signs offends the community's desire for an orderly, visually pleasing environment. A second objective might simply be the elimination of the messages typically carried by the signs. 5 In that case, the aesthetic judgment would be that the signs' messages are themselves displeasing. The first objective is lawful, of course, but the second is not. Yet the City might easily mask the second [466 U.S. 789, 824] objective by asserting the first and declaring that signs constitute visual clutter. In short, we must avoid unquestioned acceptance of the City's bare declaration of an aesthetic objective lest we fail in our duty to prevent unlawful trespasses upon First Amendment protections. http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.html 9/20/2006 FindLaw: Cases and Codes Page 18 of 21 B A total ban on an important medium of communication may be upheld only if the government proves that the ban (1) furthers a substantial government objective, and (2) constitutes the least speech-restrictive means of achieving that objective. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). Here too, however, meaningful judicial application of these standards is seriously frustrated. (1) No one doubts the importance of a general governmental interest in aesthetics, but in order to justify a restriction of speech, the particular objective behind the restriction must be substantial. E. g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 177 (1983); Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37. 45 (1983); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Therefore, in order to uphold a restriction of speech imposed to further an aesthetic objective, a court must ascertain the substantiality of the specific objective pursued. Although courts ordinarily defer to the government's assertion that its objective is substantial, that assertion is not immune from critical examination. See, e. g., Schad v. Mount Ephraim, supra, at 72-73. This is particularly true when aesthetic objectives underlie the restrictions. But in such cases independent judicial assessment of the substantiality of the government's interest is difficult. Because aesthetic judgments are entirely subjective,the government may too easily overstate the substantiality of its goals. Accordingly, unless courts carefully scrutinize [466 U.S. 789, 8251 aesthetics-based restrictions of speech, they risk standing idly by while important media of communication are foreclosed for the sake of insubstantial governmental objectives. (2) Similarly, when a total ban is justified solely in terms of aesthetics,the means inquiry necessary to evaluate the constitutionality of the ban may be impeded by deliberate or unintended government manipulation. Governmental objectives that are purely aesthetic can usually be expressed in a virtually limitless variety of ways. Consequently, objectives can be tailored to fit whatever program the government devises to promote its general aesthetic interests. Once the government has identified a substantial aesthetic objective and has selected a preferred means of achieving its objective, it will be possible for the government to correct any mismatch between means and ends by redefining the ends to conform with the means. In this case, for example, any of several objectives might be the City's actual substantial goal in banning temporary ) signs: 1 the elimination of all signs throughout the City, (2) the elimination of all signs in certain parts of the City, or g ( (3) a reduction of the density of signs. Although a total ban on the posting of signs on public property would be the least restrictive means of achieving only the first objective, it would be a very effective means of achieving the other two as well. It is quite possible, therefore, that the City might select such a ban as the means by which to further its general interest in solving its sign problem, without explicitly considering which of the three specific objectives is really substantial. Then, having selected the total ban as its preferred means,the City would be strongly inclined to characterize the first objective as the substantial one. This might be done purposefully in order to conform the ban to the least-restrictive-means requirement, or it might be done inadvertently as a natural [466 U.S. 789, 8261 concomitant of considering means and ends together. But regardless of why it is done, a reviewing court will be confronted with a statement of substantiality the subjectivity of which makes it impossible to question on its face. This possibility of interdependence between means and ends in the development of policies to promote aesthetics poses a major obstacle to judicial review of the availability of alternative means that are less restrictive of speech. Indeed, when a court reviews a restriction of speech imposed in order to promote an aesthetic objective, there is a significant possibility that the court will be able to do little more than pay lipservice to the First Amendment inquiry into the availability of less restrictive alternatives. The means may fit the ends only because the ends were defined with the means in mind. In this case, for example, the City has expressed an aesthetic judgment that signs on public property constitute visual clutter throughout the City and that its objective is to eliminate visual clutter. We are then asked to determine whether that objective could have been achieved with less restriction of speech. But to ask the question is to highlight the circularity of the inquiry. Since the goal, at least as currently expressed, is essentially to http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.htmi 9/20/2006 FindLaw: Cases and Codes Page 19 of 21 eliminate all signs, the only available means of achieving that goal is to eliminate all signs. The ease with which means can be equated with aesthetic ends only confirms the importance of close judicial scrutiny of the substantiality of such ends. See supra, at 824-825. In this case, for example, it is essential that the Court assess the City's ban on signs by evaluating whether the City has a substantial interest in eliminating the visual clutter caused by all posted signs throughout the City - as distinguished from an interest in banning signs in some areas or in preventing densely packed signs. If, in fact, either of the latter two objectives constitute the substantial interest underlying this ordinance,they could be achieved by means far less restrictive [466 U.S. 789, 8271 of speech than a total ban on signs, and the ban, therefore, would be invalid. C Regrettably, the Court's analysis is seriously inadequate. Because the Court has failed to develop a reliable means of gauging the nature or depth of the City's commitment to pursuing the goal of eradicating "visual clutter," it simply approves the ordinance with only the most cursory degree of judicial oversight. Without stopping to consider carefully whether this supposed commitment is genuine or substantial, the Court essentially defers to the City's aesthetic judgment and in so doing precludes serious assessment of the availability of alternative means. The Court begins by simply affirming that "[t]he problem addressed by this ordinance - the visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property - constitutes a significant substantive end within the City's power to prohibit." Ante, at 807. Then, addressing the availability of less restrictive alternatives, the Court can do little more than state the unsurprising conclusion that "[b]y banning these signs, the City did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy." Ante, at 808. Finally, as if to explain the ease with which it reaches its conclusion, the Court notes that "[w]ith respect to signs posted by appellees . . . it is the tangible medium of expressing the message that has adverse impact on the appearance of the landscape." Ante, at 810. But, as I have demonstrated, it is precisely the ability of the State to make this judgment that should lead us to approach these cases with more caution. III The fact that there are difficulties inherent in judicial review of aesthetics-based restrictions of speech does not imply [466 U.S. 789, 8281 that government may not engage in such activities. As I have said, improvement and preservation of the aesthetic environment are often legitimate and important governmental functions. But because the implementation of these functions creates special dangers to our First Amendment freedoms, there is a need for more stringent judicial scrutiny than the Court seems willing to exercise. In cases like this, where a total ban is imposed on a particularly valuable method of communication, a court should require the government to provide tangible proof of the legitimacy and substantiality of its aesthetic objective. Justifications for such restrictions articulated by the government should be critically examined to determine whether the government has committed itself to addressing the identified aesthetic problem. In my view, such statements of aesthetic objectives should be accepted as substantial and unrelated to the suppression of speech only if the government demonstrates that it is pursuing an identified objective seriously and comprehensively and in ways that are unrelated to the restriction of speech. Metromedia, 453 U.S.. at 531 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). Without such a demonstration, I would invalidate the restriction as violative of the First Amendment. By requiring this type of showing, courts can ensure that governmental regulation of the aesthetic environment remains within the constraints established by the First Amendment. First, we would have a reasonably reliable indication that it is not the content or communicative aspect of speech that the government finds unaesthetic. Second, when a restriction of speech is part of a comprehensive and seriously pursued program to promote an aesthetic objective, we have a more reliable indication of the government's own assessment of the substantiality of its objective. And finally, when an aesthetic objective is pursued on more than one front,we have a better basis upon which to ascertain its precise nature [466 U.S. 789, 8291 and thereby determine whether the means selected are the least restrictive ones for achieving the objective. 6 http://caselaw.1p.fiindlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.html 9/20/2006 FindLaw: Cases and Codes Page 20 of 21 This does not mean that a government must address all aesthetic problems at one time or that a government should hesitate to pursue aesthetic objectives. What it does mean, however, is that when such an objective is pursued, it may not be pursued solely at the expense of First Amendment freedoms, nor may it be pursued by arbitrarily discriminating against a form of speech that has the same aesthetic characteristics as other forms of speech that are also present in the community. See Metromedia, supra, at 531-534 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). Accordingly, in order for Los Angeles to succeed in defending its total ban on the posting of signs, the City would have to demonstrate that it is pursuing its goal of eliminating visual clutter in a serious and comprehensive manner. Most importantly, the City would have to show that it is pursuing its goal through programs other than its ban on signs, that at least some of those programs address the visual clutter problem through means that do not entail the restriction of speech, and that the programs parallel the ban in their stringency, geographical scope, and aesthetic focus. In this case, however, as the Court of Appeals found, there is no indication that the City has addressed its visual clutter problem in anyway other than by prohibiting the posting of signs - [466 U.S. 789, 8301 throughout the City and without regard to the density of their presence. 682 F.2d 847, 852 (CA9 1982). Therefore, I would hold that the prohibition violates appellees' First Amendment rights. In light of the extreme stringency of Los Angeles' ban - barring all signs from being posted - and its wide geographical scope - covering the entire City - it might be difficult for Los Angeles to make the type of showing I have suggested. Cf. Metromedia, supra, at 533-534. A more limited approach to the visual clutter problem, however, might well pass constitutional muster. I have no doubt that signs posted on public property in certain areas - including, perhaps, parts of Los Angeles - could contribute to the type of eyesore that a city would genuinely have a substantial interest in eliminating. These areas might include parts of the City that are particularly pristine, reserved for certain uses, designated to reflect certain themes, or so blighted that broad-gauged renovation is necessary. Presumably, in these types of areas, the City would also regulate the aesthetic environment in ways other than the banning of temporary signs. The City might zone such areas for a particular type of development or lack of development; it might actively create a particular type of environment; it might be especially vigilant in keeping the area clean; it might regulate the size and location of permanent signs; or it might reserve particular locations, such as kiosks, for the posting of temporary signs. Similarly, Los Angeles might be able to attack its visual clutter problem in more areas of the City by reducing the stringency of the ban, perhaps by regulating the density of temporary signs, and coupling that approach with additional measures designed to reduce other forms of visual clutter. There are a variety of ways that the aesthetic environment can be regulated, some restrictive of speech and others not, but it is only when aesthetic regulation is addressed in a comprehensive and focused manner that we can ensure that the [466 U.S. 789, 8311 goals pursued are substantial and that the manner in which they are pursued is no more restrictive of speech than is necessary. In the absence of such a showing in this case, I believe that Los Angeles' total ban sweeps so broadly and trenches so completely on appellees' use of an important medium of political expression that it must be struck down as violative of the First Amendment. 7 I therefore dissent. [ footnote_]-] According to the Court of Appeals, street inspection personnel removed 51,662 illegally posted signs between January 1, 1980, and May 24, 1980. 682 F.2d 847, 853,n. 6. (1982). [ Footnote 2 ] Of course, a content-neutral restriction must also leave open ample alternative avenues of communication. See supra, at 819-820, and this page. [ Footnote 3_] Safety, health, and national security have their subjective aspects as well, but they are not wholly subjective. When these objectives are invoked to justify a restriction of speech, courts can broadly judge their plausibility. This is not true of aesthetics. [ Footnote 4 ] As one scholar has stated: "Aesthetic policy, as currently formulated and implemented at the federal, state, and local levels, often partakes http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.htm1 9/20/2006 FinaLaw: Cases and Codes Page 21 of 21 more of high farce than of the rule of law. Its purposes are seldom accurately or candidly portrayed, let alone understood, by its most vehement champions. Its diversion to dubious or flatly deplorable social ends undermines the credit that it may merit when soundly conceived and executed. Its indiscriminate, often quixotic demands have overwhelmed legal institutions, which all too frequently have compromised the integrity of legislative, administrative, and judicial processes in the name of'beauty."' Costonis,Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformation of the Dilemmas, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 355 (1982). [ Footnote 51 The fact that a ban on temporary signs applies to all signs does not necessarily imply content-neutrality. Because particular media are often used disproportionately for certain types of messages, a restriction that is content- neutral on its face may, in fact, be content-hostile. Cf. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 233, 257. [ Fogtnote 6 ] It is theoretically, though remotely, possible that a form of speech could be so distinctively unaesthetic that a comprehensive program aimed at eliminating the eyesore it causes would apply only to the unpleasant form of speech. Under the approach I suggest, such a program would be invalid because it would only restrict speech, and the community, therefore would have to tolerate the displeasing form of speech. This is no doubt a disadvantage of the P g P approach. But at least when the form of speech that is restricted constitutes an important medium of communication and when the restriction would effect a total ban on the use of that medium, that is the price we must pay to protect our First Amendment liberties from those who would use aesthetics alone as a cloak to abridge them. [ Footnote 7 ] Although the Court does not reach the question, appellants argue that the City's interest in traffic safety provides an independent and significant justification for its ban on signs. As the Court of Appeals concluded, however, an genuine issue regarding traffic safe hazards with respect to t he City has not offered to rove facts that raise safety p [ ] �' P any g g the posting of signs on many of the objects covered by the ordinance." 682 F.2d at 852. [466 U.S. 789, 11 Company_ I Privacy Policy I Disclaimer Copyright © 1994-2006 FindLaw http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/466/789.htm1 9/20/2006 ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE M E M O R A N D U M TO: Robert W. Hargreaves FROM: Helene P. Dreyer DATE: January 27, 1998 RE : City of Palm Desert - Sign Ordinance : In-Depth Discussion of Current Status of Law Regulating Non-Commercial Speech. (P.D. Mun. C. 25 . 68 . 010 . ) DISCUSSION I. GOVERNMENTS MAY REGULATE SIGNAGE/SPEECH ON PUBLIC PROPERTY. A government may preclude advertising - including political advertising - so long as the prohibition is not "arbitrary, capricious or invidious . " (Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights (1974) 418 U.S. 298, 94 S.Ct . 2714 , 2717 . ) ' However, with respect to public property, content-based regulation of a traditional or designated public forum is subject to strict scrutiny; content- neutral regulation is subject to heightened scrutiny. (Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n (1983) 460 U.S . 37 . ) Regulation of non-public forums on public property need only pass a reasonable relationship standard. (Id. ) All public property that is not a traditional public forum or a designated public forum is considered to be non-public forum. A government may impose a viewpoint-neutral exclusion of "speakers" (including advertisers, whether political or commercial) to avoid disrupting a non-public forum or avoid hindering its effectiveness for its intended purpose. (International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee (1992) 112 S .Ct . 2701 (public airport solicitation. ) Furthermore, even traditional or designated public forums (such as streets and parks) may be subject to reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions so long as the restrictions are content-neutral (not undertaken in an effort to suppress a particular speaker or viewpoint) , narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and there are ample alternative channels of communication. (Perry, supra, 460 U.S. at 45; City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984) 466 U. S . 789, 104 S .Ct . 2118 . ) ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE A. CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION ON PUBLIC PROPERTY. In Vincent, the Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance that prohibited all signs on public property, including the posting of political signs on utility poles along sidewalks . Because the restriction was content-neutral, it was not subject to a strict- scrutiny test . Citing a "captive audience" rationale,l/ the court found the regulation was related to a legitimate city interest (avoiding "visual clutter" ) and not overly burdensome since oral speaking and/or distribution of handbills was still permitted on public property. (Id. at 810 . ) Likewise upheld has been an ordinance restricting posting of political signs on city property to lamp posts and utility poles was found not to violate the First Amendment where a city has a legitimate interest in aesthetics, prevention of damage to public property and promotion of traffic safety; the restriction was reasonably related to that interest; and the restriction not overly burdensome because ample alternative forums of expression were available . (Candidates v. Outdoor Graphic Service v. City and County of San Francisco (N.D. Cal . 1983) 574 F.Supp. 1240 . ) "Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused. . . (T] he Government, no less than a private owner of property has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. . . . " (Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (1985) 473 U. S . 788 , 799-800, 105 S .Ct . 3439 . ) A content-neutral regulation will survive First Amendment challenge so long as : (1) the ordinance is truly content-neutral; (2) the ordinance furthers a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of speech; (3) the ordinance is narrowly tailored to protect that interest; and (4) reasonable alternative channels of communication remain open. (Vincent, supra; Perry Educ . Ass' n v. Perry Local Educators' i� See also Women' s International League for Peace and Freedom (1986) 186 Cal .App. 3d 30 (total ban on political ads permissible on public transportation buses where there is a "captive audience"] . ) RMPUB\HP01872 ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE Ass' n (1983) 460 U.S . 37, 45; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm' n (1980) 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 ; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights (1974) 418 U.S. 298 (sustained ban on political signs on buses) . ) 2/ II. REGULATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY. A. REGULATION AS EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. Surprisingly, it is in the realm of regulating private - rather than public - property where even content-neutral ordinances have run into the gravest difficulty. Regulation of speech on private property - including sign regulation - receives less latitude from the courts . In addition to First Amendment restrictions on regulation of speech, regulations restricting private property speech must be within the scope of a valid exercise of police power, i .e . , beneficial to the public health, safety and welfare. (City of Landue v. Gilleo (1994) 114 S .Ct . 2038 . ) Preservation of aesthetics is generally recognized as a valid exercise of police power and, thus, an important government interest . (See Berman v. parker (1954) 348 U.S . 26 . ) Furtherance of aesthetic values, however, has received varied treatment from the courts when it comes to regulation of signs on private property. V With respect to Palm Desert, however, an issue arose last year as to whether the RDA could lease property at the corner of Portola and Hwy 111 to persons desiring to erect political signs . If it did so lease, there may be an issue as to whether that act created a limited public forum of that property. A government may create a "limited" or "designated" public forum by opening up a particular property for expressive activity by part or all of the public. (See, e .g. , White v. City of Norwalk (9th Cir. 1990) 900 F. 2d 1421. ) Content-based regulation of a designated public forum is subject to strict scrutiny. (Id. ) In fact, content-based restrictions of any sort are viewed as evidence that a government is impermissibly favoring one message over another. (See, e .g. , Carey v. Brown (1980) 447 U.S . 455 . ) If a total ban on signage on "public property" will be initiated, care should be taken not to lease the RDA property for that purpose. Though there may be a question as to its "public property" v. private character when under a lease agreement, and though the RDA probably could not refuse to lease based upon content of particular signs, it is free to refuse to lease for signage purposes, generally, and that would probably avoid a lot of issues . RMPUB\MPD1872 -3- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE In Metromedia, Inc . v. City of San Diego (1981) 453 U.S . 490 , a plurality opinion implied that aesthetic preservation is not a "compelling" enough interest to survive strict scrutiny of content- based regulation banning off-site advertising. Furthermore, because preservation of "aesthetic values" is necessarily subjective, regulations based on aesthetics should be carefully scrutinized to be certain they are not really public- rationalizations for what is actually intended to regulate the content of speech. A determinative factor in ascertaining the "true" intent of a regulation is the extent to which the regulation is "overly inclusive" or broader than necessary to guard against aesthetic detriment . (Id. at 510 . ) Thus, even a seemingly content-neutral replation violates the First Amendment if it is "too overinclusive" .- Banning all signs in a city, including those on residential front lawns and windows, for example, is impermissible . (City of Landue v. Gilleo (1994) 114 S .Ct . 2038, 2044 (sign in home window speaking out against Gulf War] ; Spence v. Washington (1974) 418 U.S. 405, 409 (reversing conviction for displaying altered American flag from window of apartment building] . ) B. RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY RECEIVED SPECIAL DEFERENCE. Residential property is, by far, the most difficult type of private property to regulate with respect to signs . Courts have produced varied results, often not even following the analytical "rules" previously established. In City of Landue v. Gilleo, for example, a woman was convicted of violating an ordinance that banned all signs in residential districts with 10 limited exceptions (for sale, yard sale, etc . ) . The woman had placed a sign in the front window of her home protesting the Gulf War. The court did not analyze the case via the step-by-step test (set forth, above) for consideration of content-based regulation. Rather, it engaged in a generalized balancing test between the aesthetic interests of the community and 3/ Likewise, the more "exceptions" a regulation contains, the more often it will be viewed by courts as content-based. This is especially true of lower and intermediary courts - though the U.S . Supreme Court appears to be moving away from that interpretation and the strict-scrutiny test and toward a more generalized balancing of interests . (See, e .g. , City of Landue v. Gilleo (1994) 114 S .Ct . 2038; Turner Broadcasting Sys . v. Federal Communications Comm'n. (1994) 114 S .Ct . 2445; Madsen v. Women' s Health Ctr. . Inc . (1994) 114 S . Ct . 2516; compare Loftus v. Township of Lawrence Park (1991) 764 F.Supp. 354 (W.D. Pa. ) (permitting only "garage sale" signs content-based) ; Tauber v. Town of Longmeadow (1988) 695 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Mass . ) (blanket ban that included narrow exceptions held to be content based] . ) RMPUB\HPD1872 -4- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE the First Amendment interests of individual residents .4/ In the court' s view, the sweeping ban at issue effectively destroyed an entire and important mode of communication that rendered it impermissible. In reaching that conclusion, the Court gave "special respect [to] individual liberty in the home, 11 and suggested that regulation of home speech could almost never be warranted. (Id. at 2047 . ) Residential signs, especially, say much not only about the message imparted on the sign, but about the identity of the speaker as well . (An "end the war" sign on the lawn of a veteran, or a sign supporting socialism on the lawn of a mansion, for example, impart additional and special meaning. ) Furthermore, speakers were not left with reasonable alternative channels of communication, especially considering the practical ineffectiveness of public speaking or handbill distribution from a residential front lawn and the vast cost differences that may ultimately be involved with alternative methods of communication. Therefore, the ordinance was too overly inclusive to be considered truly content-neutral in intent .5/ The court in Gilleo hinted that "more temperate" restrictions, such as a reasonable time, place and manner restriction on all types of temporary signs in residential areas - rather than a total ban - might survive challenge . However, while recognizing that citizens have an interest in preserving their property values and avoiding "visual clutter" in their neighborhoods, the court gives very little guidance as to what types specific regulation might be acceptable. At the same time, Gilleo makes clear that political yard and window signs in residential areas are of paramount importance - both in character and in availability - and that, especially for lower income citizens, may be the only method of expression reasonably available . Gilleo' s deference to residential speech carries,.echos of a similar attitude in Vincent, supra, where the court (interestingly) found political postings on public 4/ But court implied restrictions against signs erected in exchange for a fee may attain different result under balancing of interests. V Even though the ordinance in Gilleo did contain several exceptions, it was still not considered a content-based ordinance . The exceptions present were not aimed at a particular viewpoint but were tailored toward unique public needs for certain types of speech - such as directional signs, municipal signs, for sale or rental signs, church schedule signs, road and warning signs . (Gilleo, supra, 114 S .Ct . at 2044 . ) Although the ordinance found to be content-based in Metromedia also contained similar exceptions, that ordinance also contained a broad exception for on- site advertising - an entire form of commercial speech thus being permitted while others were not . RMPUB\HPD1872 -S- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE property were not a "uniquely valuable or important mode of communication" (466 U.S . 789, 812) , while indicating that postings on residential property were a "venerable means of communication that is both unique and important" (114 S .Ct . 2038 , 2044-47 . ) C. THERE IS NO CLEAR-CUT STANDARD FOR REGULATION OF NON- COMMERCIAL SIGNAGE. As the foregoing demonstrates, U.S . Supreme Court treatment of sign regulation has been varied and conflicting and leaves no reliable guide for cities enacting regulations : * In 1981, the court in Metromedia invalidated an ordinance banning all "outdoor advertising signs" but with 12 specified exceptions . The exceptions included on-site advertising signs as well as temporary political signs . According to Metromedia, these exceptions reflected viewpoint or content- based regulation that could not be justified. Permitting on- site commercial advertising while excluding most on-site non- commercial messages favored commercial speech over non- commercial speech. At the same time, exempting temporary political signs while prohibiting other non-commercial signs impermissibly effected government control over public ideas and opinions . Because the city allowed certain types of signs, it did not have a compelling interest in prohibiting other types of signs. (453 U.S . 513 - 520 . ) * In 1984 , the court in Vincent upheld a total ban of signs on public property (other than those with a public/municipal purpose) , but would not have upheld content-based exceptions had any been present (i .e . , exception for some types of non- commercial opinion speech while prohibiting others . ) Thus, both Metromedia and Vincent indicate that total bans containing content-based exceptions are suspect and not likely to be upheld. Rather than allowing any such signs, these cases indicate that total bans on signage would bear the greatest likelihood of survival . * Then, in 1994, the court in Gilleo indicated that suppressing too much protected speech would likewise be impermissible (prohibiting some types of protected speech in residential areas . ) In sum, an ordinance is in danger of being struck down if it : (a) contains content-based exceptions, thus prohibiting "too little" speech; or (b) does not sufficiently exempt protected speech, thus prohibiting "too much" speech: RMPUS\BPD1872 -6- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE "Justice Stevens used Metromedia and Vincent to ' identify two analytically distinct grounds for challenging the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance regulating the display of signs . ' The first is that the ordinance in effect restricts too little speech because the exemptions discriminate based on the signs' message . Justice Stevens found an exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of speech could fit that definition if it represents a governmental attempt to give an advantage to one side of an issue of public debate, or to select the topics for public debate. That language mirrors the traditional definition of content- based discrimination, but Justice Stevens stated that simply removing the exemptions would not necessarily cure the defects in the regulation. " "The reasoning behind that conclusion relates to the second analytical basis identified in the opinion: that an ordinance could restrict too much protected speech. Justice Stevens found that even if the exemptions in the Ladue (v.Gilleo] ordinance were free of viewpoint discrimination, the ordinance still restricted too much speech by almost completely banning signs from residential property. The broad sign prohibition struck down in Gillen was distinguished from the broad sign prohibition approved in Vincent on the basis that residential signs, unlike signs placed on public property, are a unique and important means of communication. " (D. McPherson, Municipal Regulation of Political Signs : Balancing First Amendment rights Against Aesthetic Concerns, 45 Drake L. Rev. 767, 783 (1997) (citations omitted] . ) "The Gilleo decision appears to add a new wrinkle to the analysis of total sign bans, by looking not only at whether the regulation discriminates between different types of speech, but also at the relationship between the type of speech being regulated and the location of that speech. The ruling is viewed by some commentators as an indication that the Court is even willing to examine carefully - and sometimes invalidate - content-neutral speech restrictions. Other experts think the reach of the decision will be limited to residential property and will not affect the ability of cities to enact content- neutral exemptions for signs on public or non-residential private property. " (Id. at 784) (citations omitted] . ) The ambiguity resulting from these cases has produced a wide variety of disparate outcomes in the courts and provides little RMPUB\HP01872 -7- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE adequate guidance for local authorities endeavoring to protect the aesthetic qualities of their communities . As Justice Rehnquist observed in his dissent of the Metromedia plurality opinion: "In a case where city planning commissions and zoning boards must regularly confront constitutional claims of this sort, it is a genuine misfortune to have the Court' s treatment of the subject be a virtual Tower of Babel, from which no definitive principles can be clearly drawn. . . . " (453 U.S. at 569, 101 S.Ct . at 2924 . ) In sum, if an ordinance bans only some speech, based upon content, it will likely be struck down on the basis that aesthetic preservation is not a compelling enough government interest . Likewise, an ordinance banning all (or too many) signs in a particular area may be struck down as being overly-inclusive and destroying important forums or leaving inadequate alternative methods of expression. D. REGULATIONS PROTECTING "POLITICAL" OR "ELECTION" SPEECH BUT IGNORING OTHER FORMS OF PROTECTED OPINION SPEECH WILL NOT BE UPHELD. Though most cases that are ultimately litigated involve the posting of election or campaign-oriented political signs, it is important to remember that the restrictions on government regulation reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court cases are not limited to purely political/election speech. Gilleo, for example, concerned the posting of an anti-war sign in a residential window -not a candidate advertisement (114 S.Ct . 2038) ; and Spence involved the display of an altered flag - not a statement respecting a particular election issue (418 U.S. 405 . ) Likewise, in Vincent, Justice Stevens notes that , (a] n assertion that 'Jesus Saves' , that 'Abortion is Murder' , that every woman has the 'Right to Choose, ' or that 'Alcohol Kills, ' may have a claim to a constitutional exemption from the ordinance that is just as strong as ' Roland Vincent - City Council . ' ,, (Vincent , supra, 466 U.S . at 816 . ) (See also Union City Bd. of Zoning Appeals et . al . v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc. (Sup. Ct. GA 1996) 467 S .E.2d 875, 879 - 882 [ordinance limiting definition of on-site sign to messages relating to situs impermissibly impugns upon non- commercial protected speech; allowance for temporary political/election signs insufficient to cure defect in omission of allowance for permanent political or opinion signs; limitation requiring removal of temporary political signs within specified duration of election impermissible content-based regulation where other temporary signs had no such durational limitation and where city failed to justify restriction] . ) Thus, even if a specific exemption for election-related speech question) an ' le and that remains in e )were clearly permissible ( qu , RMPUB\HP01872 -8- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE ordinance not also exempting other forms of non-commercial opinion speech would not likely survive constitutional scrutiny. Like election-related "political speech, " religious speech and speech directed toward issues of general public interest or importance are entitled to a significant level of protection. "Government may not set the agenda" for public debate via regulations limiting the types of non-commercial speech permitted. (See, e .g. , City of Lakewood v. Colfax (Colo. 1981) 634 P. 2d 52 . ) III. REGULATION OF NON-COMMUNICATIVE ASPECTS: SIZE, COLOR, LOCATION, DURATION The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that cities have a legitimate government interest in regulating the non-communicative aspects of signs . These aspects may, under some circumstances, include size, shape, color, number and duration. (See, e .g. , Metromedia, supra, 453 U.S . at 502 ; Rectan v. Time, Inc . (1984) 468 U.S. 641, 104 S.Ct . 3262 , 3270 [color and size limitations may exist without being content based; restrictions do not prevent expression of views or use of illustrations to express those views . ) Such restrictions may be permissible to the extent that sign limitations do not significantly deter the exercise of First Amendment rights . (Baldwin v. Redwood City (9th Cir. 1976) 540 F. 2d 1360 cert . denied sub. nom. Leipzig v. Baldwin, 431 U.S . 913 [comparing size restrictions to decibel restrictions upheld in noise ordinances] . ) However, if regulation of the non- communicative aspects impinges upon the communicative aspects of the sign, the ordinance will still be struck down. A. NO CLEARCUT STANDARDS. Unfortunately, cases in this area have likewise produced disparate results and there is no clearcut "minimum" size, spacing, or number limitation that is acceptable to the courts. For example : 1976 - Limiting Number of Signs "OK" : In Baldwin v. Redwood City, supra, (9th Cir. 1976) 540 F. 2d 1360, the court upheld a size limitation of 16 sq. ft . per sign and an aggregate total per lot of 80 sq. ft . But the court also expressly noted it was not addressing validity of duration limitation on temporary signs because the issue was not raised by the parties. 1977 - Limiting Number and Size Not "OK" : Then, in Verrilli v. City of Concord (9th Cir. 1977) 548 F.2d 262, the court struck an ordinance restricting political signs to 4 sq. ft . and one sign per lot . (However, this appears to have been RMPUB\HPD1872 -9- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE based entirely upon the trial court' s conclusion that the city had not even attempted to justify its size restrictions . ) 1993 Limiting Number Not "OK" , but Limiting Duration "OK" : Then, in Arlington County Republican Committee v. Arlington county, Virginia (4th Cir. 1993) 983 F . 2d 587, 595, the court struck down an ordinance limiting the number of political signs on residential property to two (especially where governing authority failed to demonstrate any fact- specific need for such a limitation) , but suggesting regulation be accomplished via limitations on spacing and duration of the sign. (Accord Dimas v. City of Warren (E.D. MI 1996) 939 F.Supp. 554 . ) Limiting Number "OK, " but Limiting Duration Not "OK" : In Whitton v. City of Gladstone, Missouri (8th Cir. 1995) 54 F. 3d 1400 , 1408 - 1409, an ordinance limiting size to 4 sq. ft . per sign and 64 sq. ft . aggregate was held unconstitutional because of durational limitation; lack of proof of necessity, coupled with less restrictive means of remedyalready in lace (including size limitations) rendered Y P g duration limitation impermissible and unnecessary. 1996 - Limiting Number "OK" , but Limiting Duration Not "OK" : But recently, in Union City Board of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc . (Sup. Ct . GA. 1996) 467 S .E. 2d 875, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld an unspecified number limitation, but struck a duration limitation as impermissible content- related regulation of temporary political signs . As these cases reflect, not only have the courts failed to reach a consensus as to limitations on number and, to some extent, duration, they establish no clear guidelines with respect to size . (One court did uphold an eleven inch height restriction for signs placed on public property, but this holding is not the norm and the facts of the case are limited to posters placed upon utility poles . It did not limit the size of signs placed on private property nor signs placed in more spacious areas . (Candidates Outdoor Graphic Service v. City and County of San Francisco (N.D. CA 1983) 574 F. Supp. 1240 . ) A sampling of ordinances from the California League of Cities likewise reveals a wide-range of size provisions in ordinances . B. AN EMERGING CONSENSUS. Nevertheless, some consensus does appear to be forming with respect to time, place and manner regulation.V V The confusion in this area of law has led to some interesting gymnastics by cities attempting to come up with a valid ordinance . (continued. . . ) RMPUB\MPD1872 -1 0- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 1. Limitations must be content-neutral : non-commercial speech should be afforded at least as great protection as commercial speech and political/election speech must not be arbitrarily discriminated from opinion speech or general temporary signs or permanent signs. First and foremost, any regulation imposed must be content neutral . That is, non-commercial speech must be afforded at least as great a freedom as commercial speech (more freedom is also acceptable) and the regulation may not distinguish different types of temporary signs, or non-commercial signs, based upon the content of the message . For example : McCormack v. Township of Clinton (1994) 872 F.Supp. 1320 (D.N.J. ) , an ordinance limiting the duration of temporary political signs in residential districts to a time period of ten days before until ten days after an election was found to be an unconstitutional content-based restriction. In this case, other types of temporary signs (yard sales, etc. ) were permitted to be erected up to 30 days in advance of the event . (Indeed, given the U.S . Supreme Court' s deference to residential signs in Gilleo, any regulation as to residential 6� ( . . .continued) By the time of trial in Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid (6th Cir. 1996) 88 F.3d 382, for example, a city had three times amended a challenged ordinance originally intended to stop a proliferation of real estate "for sale" signs on residential property (and -concurrent drops in market values) . The first version of the ordinance restricted "for sale" signs to front windows . When the trial court issued a preliminary injunction to prohibit its enforcement, the city amended the ordinance to apply to all types of commercial signs in residential areas . Then, just days before trial, the ordinance was amended a third time - this time banning all yard signs in residential areas (except identification and temporary construction signs) . Because the first two versions of the ordinance had been amended, the court of appeals declined to consider whether they would have been valid. A reading of the remainder of its opinion, however, indicates that they would not have upheld the first two versions even had the issue not become moot . First, the court noted that Gilleo now prohibits a total ban on residential yard signs . Furthermore, the prohibition limiting signs to window display did not provide adequate alternative means of communication - especially for owners wishing to sell their own homes, for whom listings, mailers and other traditional real estate sales forums would not reasonably be available . RMPUB\HP01872 -11- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE political signs will now be under close scrutiny and may now be impermissible - including limitations as to duration. ) Collier v. City of Tacoma (Sup. Ct . Wash. 1993) 854 P. 2d 1046 [duration limitation of 60 days before election unconstitutional content-based regulation directed toward election materials . ] Whitton v. City of Gladstone (8th Cir. 1995) 54 F. 3d 1400 [durational limitation on political signs and imposition of vicarious liability on candidates for ordinance violations invalid. content-based restrictions . ] Brayton v. City of New Brighton (Ct . App. Minn. 1994) 519 N.W. 2d 243 [ordinance upheld limiting number of non-commercial o signs to one per property for entire year where sign could contain multiple messages; and where allowance during election periods for one additional sign per ballot measure and one additional sign per candidate; ordinance did not discriminate against content of non-commercial messages nor advocate particular viewpoint . 171 City of Waterloo v. Markham (App. Ct . 111 . 1992) 600 N.E. 2d 17 1320 [requirement that all temporary signs, regardless of ' message or content, be removed within 90 days of erection valid regulation; applied to all temporary signs and also 7 �t provided adequate alternative channels in that persons free to re-erect sign at any time . ] In Rzadkowolski v. Village of Lake Orion (6th Cir. 1988) 845 F. 2d 653 , 654, an ordinance limiting the number of billboards carrying commercial or non-commercial messages was found not to be regulative of content; limitations not directed toward specific ,message, only toward commercial v. noncommercial distinction. Outdoor Sys . , Inc. v. City of Mesa (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F. 2d 604 , 615 . ) Ordinances of two Arizona cities regulating size and location of both commercial and non-commercial speech were Authorities caution against too much reliance upon Brayton' s x ra durin acceptance of the "one permanent, extra g elections" restrictions for several reasons : (1) it conflicts with Arlington, a case better reasoned and decided just one year prior to Gilleo but for which cert . was denied; (2) Brayton fails to distinguish between yard signs and window signs, despite Gilleo' s strong deference to residential, particularly in-home, use; and (3) Brayton relies too heavily upon implicit deference to local decision-making, rather than undertaking an in-depth analysis of the constitutional issues at stake . (See Zoning and Planning Commission Handbook (1997) sec . 12 . 05 [4] , p. 615 - 616 . ) RMPUB\HPD1872 -12- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE upheld. Both Mesa and Tucson ordinances limited commercial signs to on-site locations and permitted non-commercial copy to be substituted for commercial copy. Tucson permitted off- site commercial messages in only specified locations, and Mesa prohibited off-site commercial messages altogether. But see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network. Inc. (1993) 507 U. S . 410, 429 - 431 (city' s aesthetic and safety interest in limiting the total number of newsracks is not furthered by an ordinance banning all commercial newsracks, but not limiting the number of non-commercial newsracks . ] Gannett Outdoor Co. of Michigan v. City of Troy (Ct . App. Mich. 1986) 409 N.W. 2d 719, an ordinance permitting political signs in any virtually any area of the city, but limiting "non-accessory" signs of any nature to 12 ft . in height, 300 sq. ft . in area and 200 ft . set back from the right-of-way, was upheld as, inter alia, applying equally to commercial and non-commercial messages without exception (unlike the ordinance in Metromedia. ) Gannett was decided long before the U.S . Supreme Court' s decision in Gilleo, however, and it is unlikely it would still survive challenge to the extent that the definition of "non-accessory" signs may include residential signs unable to comply with the set-back requirements. Wilson v. City of Louisville (W.D. KY 1997) 957 F.Supp. 948, 950 - 952, a federal district court upheld a city' s ordinance amendment reducing the permissible size of small, freestanding signs from 32 sq. ft . to 8 sq. ft . ; and reducing their maximum height from 9 ft . to 4 ft . By the trial court' s analysis, the reductions did not violate standards of reasonable time, place and manner regulation. The decisive factors appeared to be both the city' s detailed findings with respect to safety hazard, aesthetic improvement, etc . , and the opposition' s failure to present adequate evidence that persons communicating via the larger signs would be unable to effectively communicate via the smaller ones . In other words, this "channel of communication" was potentially still open and usable. (However, the trial court' s analysis on this latter point is rather weak, and at no time is Gilleo or the effect on residential areas discussed. ) See also Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc . v. State of Oregon (Ct . App. OR 1997) 945 P.2d 614 , 620 - 621 (plaintiff' s argument that non-commercial speech treated more harshly than commercial where ordinance placed size (32 sq. ft . ) and duration (remove within 30 days of election) limitations on off-premise political signs is unfounded; commercial signs not permitted off-premises at all . RMPUB\HPD1872 -13- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 2 . Non-commercial speech, especially in residential areas, will receive favored treatment from the courts. Ultimately, the trend in the caselaw appears to favor liberal treatment of non-commercial signage/speech - especially in residential areas - absent a concrete and specific factual basis for limitation. The U. S . Supreme Court observed in Gilleo that : "individual residents themselves have strong incentives to keep their own property values up and to prevent 'visual clutter' in their own yards and neighborhoods . . . (A] resident' s self interest diminishes the danger of the 'unlimited' proliferation of residential signs that concerns the City. . . . " (114 S .Ct . at 2047 . ) That observation has been relied upon by at least one federal appellate court in further support of its conclusion that a city had inadequately demonstrated any need to impose durational limitations on election signs or impose liability upon candidates for removal of non-conforming signs . Whitton v. City of Gladstone, Missouri (8th Cir. 1995) 54 F.3d 1400, 1408 - 1409 . ) 3 . General standards for regulation. To be content-neutral, restrictions should not : * Place greater restrictions upon political/opinion temporary signs than upon other temporary signs; * Limit erection of political/opinion signs to non- commercial zones; * Place durational limitations upon political/opinion signs that do not exist for other temporary signs; * So restrict size, number or color/type size as to impede upon its reasonable use as a means of communication; single out political/opinion signs for such restriction when similar signs are not so restricted; Furthermore, a city cannot require the obtaining of a "permit" to engage in political/opinion speech; should not impose vicarious liability upon a candidate for office for payment of abating non- conforming signs; must make a reasonable attempt to locate the signs owner prior to summary removal (but thereafter may treat as abandoned) ; impose a deposit and/or inspection fee requirement that is not both reasonable and proportionately related to the actual cost of the services involved; nor require burdensome nor otherwise unreasonable "application" or registration for the posting of political/opinion signs, such that exercise of free speech is RMPUB\MPD1872 -14- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE discouraged, impeded, taxed or otherwise made unnecessarily burdensome . (Baldwin v. City of Redwood (9th Cir. 1976) 540 F. 2d 1360 ; see also, Verrilli v. City of Concord (9th Cir. 1977) 548 F. 2d 262, 264 . ) Finally, and second in importance only to the avoidance of content-based limitations, a city must be prepared to backup its stated objectives with hard facts demonstrating the need to impose whatever limitations are imposed. It is not enough to state an aesthetic or safety purpose in limiting political or opinion signs where the existence of other temporary signs has caused no such problems or no trouble arose prior to enactment of the limitations . (In this instance, for example, the City' s size limitation for political signs is five square feet . The ordinance does not state that the City has a need for such a restrictive size provision, and the City could probably not demonstrate that need. ) IV. A COURT WOULD LIKELY DETERMINE THAT THE CITY OF PALM DESERT SIGN ORDINANCE IS NOT CONTENT-NEUTRAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DISCRIMINATES AGAINST NON-COMMERCIAL SPEECH. The City' s sign ordinance (Chapter 25 . 68 et . seq. ) is probably unenforceable in several respects. Section 25 . 68 . 080 lists six types of signs "allowed on all commercial, industrial, and residential zoned property without a sign permit being required. . . . " Though most are described in terms of their "public purpose, " rather than their content , and thereby probably permissible, section 25 . 68 . 080 (D) specifically exempts : "Religious, charitable, educational, or cultural posters not exceeding sixteen square feet in area, and temporary in nature . " Though "political signs" are also exempt from the permit requirement by virtue of a different section, (section 25 . 68 . 620 (F) ) , but are limited in size to 5 square feet . (Section 25 . 68 . 620 (A) . ) "Political sign" means any sign concerning candidates for political office or involving a ballot issue . " (Section 25 . 68 . 010 (P) . ) A. OPINION SIGNS ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM PERMITS. Non-commercial signs are exempt from the permit requirement, only so long as they contain a message pertaining to an election, or a message that is "religious, cultural , educational or charitable" in nature . Opinion signs, or signs relating to general topics of public debate, are not exempt . (Section 25 . 68 . 540 provides for a "special permit" for civil, patriotic or special events - but given that it is a "permit" process, it appear to be RMPUB\8PD1872 -15- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE focused upon announcements of events rather than expressions of opinion. ) B. NO UNIFORM TREATMENT OF NON-COMMERCIAL SIGNS. Of the exempt non-commercial signage, political signs are singled out for a size restrictions that is nearly 1/3 the size of other exempt non-commercial signs . That is, political signs are limited to 5 sq. ft . while religious, charitable, educational and cultural posters are permitted 16 sq. ft . Additionally, political signs are (rightly) not limited to residential areas . What is the justification for limiting the size of political signs in commercial zones to 5 ft . even where existing signs therein are far larger? Finally, political signs "shall not be located closer together than fifty feet, " (sec . 25 . 68 . 620 (B) ) , but no such limitation exists for religious, charitable, educational or cultural posters . C. THE ORDINANCE MAY UNNECESSARILY INHIBIT THE EXERCISE OF FREE SPEECH BY AMBIGUOUSLY DESCRIBING WHAT IS NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH THE SIGN ORDINANCE. The ordinance states that : " ' Sign' means any thing of visual appearance primarily used for, or having the effect of, attracting attention from the streets, sidewalks or other outside public areas 4&sd 7f0 for identification purposes. . . . " (Sec . 25 . 68 . 010 (U) . ) J!5.O4' Section 25 .68 . 080 exempts religious, charitable, educational or cultural posters - an undefined term, and ostensibly not falling within the definition of "signs . " They are expressly exempt from the permit requirement and no further limitations are placed upon them, other than limiting size to 16 sq. ft . "Political signs, " as noted above, are defined as signs concerning a particular election or ballot issue. Yet, most political signs are not "signs" as that term is defined - that is, they do not "attract attention for identification purposes" . Defining "political signs" by using the pre-defined term "signs, " while calling the other exempted non-commercial articles "posters" creates a preliminary confusion that is only further muddied by the fact that "applicants" for political posters must comply with numerous additional requirements, including duration limitations, written affirmation of responsibility for removal (25 . 68 . 620 (D) , (E) , and written approval from the property owner where the sign will be placed (25 . 68 . 620 (F) , with which "poster" hangers need not comply. RMPUB\RPD1872 -16- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE Additionally, "applicant" is undefined. Both political signs and religious, etc . , "posters" are exempt from the permit requirement, yet those erecting such "posters" are not likewise referred to as "applicants . " Does "applicant" denote that political signs are subject to Section "IX. General Provisions" (25 . 68 .420 et . seq. ) - including approval of the architectural review commission process - while posters are not? Furthermore, because of the requirements already contained in 25 . 68 . 620, .political signs are clearly required to be submitted for some type of prior approval, yet no clear indication is given as to what information, specifically, is required to be presented; or within what timeframe approval will be completed. Finally, "temporary signs" are prohibited except as otherwise specifically allowed, (sec . 25 . 68 . 090 (D) , yet "temporary signs within window areas" are only allowed in commercial zones (sec . 25 . 68 . 340 . ) As with political signs, it could be argued that window displays in a residential district are not "signs, " but that rather begs the question and is, nonetheless, still ambiguous . Is a homeowner entitled to display a poster or sign in the window facing the street protesting a particular issue? D. COMMERCIAL SIGNS APPEAR TO RECEIVE GREATER PROTECTION THAN NON-COMMERCIAL SIGNS. overall, the ordinance appears to afford greater protection to commercial signs than to non-commercial signs, especially in commercial areas. For example, in many instances signs in commercial or industrial zones are afforded a greater signface area. While this may be a reasonable time, place and manner distinction from residential areas, it may difficult to justify the reason for restricting the size of political signs in commercial zones . E. THE SIZE RESTRICTION ON POLITICAL SIGNS IS PROBABLY TOO SMALL. Though no clear minimum size has been established by the courts, signface limitations smaller than 8 - 12 sq. ft . have rarely been approved. A size limitation for political signs of 5 sq. ft . is probably not large enough to be effectively read from the street . Furthermore, absent substantial justification, a prohibition against double-sided and/or corner side signs may be difficult to withstand scrutiny. On a related topic, the 3-color limitation applicable to all signs is probably enforceable as to non-commercial signs in like manner as to commercial signs . (Sec . 25 . 68 .480) No case authority was located expressly addressing regulation of type size or font formatting - other than upon the general premise that any RMPUB\MPD 1872 -17- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE regulation imposed must (a) be content neutral; and (b) not unduly interfere with effective communication. V. RECOMMENDATIONS. Unless the contrary can be can be supported by significant factual evidence and findings : 1 . Amend 25 . 68 . 080 (D) to eliminate the ambiguity with "posters" and move that subsection to part "X. Special Purpose Signs" . The remainder of 25 . 68 . 080 is directed toward public use/informational signage that seems unrelated to the religious, educational, cultural, etc. "posters . " 2 . Set out explicitly what information is required to post non-commercial signs, how quickly they will be approved, and that such temporary signs will be considered abandoned (and thereby summarily abated) after reasonable attempts have been made to locate the owner. (Sec. 25 . 68 . 100 . ) 3 . Clarify that non-commercial opinion speech is also allowed without need of a permit . One possibility is the definition of "political sign" contained in Gannett Outdoor Co of Michigan v. City of Trov (Ct . App. Mich. 1986) 409 N.W.2d 719 . The ordinance therein stated that : " ' Political sign, means a sign whose message relates to: The election of a person to public office, or to a political party, or to a public issue, which shall be voted on at an election called by a public body. Signs relating to an expression of opinion may be included in this definition provided they are not signs as defined in [this chapter] • " "Signs" are then defined in terms of being "used as or is in the nature of an announcement, direction or advertisement by attracting attention to an object, place, activity, person, product, institution, organization or business . " The sole permissible uses for "political signs, " on the other hand, are to provide : "information relating to the election of a person to public office, or relating to a political party, or relating to a matter to be voted upon at an election called by a public body, or any other public issue or expression of opinion. . . . " (Gannett, 409 N.W. 2d at 129 - 130 . ) RMPUB\HP01872 -1 8 ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 4 . Expressly indicate that non-commercial signs may be placed in any zone, including residence windows and commercial/industrial zones (but you may provide that placement in commercial/industrial zones must be over existing copy. ) 5 . Specify that a non-commercial sign, whether permanent or temporary, is permitted off-site (i .e . , does not violate 25 . 68 . 090 (C) . ) 6 . Specify that permanent non-commercial signs are permitted in residential zones . 7 . Specify whether part "IX. General Provisions" applies to non-commercial signs and, if so, to what extent . 8 . Remove the duration limitations for political signs, or impose a uniform duration limit upon all temporary signs . 9 . Remove the minimum spacing of 50 ft . between signs in residential districts (respecting non-commercial signs . ) RMPUS\BPD1872 -19- I _ ♦ LAW OFFICES OF • BEST BEST 6 KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE January 30, 1998 MEMORANDUM - SUMMARY OF LAW TO: Steve Smith, City of Palm Desert FROM: Robert W. Hargreave, Deputy City Attorney Helene P. Dreyer, Deputy City Attorney RE: Sian Ordinance : Summary of memorandum of law respecting regulation of political, opinion and non-commercial signs . (P.D. Mun. C. 25 . 68 . 010 et . seq. ) This memorandum summarizes, and is a companion memorandum to, the memorandum dated January 30, 1997 "RE: Sign Ordinance - In- Depth Discussion of Current Status of Law Regulating Non-Commercial Speech. " (P.D. Mun. C. 25 . 68 . 010 . ) 1. A City May Regulate Signs to Protect Aesthetic Values . Under current Constitutional standards, a municipality may regulate political signs to further important and legitimate government interests, such as traffic safety or preservation of aesthetic values . 2 . Preservation of Aesthetic Values is Insufficient to Justify Content-Based Regulation. Restrictions on speech, including signs, based upon the content of the message will be subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny. Content-based restrictions that survive this scrutiny are extremely rare . Aesthetic preservation is not a compelling enough governmental interest to justify content-based restrictions . Furthermore, because "aesthetics" are necessarily subjective, regulations based upon aesthetics will receive close consideration by the courts to ensure they are not really "public rationalizations" for what is actually the regulation of the content of speech. Thus, even regulations that do not initially appear to be content-based may ultimately be so characterized if the regulation is "overly inclusive, 11 such as a broad category restriction that unnecessarily restricts too much speech. Regulations containing too many "exceptions" are likewise suspect . RMPUB\HPD1944 ♦ LAW OFFICES OF • BEST BEST 6 KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE It is, therefore, extremely important that all findings, staff research, rationales, etc. , made or considered in supporting restrictions upon signs be supported by factual evidence as succinctly as possible. 3 . Content-Neutral Regulation Must Still Pass the Test. Content-based regulation of speech rarely survives constitutional challenge . A content-neutral regulation, on the other hand, will survive challenge so long as : (1) the ordinance is truly content-neutral; (2) the ordinance furthers a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of speech; (3) the ordinance is narrowly tailored to protect that interest; and (4) reasonable alternative channels of communication remain open. 4 . There is no clear-cut standard for regulating non-commercial speech and once clear standards for commercial speech are eroding. In the past few years, the United Supreme Court has issued several ambiguous and/or seemingly contradictory opinions with respect to sign regulation. The ambiguity resulting from these cases has produced a wide variety of disparate outcomes in the courts and provides little adequate guidance for local authorities endeavoring to protect the aesthetic qualities of their communities . As Justice Rehnquist observed in his dissent of one such opinion: "In a case where city planning commissions and zoning boards must regularly confront constitutional claims of this sort, it is a genuine misfortune to have the Court' s treatment of the subject be a virtual Tower of Babel, from which no definitive principles can be clearly drawn. . . . " (453 U.S. at 569, 101 S .Ct . at 2924 . ) According to some commentators, the trend of the courts to now look not only at whether a regulation discriminates between different types of speech, but also at the relationship between the type of speech and its location, signals a judicial willingness to carefully examine - and often invalidate - even content-neutral regulation. RHPUB\HPD1944 -2- y LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 5 . Restrictions on Residential Non-Commercial Speech Rarely Pass the Pass. a. Individual liberty in the home is protected. Residential property is, by far, the most difficult type of private property to regulate. Courts pay a "special respect to individual liberty in the home" and give great deference to this "venerable means of communication that is both unique and important . " Therefore, though courts make generalized statements that government may impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions even in residential areas, no agreed standard of acceptable regulation has been reached. b. Few practical alternative channels of communication exist. In addition to this deference to a citizen' s right to "speak out" from the home, courts also consider the practical ineffectiveness of alternative channels of communications . Public speaking or handbill distribution from the front lawn cannot compare with the posting of a yard sign and, though other channels for signage may exist, for the low income citizen a hand-made sign in the front window may be the only alternative available . C. The place of the posting may be part of the message. Furthermore, the location of the posted message often identifies the speaker or lends a unique additional meaning to the message conveyed. A "stop the war', sign on the lawn of a veteran, for example, or a sign advocating socialism on the lawn of a mansion. 6 . Emerging consensus M Analysis of multiple court opinion from a variety of state and federal courts reveals the following general results : * Regulations permitting "political" or "election" signs, but ignoring other forms of protected non-commercial speech (opinion, debate, commentary, etc . ) will not be upheld. * Regulation of non-communicative aspects of signs (number, spacing, color, size, etc . ) is permissible in the abstract, but once applied to particular circumstances any such aspect may be viewed "communicative" or a restriction viewed as "overly inclusive. " * Non-commercial speech generally must receive at least as great a protection as commercial speech (i .e . , no limiting temporary opinion signs to one week, but allowing garage sale signs for 30 days . ) RMPUB\HPD19" -3- ' LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE * Political and opinion speech should not require a permit, be charged a fee or deposit, be arbitrarily banned from permanent signage, or be summarily removed without notice . * Political and election-related signs should not be limited to a discrete number of days preceding the election, nor be subjected to durational limits not otherwise applicable to all temporary signs. * Non-commercial speech in developed residential areas will receive highly favored treatment from the courts . * Size, color, number, etc. , limitations cannot unnecessarily restrict the sign' s reasonably effective use as a means of communication. 7 . The Palm Desert Sign Ordinance is Subject to Challenge in Several Respects: The Ordinance : * It is not content-neutral in that it frequently discriminates against non-commercial speech; and there is no uniform treatment of non-commercial signs; there is no uniform treatment of temporary signs; and commercial speech appears to be afforded greater protection than political, opinion and non-commercial speech. * Provides an exception for "political" election related signs, but not for other non-commercial opinion signs . * Provides an even more liberal exception for "religious, charitable, educational, or cultural" speech than it does for political speech. * Non-commercial signs are not exempt from permitting process . * May chill the exercise of free speech by ambiguously describing what is required for certain types of expressive signs . * The size and spacing restrictions on political signs, especially in residential neighborhoods, are too restrictive and prohibit "too much" speech. RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendations for specific language revisions are set forth in a separate memorandum submitted herewith. These are initial draft proposal and much of the language therein is subject to revision upon further consideration and discussion with staff and the City Council . RMPUB\HPD1944 -4- LAW OFFICES OF • BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE At this juncture, our revision efforts have been, and continued to be, focused upon revisions respecting political and/or opinion type signs, and the regulation of temporary signs generally. It is these areas which we feel pose the greatest immediate risk of challenge . However, future consideration should also be given to review of other issues within the sign ordinance, such as revision of the "on site" v. "off site" advertising regulation, or a general overhaul of the ordinance with an eye toward simplification. RMPUB\HPD1944 -5 LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP 4 ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE January 30, 1998 MEMORANDUM TO: Steve Smith, City of Palm Desert FROM: Robert W. Hargreaves, Deputy City Attorney Helene P. Dreyer, Deputy City Attorney RE: Sign Ordinance: Initial draft suggested revisions (P.D. Mun. C. 25 . 68 . 010 et . seq. ) DRAFT PROPOSED REVISIONS TO SIGN ORDINANCE 1. DELETE sec. 25.68.080 (D) . 25 . 68 . 080 (D) exempts from the sign permit requirements "religious, charitable, educational, or cultural posters not exceeding sixteen square feet in area, and temporary in nature" (The remainder of this section is directed toward exemption of general identification, required notices, or directional signs . "Posters" of "religious, " etc . , nature do not logically belong with this group. It should be moved and incorporated into a section covering non-commercial signs as outlined below. ) 2 . AMEND sec. 25. 68 . 020 - Definitions. a. ADD definitions as follows : "Non-commercial message" means a message which does not advertise, announce or attract attention to places or things offered for sale, lease or hire, or products, goods, businesses, or services . A non-commercial message includes a message expressing an opinion or ideology. RMPUB\HP01943 LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ' ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE "Non-commercial sign" means a sign bearing a non-commercial message . "Temporary sign" means a sign that is : painted upon a window, or constructed of cloth, canvas, cardboard, poster board, plastic, light-weight [gauge?] aluminum, or other light temporary materials, with or without a structural frame; and affixed or erected by means of a temporary method of erecting, hanging or affixing, such as by one or more ground stakes, tape, pins, tacks, staples, or other easily removable method; and intended for a temporary period of display. b. AMEND existing definitions as follows : "Political sign" means a non-commercial sign whose message relates to the election of one or more persons to public office, or one or more measures, initiatives or ballot proposals, on an election ballot to be voted on at an election called by a public body. C. AMEND first sentence of "Sign" definition to read: "Sign" means any thing of visual appearance, including but not limited to any word, numeral, letter model, banner, flag, pennant, poster, insignia, device, design or trademark which is affixed to, painted on, or represented upon a building, structure, window, piece of land or natural object, and which is in the nature of or used as an announcement, direction or advertisement by attracting attention to an topic, object, place, activity, person, product, institution, organization or business . " 3 . AMEND the first sentence of sec. 25.68.90 (C) (prohibited signs) to add at the beginning of the first sentence: "Except for permanent non-commercial signs or non- commercial messages, . . . . " 4 . AMEND the first sentence of sec. 25.68.170 ("other signs" in single-family zones) to add to the beginning of the sentence: "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter. . . . " RMPUB\HPD1943 -2- ` LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 5. AMEND the first sentence of sec. 25. 68 .420 ("Signs generally") to read: "The following general sign usage provisions and regulations shall apply for all signs, except that sections 25 . 68 .430 , 25 . 68 .440 and 25 . 68 .460 shall not apply to temporary non-commercial signs . " 6. AMEND the first phrase of the first sentence of sec. 25.68.440 ("Sian review criteria") to read: "All signs which require a sign permit pursuant to this Chapter. . . . " 7 . AMEND sec. 25 . 68 .450 ("Signs facing private property prohibited") to add the following to the beginning of the first sentence: "Except as otherwise provided in section 25 . 68 . 620-4 (C. ) . . . " 8. ADD sec. 25. 68.550 as follows: 1125 . 68 . 550 Non-Commercial Messages . Any sign authorized pursuant to, and otherwise complying with, this Chapter may contain a non-commercial message . Temporary non-commercial signs shall comply with the provisions set forth in Section 25 . 68 . 620 . 9. DELETE sec. 25 . 68 . 620 "Political sign regulation" and ADD new sec. 25 . 68 .620 as follows: 25 . 68 . 620 . Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation. 25 . 68 . 620-1 . General Provisions . A. Registration. Temporary non-commercials igns maybe erected upon submission of a completed registration form to be provided by the department of community development . Registration forms shall be signed by the registrant and shall include : (1) The name of the registrant and the mailing address to which any notices required by this section 25 . 68 . 620 may be sent; (2) A general description of the sign and the location where it will be erected, including whether it will be RMPUB\HPD1943 -3- LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE erected in lieu of an authorized commercial sign or sign copy; (3) A statement affirming that the registrant is responsible for complying with this Chapter, including but not limited to sign maintenance and removal; (4) A statement affirming that the registrant has the permission of the property owner to erect the sign; and (5) A statement affirming, under penalty of perjury, that the registrant has read and understood the contents of the form. B. Consent of Property Owner. No temporary non- commercial sign may be erected without the prior consent of the property owner. Any sign erected or maintained without permission of the property owner may be summarily removed by the property owner, or his or her authorized representative . C. Public right-of-way. Except as otherwise specifically authorized in this Chapter, no temporary sign may be displayed, erected or maintained in or upon public property or the public right-of-way, including but not limited to, any public utility pole, street sign, shelter, bench or trash receptacle . D. Duration. The registration for a temporary non- commercial sign shall expire ninety days following it' s submission to the department of community development . Notwithstanding the foregoing, the registration for a temporary political sign expires ninety days following it' s submission to the department of community development, or seven days after the election, whichever occurs first . Upon expiration of the registration, the registrant must either remove the sign or complete a new registration form. Signs not removed or re-registered by the end of the next business day following the date of expiration shall be deemed non-complying signs and subject to all applicable penalties and abatement procedures. E. violation - Infraction. Any person violating this section 25 . 68 . 620 shall be guilty of an infraction, and upon conviction thereof shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) ; and such person shall be deemed guilty of a separate offense for each day, or portion thereof, during which any violation of this chapter is committed or continued. //� �hw.1W� C.IW F. Abatement . The director of environmental semuiaes shall not permit, and shall abate,any temporary non- RMPUB\HPD1943 -4- LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST 6 KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE commercial sign within the city which fails to meet the requirements of this Chapter or other applicable law. In addition to the penalties set forth in subsection (F) , the director of env-ironmentta�—se-r-v-ees, or his authorized representative, may remove any temporary non-commercial sign that is not in compliance with this Chapter. Prior to removal , the director of environmental services, or his authorized representative, shall give notice to the registrant, or the property owner if the sign is not registered, that the sign is not in compliance and is subject to removal . The notice shall specify the corrections necessary to restore compliance, including the option of voluntary removal of the sign; and shall warn the recipient that the sign will be removed if compliance is not restored within five days of the date of the notice, that such removal will be at the expense of the recipient, and that such removal shall be in addition to the penalties provided for in subsection M . Notwithstanding the foregoing, temporary signs found on public property or the public right-of-way will be summarily removed and stored at city hall . Notice shall be given to the registrant, if known, informing the registrant of the removal and reasonable costs incurred, and warning that the sign will be stored at city hall for only ten days from the date of the notice. Prior to releasing such stored signs to the registrant, the registrant shall pay the reasonable removal and storage costs and any other penalty due pursuant to this chapter. 25 . 68 . 620-2 . Temporary Non-Commercial Signs on Developed Lots in Residence Districts or Residential Zones. A. One or more temporary non-commercial signs may be maintained on any residence-developed lot in a residential district or residential zone . B. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages . C. Owners of residence-developed residential lots may apply for a permit to erect a permanent non-commercial sign pursuant to the permit process set forth in section 25 . 68 . 030 et . seq. , with a maximum sign face area II (To fill in blank: If lot size similar to lot size of commercial, then "in the same proportion as forth in section 25 . 68 . 270" ; if lot size similar to lot sizes for churches, restaurants, etc. , then "not exceeding twenty square feet (sec . 25 . 68 .210 . ) " RMPUB\HPD1943 -5- LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 25 . 68 . 620-3 . Temporary Non-Commercial Signs on Non- Residence Developed Lots in Residential Districts or Residential Zones; and on Developed Lots in Commercial or Industrial Zones. A. The owner or user of any permanent sign authorized on a developed lot in a commercial or industrial zone, or pursuant to Part VI . , Other Residential Zones, may erect, or allow to be erected, temporary sign copy containing one or more non-commercial messages in lieu of part or all of, and subject to the same size restrictions as, the permanent sign copy authorized. Such "in lieu of" temporary sign copy shall be affixed to the permanent sign within the permanent sign face . If the sign face area used for "in lieu of" temporary sign copy exceeds 6 square feet, the size of the individual text characters of the temporary sign shall not exceed 8 inches . B. One additional temporary non-commercial sign, with a sign face area not to exceed 6 square feet, may be maintained on any developed lot in a commercial or industrial zone . The maximum height of the sign shall be six feet unless topographic or other physical features exist necessitating a higher sign, but in no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. The sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages . 25 . 68 . 620-4 . Temporary Non-Commercial Signs on Undeveloped Lots . A. One or more temporary non-commercial signs may be maintained on any undeveloped lot in the City. B. For any undeveloped lot with frontage adjacent to a public right-of-way, the aggregate total sign face area per lot shall not exceed one square foot of sign face per lineal foot of frontage on the public-right of way, to a maximum of fifty square feet of sign face. An undeveloped lot on more than one public right-of-way shall be authorized the sign area on each right-of-way, provided that the sign face areas may not be accumulated and shall not exceed the allowed area of any one right-of-way. Such signs shall be located no farther than 100 feet and no closer than 5 feet from the public right of way. On any sign with a sign face area in excess of 6 square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed 8 inches . C. For any undeveloped lot with no frontage adjacent to a public right-of-way, the aggregate total sign face area per lot shall not exceed one square foot of sign face per lineal RMPUB\HPD1943 -6- • LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST 6 KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE feet of the longest property line, up to a maximum of fifty square feet of sign face. Such signs shall be located no farther than 100 feet and no closer than 5 feet from the property line . On any sign with a sign face area in excess of 6 square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed 10 inches. Signs may not be erected facing any adjacent developed lot . D. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages . E. The maximum height of such signs shall be six feet unless topographic or other physical features exist necessitating a higher sign, but in no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. RMPUB\HP01943 -7- LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST 6 KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE January 30 , 1998 MEMORANDUM TO: Steve Smith, City of Palm Desert FROM: Robert W. Hargreaves, Deputy City Attorney Helene P. Dreyer, Deputy City Attorney RE: Sign Ordinance : Initial draft suggested revisions (P.D. Mun. C. 25 . 68 . 010 et . seq. ) DRAFT PROPOSED REVISIONS TO SIGN ORDINANCE 1 . AMEND Chapter 25 .04 sec. 25 . 04 .750 . 25 . 04 . 750 contains an existing definition of "sign" that conflicts with the existing (and proposed amended) definition of "sign" for Chapter 25 . 68, but may still have relevance with respect to other portions of the zoning ordinance. Therefore, 25 . 04 . 750 should be amended to read at the beginning: "Except as otherwise provided, "Sign" means . . . " 2 . DELETE sec. 25.68.080 (D) . 25 . 68 . 080 (D) exempts from the sign permit requirements "religious, charitable, educational , or cultural posters not exceeding sixteen square feet in area, and temporary in nature" (The remainder of this section is directed toward exemption of general identification, required notices, or directional signs . "Posters" of "religious, " etc . , nature do not logically belong with this group. It should be moved and incorporated into a section covering non-commercial signs as outlined below. ) RMPUB\HPD1943 LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST 6 KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 3 . AMEND sec. 25.68.020 - Definitions. a . ADD definitions as follows : "Non-commercial message" means a message which does not advertise, announce or attract attention to places or things offered for sale, lease or hire, or products, goods, businesses, or services . A non-commercial message includes a message expressing an opinion or ideology. "Non-commercial sign" means a sign bearing a non-commercial message . "Temporary sign" means a sign that is : painted upon a window, or constructed of cloth, canvas, cardboard, poster board, plastic, light-weight [gauge?] aluminum, or other light temporary materials, with or without a structural frame; and affixed or erected by means of a temporary method of erecting, hanging or affixing, such as by one or more ground stakes, tape, pins, tacks, staples, or other easily removable method; and intended for a temporary period of display. b. AMEND existing definitions as follows : "Political sign" means a non-commercial sign whose message relates to the election of one or more persons to public office, or one or more measures, initiatives or ballot proposals, on an election ballot to be voted on at an election called by a public body. C . AMEND first sentence of "Sign" definition to read: "Sign" means any thing of visual appearance, including but not limited to any word, numeral, letter model, banner, flag, pennant, poster, insignia, device, design or trademark which is affixed to, painted on, or represented upon a building, structure, window, piece of land or natural object, and which is in the nature of or used as an announcement, direction or advertisement by attracting attention to an topic, object, place, activity, person, product, institution, organization or business; together with all parts, materials, frame and background. " 4 . AMEND the first sentence of sec. 25.68.90 (C) (prohibited signs) to add at the beginning of the first sentence: "Except for permanent non-commercial signs or non- commercial messages, . . . . Il RMPUB\HPD1943 -2 LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 5 . AMEND the first sentence of sec 25 68 . 170 ("other signs" in single-family zones) to add to the beginning of the sentence: "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter. . . . " 6 . AMEND the first sentence of sec 25 68 .420 ("Signs generally") to read: "The following general sign usage provisions and regulations shall apply for all signs, except that sections 25 . 68 . 430 , 25 . 68 . 440 and 25 . 68 .460 shall not apply to temporary non-commercial signs . " 7 . AMEND the first phrase of the first sentence of sec. 25. 68 .440 ("Sign review criteria") to read: "All signs which require a sign permit pursuant to this Chapter. . . . " 8. AMEND sec 25 68 450 ("Signs facing private property prohibited") to add the following to the beginning of the first sentence: "Except as otherwise provided in section 25 . 68 . 620-4 (C. ) . . . " 9. ADD sec. 25.68.550 as follows: 1125 . 68 . 550 Non-Commercial Messages . Any sign authorized pursuant to, and otherwise complying with, this Chapter may contain a non-commercial message . Temporary non-commercial signs shall comply with the provisions set forth in Section 25 . 68 . 620 . 10 . DELETE sec 25 68 620 "Political sign regulation" and ADD new sec. 25.68.620 as follows: 25 . 68 . 620 . Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation. 25 . 68 . 620-1 . General Provisions . A. Registration. Temporary non-commercial signs maybe erected upon submission of a completed registration form to be provided by the department of community development . Registration forms shall be signed by the registrant and shall include : RMPUB\HPD1943 -3 LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE (1) The name of the registrant and the mailing address to which any notices required by this section 25 . 68 . 620 may be sent; (2) A general description of the sign and the location where it will be erected, including whether it will be erected in lieu of an authorized commercial sign or sign copy; (3) A statement affirming that the registrant is responsible for complying with this Chapter, including but not limited to sign maintenance and removal ; (4) A statement affirming that the registrant has the permission of the property owner to erect the sign; and (5) A statement affirming, under penalty of perjury, that the registrant has read and understood the contents of the form. B. Consent of Property Owner. No temporary non- commercial sign may be erected without the prior consent of the property owner. Any sign erected or maintained without permission of the property owner may be summarily removed by the property owner, or his or her authorized representative . C. Public right-of-way. Except as otherwise specifically authorized in this Chapter, no temporary sign may be displayed, erected or maintained in or upon public property or the public right-of-way, including but not limited to, any public utility pole, street sign, shelter, bench or trash receptacle . D. Duration. The registration for a temporary non- commercial sign shall expire ninety days following it' s submission to the department of community development . Notwithstanding the foregoing, the registration for a temporary political sign expires ninety days following it' s submission to the department of community development, or seven days after the election, whichever occurs first . Upon expiration of the registration, the registrant must either remove the sign or complete a new registration form. Signs not removed or re-registered by the end of the next business day following the date of expiration shall be deemed non-complying signs and subject to all applicable penalties and abatement procedures . E. Violation - Infraction. Any person violating this section 25 . 68 . 620 shall be guilty of an infraction, and upon conviction thereof shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) ; and such person shall be deemed RMPUB\MPD1943 -4- LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE guilty of a separate offense for each day, or portion thereof, during which any violation of this chapter is committed or continued. F. Abatement . The director of environmental services shall not permit, and shall abate, any temporary non- commercial sign within the city which fails to meet the requirements of this Chapter or other applicable law. In addition to the penalties set forth in subsection (F) , the director of environmental services, or his authorized representative, may remove any temporary non-commercial sign that is not in compliance with this Chapter. Prior to removal, the director of environmental services, or his authorized representative, shall give notice to the registrant, or the property owner if the sign is not registered, that the sign is not in compliance and is subject to removal . The notice shall specify the corrections necessary to restore compliance, including the option of voluntary removal of the sign; and shall warn the recipient that the sign will be removed if compliance is not restored within five days of the date of the notice, that such removal will be at the expense of the recipient, and that such removal shall be in addition to the penalties provided for in subsection (F) . Notwithstanding the foregoing, temporary signs found on public property or the public right-of-way will be summarily removed and stored at city hall . Notice shall be given to the registrant, if known, informing the registrant of the removal and reasonable costs incurred, and warning that the sign will be stored at city hall for only ten days from the date of the notice . Prior to releasing such stored signs to the registrant, the registrant shall pay the reasonable removal and storage costs and any other penalty due pursuant to this chapter. G. Exception. In a residence district, the owner or occupant of property that is developed with a dwelling may erect temporary non-commercial signage thereon without complying with the registration process . 25 . 68 . 620-2 . Temporary Non-Commercial Signs on Developed Lots in Residence Districts or Residential Zones . A. One or more temporary non-commercial signs may be maintained on any residence-developed lot in a residential district or residential zone . B. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages . RMPUB\HPD1943 -5 LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE C. Owners of residence-developed residential lots may apply for a permit to erect a permanent non-commercial sign pursuant to the permit process set forth in section 25 . 68 . 030 et . seq. , with a maximum sign face area 11 (To fill in blank: If lot size similar to lot size of commercial, then "in the same proportion as forth in section 25 . 68 . 270" ; if lot size similar to lot sizes for churches, restaurants, etc . , then "not exceeding twenty square feet (sec . 25 . 68 . 210 . ) " 25 . 68 . 620-3 . Temporary Non-Commercial Signs on Non- Residence Developed Lots in Residential Districts or Residential Zones; and on Developed Lots in Commercial or Industrial Zones . A. The owner or user of any permanent sign authorized on a developed lot in a commercial or industrial zone, or pursuant to Part VI . , Other Residential Zones, may erect , or allow to be erected, temporary sign copy containing one or more non-commercial messages in lieu of part or all of, and subject to the same size restrictions as, the permanent sign copy authorized. Such "in lieu of" temporary sign copy shall be affixed to the permanent sign within the permanent sign face. If the sign face area used for "in lieu of" temporary sign copy exceeds 6 square feet, the size of the individual text characters of the temporary sign shall not exceed 8 inches . B. One additional temporary non-commercial sign, with a sign face area not to exceed 6 square feet, may be maintained on any developed lot in a commercial or industrial zone . The maximum height of the sign shall be six feet unless topographic or other physical features exist necessitating a higher sign, but in no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. The sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages . 25 . 68 . 620-4 . Temporary Non-Commercial Signs on Undeveloped Lots . A. One or more temporary non-commercial signs may be maintained on any undeveloped lot in the City. B. For any undeveloped lot with frontage adjacent to a public right-of-way, the aggregate total sign face area per lot shall not exceed one square foot of sign face per lineal foot of frontage on the public-right of way, to a maximum of fifty square feet of sign face. An undeveloped lot on more than one public right-of-way shall be authorized the sign area RMPUB\HP01943 -6 LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST 6 KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE on each right-of-way, provided that the sign face areas may not be accumulated and shall not exceed the allowed area of any one right-of-way. On any sign with a sign face area in excess of 6 square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed 8 inches . C. For any undeveloped lot with no frontage adjacent to a public right-of-way, the aggregate total sign face area per lot shall not exceed one square foot of sign face per lineal feet of the longest property line, up to a maximum of fifty square feet of sign face . On any sign with a sign face area in excess of 6 square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed 10 inches . Signs may not be erected facing any adjacent developed lot . D. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. E . The maximum height of such signs shall be six feet unless topographic or other physical features exist necessitating a higher sign, but in no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. RMPUB\HPD1943 -7- ' LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE February 27, 1998 MEMORANDUM TO: Steve Smith, City of Palm Desert FROM: Robert W. Hargreaves, Deputy City Attorney Helene P. Dreyer, Deputy City Attorney RE : Sign Ordinance : Draft suggested revisions (P.D. Mun. C. 25 . 68 . 010 et . seq. ) PROPOSED REVISIONS TO SIGN ORDINANCE 1 . AMEND Chapter 25 .04, sec. 25 . 04 .750 . 25 . 04 . 750 contains an existing definition of "sign" that conflicts with the existing (and proposed amended) definition of "sign" for Chapter 25 . 68 , but may still have relevance with respect to other portions of the zoning ordinance . Therefore, 25 . 04 . 750 should be amended to read at the beginning: "Except as otherwise provided, "Sign" means . . . " 2 . DELETE sec. 25. 68. 080 (D) . 25 . 68 . 080 (D) exempts from the sign permit requirements "religious, charitable, educational, or cultural posters not exceeding sixteen square feet in area, and temporary in nature" (The remainder of this section is directed toward exemption of general identification, required notices, or directional signs . "Posters" of "religious, " etc . , nature do not logically belong with this group. It should be moved and incorporated into a section covering non-commercial signs as outlined below. ) RMPUB\HPD1943 • ' LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 3 . AMEND sec. 25 . 68 . 020 - Definitions. a. ADD definitions as follows : "Non-commercial message" means a message which does not advertise, announce or attract attention to places or things offered for sale, lease or hire, or products, goods, businesses, or services . A non-commercial message includes a message expressing an opinion or ideology. "Non-commercial sign" means a sign bearing a non-commercial message . "Temporary sign" means a sign that is : painted upon a window, or constructed of cloth, canvas, cardboard, poster board, plastic, light-weight [gauge?] aluminum, or other light temporary materials, with or without a structural frame; and affixed or erected by means of a temporary method of erecting, hanging or affixing, such as by one or more ground stakes, tape, pins, tacks, staples, or other easily removable method; and intended for a temporary period of display. b. AMEND existing definitions as follows : "Political sign" means a non-commercial sign whose message relates to the election of one or more persons to public office, or one or more measures, initiatives or ballot proposals, on an election ballot to be voted on at an election called by a public body. C . AMEND first sentence of "Sign" definition to read: "Sign" means any thing of visual appearance, including but not limited to any word, numeral, letter model, banner, flag, pennant, poster, insignia, device, design or trademark which is affixed to, painted on, or represented upon a building, structure, window, piece of land or natural object, and which is in the nature of or used as an announcement, direction or advertisement by attracting attention to an topic, object , place, activity, person, product, institution, organization or business; together with all parts, materials, frame and background. " 4 . AMEND section 25 .68 .060 : DELETE "department of environmental services" and REPLACE IT WITH "department of community development" . RMPUB\HPD1943 -2- ��' ' LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 5 . AMEND the first sentence of sec. 25 .68 .90 (C) (prohibited signs) to add at the beginning of the first sentence: "Except for permanent non-commercial signs or non- commercial messages, . . . . " 6 . AMEND section 25.68 .100 : First Paragraph: DELETE "director of environmental services" and REPLACE IT WITH "director of community development" . Third Paragraph, First Sentence : DELETE "director of environmental services" and REPLACE IT WITH "director of community development" . Third Paragraph, Second Sentence : DELETE "director of environmental services" and REPLACE IT WITH "director of community development" . 7 . AMEND section 2S.68.130 ("realty signs") to add the following to the end of that section: "Realty signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25 . 68 . 620 . 7 . " 8 . AMEND sec. 25 . 68.170 ("other signs" in single-family zones) : ADD to Beginning of First Sentence : "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter. . . . " LAST Sentence : DELETE "director of environmental services" and REPLACE IT WITH "director of community development" . 9 . AMEND section 25 .68 .250 as follows: AMEND subsection B. : DELETE "director of environmental services" and REPLACE IT WITH "director of community development" ADD subsection C: "C. Sales and rental signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25 . 68 . 620 . 7 . " RMPUB\HPD1943 -3- •' LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST 6 KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 10 . AMEND section 25. 68.350 as follows: AMEND subsection A. : DELETE "director of environmental services" and REPLACE IT WITH "director of community development" 11. AMEND section 25 . 68 .400 to ADD subsection C. as follows : 11C. Sales and rental signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25 . 68 . 620 . 7 . " 12 . AMEND the first sentence of sec. 25.68 .420 ("Sicins generally") to read• "The following general sign usage provisions and regulations shall apply for all signs, except that sections 25 . 68 .430, 25 . 68 .440 and 25 . 68 . 460 shall not apply to temporary non-commercial signs . " 13 . AMEND the first phrase of the first sentence of sec. 25 . 68 .440 ("Sign review criteria") to read: "All signs which require a sign permit pursuant to this Chapter. . . . 11 14 . DELETE sec . 25 . 68 .450 ("Sians facing private property prohibited. ") 15. ADD sec . 25 . 68 . 570 as follows: 1125 . 68 . 570 Non-Commercial Messages . Any sign authorized pursuant to, and otherwise complying with, this Chapter may contain a non-commercial message . Temporary non-commercial signs shall comply with the provisions set forth in Section 25 . 68 . 620 . RMPUB\HPD1943 -4- I� • LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 16 . DELETE sec. 25.68.620 "Political sign recrulation" and ADD new sec. 25 .68 .620 as follows : 25 .68 .620 . Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation. 25 . 68 .620 .1. General Provisions. A. Public right-of-way. Except as otherwise specifically authorized in this Chapter, no temporary sign may be displayed, erected or maintained in or upon public property or the public right-of-way, including but not limited to, any public utility pole, street sign, shelter, bench or trash receptacle . B. Free standing signs . The maximum height of freestanding temporary non-commercial signs shall be six feet from ground level unless topographic or other physical features exist necessitating a higher sign. In no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. C. Sign Categories . The following categories apply to all temporary non-commercial signs : 1 . Category A. Temporary non-commercial signs in residential districts in areas developed with a dwelling. For purposes of this 25 . 68 . 620, "areas developed with a dwelling" means : the entire lot if any portion thereof is developed with a single family home; the demised premises of any occupied residential leasehold interest , such as an occupied mobilehome lot or apartment unit; the non- common areas of a condominium or timeshare unit intended for use as a dwelling. 2 . Category B . Temporary non-commercial signs in residential districts on vacant lots . 3 . Category C. Temporary non-commercial signs on developed lots in "Other Residential Zones" as provided in Part VI . , Section 25 . 68 . 180 et . seq. 4 . Category D. Temporary non-commercial signs on developed lots in commercial or industrial zones . 5 . Category E. Temporary non-commercial signs on vacant lots in commercial or industrial zones . 6 . Category F. Temporary non-commercial sign or sign copy erected in lieu of an authorized permanent sign or permanent sign copy. RMPUB\HPD1943 -5- LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 25 .68 .620 .2 . Category A Signs. One or more Category A signs may be erected and maintained by, or with the consent of, the dwelling owner or occupant . Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages . 25. 68 . 620 .3 . Category B Signs. Subject to the registration requirements set forth in 25 . 68 . 620 . 7 , one or more Category B signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate signface area shall not exceed 12 square feet . Each sign may contain any number of non- commercial messages . For each sign with a sign face area in excess of 6 square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed 8 vertical inches . 25 .68.620 .4 . Category C and Category D Signs. One or more Category C or Category D signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate signface area shall not exceed 6 square feet . The maximum height of each sign shall be six feet unless topographic or other physical features exist necessitating a higher sign, but in no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages . 25 .68.620 .5. Category E Signs. Subject to the registration requirements set forth in 25 . 68 . 620 . 7, one or more Category E signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate signface area shall not exceed 12 square feet on lots with frontage on the public-right-of-way greater than 200 lineal feet, and shall not exceed 3 square feet on lots with frontage on the public right-of-way of 200 lineal feet or less . Each sign may contain any number of non- commercial messages . For each sign with a signface area in excess of 6 square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed 8 vertical inches . 25. 68 . 620 . 6 . Category F Signs. The owner or user of any permanent sign authorized under this Chapter may erect Category F sign copy containing one or more non-commercial messages in lieu of part or all of, and subject to the same size restrictions as, the permanent sign copy authorized. Such "in lieu of" temporary sign copy shall be affixed to the permanent sign within the permanent sign face . RMPUB\HPD1943 -6- ' LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST 6 KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 25 . 68 . 620 .7 . Registration of Category B and Category E Signs. A. Registration. Temporary non-commercial signs in Category B or Category E may only be erected upon submission of a completed registration form to be provided by the department of community development . Registration forms shall be signed by the registrant and shall include : (1) The name of the registrant and the mailing address to which any notices required by this section 25 . 68 . 620 may be sent; (2) A general description of the sign and the location where it will be erected; (3) A statement affirming that the registrant is responsible for complying with this Chapter, including but not limited to sign maintenance and removal ; (4) A statement affirming that the registrant has the permission of the property owner to erect the sign; and (5) A statement affirming, under penalty of perjury, that the registrant has read and understood the contents of the form. B . Registration Information Affixed to Sign. Upon submission of a completed registration form, the registrant shall be provided with a registration number. Each sign shall have the name of the maker, the date of erection, and the registration number clearly legible on the lower right hand corner of the face of the sign. As an alternative, a decal may be issued by the city which shall be placed on the sign at a location visible and readable from the public right of way. Any sign that does not bear valid registration information shall be deemed non-complying and subject to all applicable penalties and abatement procedures . C. Consent of Property Owner. No Category B or Category E temporary non-commercial sign may be erected without the prior consent of the property owner. Any sign erected or maintained without permission of the property owner may be summarily removed by the property owner, or his or her authorized representative . D. Duration. The registration shall expire ninety days following it' s submission to the department of community development . Notwithstanding the foregoing, the registration for a temporary political sign expires ninety days following it' s submission to the department of community development, or seven days after the election, whichever occurs first . RMPUB\HPD1943 -7- • LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE E . Renewal or Removal Required. Upon expiration of the registration, the registrant must either remove the sign or complete a new registration form. Signs not removed or re- registered by the end of the next business day following the date of expiration shall be deemed non-complying signs and subject to all applicable penalties and abatement procedures . 25 . 68 . 620 .8. Enforcement and Penalties . A. Violation - Infraction. Any person violating this section 25 . 68 . 620 shall be guilty of an infraction, and upon conviction thereof shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) ; and such person shall be deemed guilty of a separate offense for each day, or portion thereof, during which any violation of this chapter is committed or continued. B . Abatement . The director of community development shall not permit, and shall abate, any temporary non- commercial sign within the city which fails to meet the requirements of this section 25 . 68 . 620 or other applicable law. In addition to the penalties set forth in 25 . 68 . 620 . 8 (A) , the director of community development, or his authorized representative, may remove any temporary non-commercial sign that is not in compliance. Prior to removal, the director of community development, or his authorized representative, shall give notice to the registrant, or the property owner if the sign is not registered, that the sign is not in compliance and is subject to removal . The notice shall specify the corrections necessary to restore compliance, including the option of voluntary removal of the sign; and shall warn the recipient that the sign will be removed if compliance is not restored within five days of the date of the notice, that such removal will be at the expense of the recipient, and that such removal shall be in addition to the penalties provided for in 25 . 68 . 620 . 8 (A) . Notwithstanding the foregoing, temporary signs found on public property or the public right-of-way will be summarily removed and stored at city hall . Notice shall be given to the registrant, if known, informing the registrant of the removal and reasonable costs incurred, and warning that the sign will be stored at city hall for only ten days from the date of the notice and, if not claimed within that time, shall be destroyed. Prior to releasing such stored signs to the registrant, the registrant shall pay the reasonable removal and storage costs and any other penalty due pursuant to this chapter. RMPUB\HPD1943 -8- LAW OFFICES OF 'BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE January 30, 1998 MEMORANDUM TO: Steve Smith, City of Palm Desert FROM: Robert W. Hargreaves, Deputy City Attorney Helene P. Dreyer, Deputy City Attorney RE: Sign Ordinance : Initial draft suggested revisions (P.D. Mun. C. 25 . 68 . 010 et . seq. ) DRAFT PROPOSED REVISIONS TO SIGN ORDINANCE 1. DELETE sec. 25 .68 . 080 (D) . 25 . 68 . 080 (D) exempts from the sign permit requirements "religious, charitable, educational, or cultural posters not exceeding sixteen square feet in area, and temporary in nature" (The remainder of this section is directed toward exemption of general identification, required notices, or directional signs. "Posters" of "religious, " etc. , nature do not logically belong with this group. It should be moved and incorporated into a section covering non-commercial signs as outlined below. ) 2 . AMEND sec. 25 .68 .020 - Definitions. a. ADD definitions as follows : "Non-commercial message'' means a message which does not advertise, announce or attract attention to places or things offered for sale, lease or hire, or products, goods, businesses, or services . A non-commercial message includes a message expressing an opinion or ideology. RMPUS\HPD1943 LAW OFFICES OF • BEST BEST S KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE "Non-commercial sign" means a sign bearing a non-commercial message . ."Temporary sign" means a sign that is : painted upon a window, or constructed 'of cloth, canvas, cardboard, poster board, plastic, light-weight [gauge?] aluminum, or other light temporary materials, with or without a structural frame; and affixed or erected by means of a temporary method of erecting, hanging or affixing, such as by one or more ground stakes, tape, pins, tacks, staples, or other easily removable method; and intended for a temporary period of display. b. AMEND existing definitions as follows : "Political sign" means a non-commercial sign whose message relates to the election of one or more persons to public office, or one or more measures, initiatives or ballot proposals, on an election ballot to be voted on at an election called by a public body. C . AMEND first sentence of "Sign" definition to read: e-C- "Sign" means any thing of visual appearance, including but not oq.7so limited to any word, numeral, letter model, banner, flag, 'Zile. pennant, poster, insignia, device, design or trademark which is affixed to, painted on, or represented upon a building, structure, window, piece of land or natural object, and which is in the nature of or used as an announcement, direction or advertisement by attracting attention to an topic, object, place, activity, person, product, institution, organization or business . " 3 . AMEND the first sentence of sec. 25.68.90 (C) (prohibited signs) to add at the beginning of the first sentence: "Except for permanent. non-commercial signs or non- commercial messages, . . . . " 4 . AMEND the first sentence of sec. 25 .68.170 ("other signs" in single-family zones) to add to the beginning of the sentence: "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter. . . . " RMPUB\HPD1943 -2- rc LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST 6 KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 5. AMEND the first sentence of sec. 25 .68 .420 ("Signs generally") to read: "The following general sign usage provisions and regulations shall apply for all signs, except that sections 25 . 68 .430, 25 . 68 .440 and 25 . 68 .460 shall not apply to temporary non-commercial signs. " 6 . AMEND the first phrase of the first sentence of sec. 25 . 68 .440 ("Sian review criteria") to read: "All signs which require a sign permit pursuant to this Chapter. . . . " 7 . AMEND sec. 25 .68.450 ("Signs facing private property w:RH prohibited") to add the following to the beginning of the Gy„rd�l^7 first sentence•. yq�lr Go (auc "Except as otherwise provided in section 25 . 68 . 620-4 (C. ) . . . " 8. ADD sec. 25.68 .550 as follows: 25 . 68 . 550 Non-Commercial Messages . d b 5�0 Any sign authorized pursuant to, and otherwise complying with, this Chapter may contain a non-commercial message. .p(IS Temporary non-commercial signs shall comply with the provisions set forth in Section 25 . 68 . 620 . 9 . DELETE sec. 25.68.620 "Political sign regulation" and ADD new sec. 25.68 .620 as follows: 25 .68 . 620 . Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation. 25 . 68 . 620-1 . General Provisions . A. Registration. Temporary non-commercial signs maybe erected upon submission of a completed registration form to be provided by the department of community development . Registration forms shall be signed by the registrant and shall include : (1) The name of the registrant and the mailing address to which any notices required by this section 25 . 68 . 620 may be sent; (2) A general description of the sign and the location where it will be erected, including whether it will be RMPUB\HP01943 -3- LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE erected in lieu of an authorized commercial sign or sign copy; (3) A statement affirming that the registrant is responsible for complying with this Chapter, including but not limited to sign maintenance and removal ; (4) A statement affirming that the registrant has the permission of the property owner to erect the sign; and (5) A statement affirming, under penalty of perjury, that the registrant has read and understood the contents of the form. i� B . Consent of Property Owner. No temporary non- / commercial sign may be erected without the prior consent of (&4 the property owner. Any sign erected or maintained without permission of the property owner may be summarily removed by the property owner, or his or her authorized representative. C. Public right-of-way. Except as otherwise specifically authorized in this Chapter, no temporary sign may be displayed, erected or maintained in or upon public property or the public right-of-way, including but not limited to, any public utility pole, street sign, shelter, bench or trash receptacle. D. Duration. The registration for a temporary non- commercial sign shall expire ninety days following it' s submission to the department of community development . Notwithstanding the foregoing, the registration for a temporary political sign expires ninety days following it' s submission to the department of community development, or seven days after the election, whichever occurs first . 5 Upon expiration of the registration, the registrant must either remove the sign or complete a new registration form. Signs not removed or re-registered by the end of the next business day following the date of expiration shall be deemed non-complying signs and subject to all applicable 5 penalties and abatement procedures . N E. Violation - Infraction. Any person violating this�IU� Pv° section 25 . 68 . 620 shall be guilty of an infraction, and upon conviction thereof shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) ; and such person shall be deemed guilty of a separate offense for each day, or portion thereof, during which any violation of this chapter is committed or continued. F. Abatement . The director of environmental 4es3zi.ees shall not permit, and shall abate,any temporary non- RMPUB%HPD1943 -4- LAW OFFICES OF fin" BEST BEST S KRIEGER LLP Co� ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE commercial sign wit in the city which fails to meet the requirements of this Chapter or other applicable Gi addition to the penalties set forth in subsection (F the director of envir- nta�— serer}ces, or his a orized representative, may remove any temporary non-commercial sign that is not in compliance with this Chapter. Prior to removal, the director of e__G� _rta.t sez v-_es, or his authorized representative, shall give notice to the registrant, or the property owner if the sign is not registered, that the sign is not in compliance and is subject to removal . The notice shall specify the corrections necessary to restore compliance, including the option of voluntary removal of the sign; and shall warn the recipient that the sign will be removed if compliance is not restored within five days of the date of the notice, that such removal will be at the expense of the recipient, and that such removal shall be in addition to the penalties provided for in subsection (F) . Notwithstanding the foregoing, temporary signs found on public property or the public right-of-way will be summarily removed and stored at city hall . Notice shall be given to the registrant, if known, informing the registrant of the removal and reasonable costs incurred, and warning that the sign will be stored at city hall for only ten days from the date of the notice. Prior to releasing such stored signs to the registrant, the registrant shall pay the reasonable removal and storage costs and any other penalty due pursuant to this chapter. 25 . 68 . 620-2 . Temporary Non-Commercial Signs on Developed Lots in Residence Districts or Residential Zones . +COL A. One or more temporary non-commercial signs may be maintained on any residence-developed lot in a residential district or residential zone. B . Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages . Owners of residence-developed residential lots may apply for a permit to erect a permanent non-commercial sign V suant to the permit process set forth in section 25 . 68 . 030 et . seq. , with a maximum sign face area 11 (To fill in blank: If lot size similar to lot size of commercial, then "in the same proportion as forth in section 25 . 68 . 270" ; if lot size similar to lot sizes for churches, restaurants, etc. , then "not exceeding twenty square feet (sec. 25 . 68 . 210 . ) " RMPUB\HP01943 -5- LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST 6 KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 25 . 68 . E -3 . / Temporary Non-Commercial Signs on Non- Residence Developed Lots in Residential Districts or Residential Zones; and on Developed Lots in Commercial or Industrial Zones . A. The owner or user of any permanent sign authorized on a developed lot in a commercial or industrial zone, or pursuant to Part VI . , Other Residential Zones, may erect, or allow to be erected, temporary sign copy containing one or more non-commercial messages in lieu of part or all of, and subject to the same size restrictions as, the permanent sign copy authorized. Such "in lieu of" temporary sign copy shall ti be affixed to the permanent sign within the permanent sign face . If the sign face area used for "in lieu of" temporary sign copy exceeds 6 square feet, the size of the individual text characters of the temporary sign shall not exceed 8 inches . B. One additional temporary non-commercial sign, .with p , a sign face area not to exceed 6 square feet, may be maintained on any developed lot in a commercial or industrial f�2 // zone . The maximum height of the sign shall. be six feet unless Ol t9 topographic or other physical features exist necessitating a higher sign, but in no event shall the total sign structure e(V/ height exceed ten feet from the ground. The sign may contain 0—LA any number of non-commercial messages . 25 . 68 . 620-4 . Temporary Non-Commercial Sign\s on Undeveloped Lots . C I'✓ W40& ZpNpsl ce*-t "'^ A. One or more temporary non-commercial signs may be maintained on any undeveloped lot in the City. B . For any undeveloped lot with frontage adjacent to a public right-of-way, the aggregate total sign face area per y lot shall not exceed one square foot of sign face per lineal ( 7� foot of frontage on the public-right of way, to a maximum of 0 fifty square feet of sign face. An undeveloped lot on more than one public right-of-way shall be authorized the sign area on each right-of-way, provided that the sign face areas may not be accumulated and shall not exceed the allowed area of W y one rigkTt-of-way. Such signs shall be located no farther han 100 feet and no closer than 5 feet from the public right o any sign with a sign face area in excess of 6 square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed 8 inches. C. For any undeveloped lot with no frontage adjacent to a public right-of-way, the aggregate total sign face area per lot shall not exceed one square foot of sign face per lineal RMPUB\HPD1943 -6- LAW OFFICES OF ' BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE feet of the longest property line, up to a maximum of fifty square feet of sign face. Such signs shall be located no farther than 100 feet and no closer than 5 feet from the S� property line . On any sign with a sign face area in excess of 6 square feet, ze of the individual text characters shall not ex e�0 in6hes . Signs may not be erecte facing O any adj acen tlev`el ped�lot .• pQt-treatY r, L.A4 ------------ D. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages . E. The maximum height of such signs shall be 4ri-r-feet unless topographic or other physical features=exist necessitati shall—the total sign structure height ex ed ten prom—rhe ground. RNPUS\HPD1943 -7- A � 3 C O W m w (n 1 F 2w m � tv a � a c 3 B ro a � n O o ro ro ro o 0 H l7 n R N y '� Hb C z tv N c o $ o o x $ Ed N Ea v n V1 07 3 H O 65 67 � 6' ^H x °c ° N N N bi �lp° H WBry v� H O !n $ V O O J M OEp 6 ^o rt w p w = n Rm �] N OZ naao � Ha � � � oG ro = O V 6 ff a $ o. � g N Cam• -,} rG. = f £ ' =, g r A � 3 A C m O W m w U! 1 K Kai w Z m D a 91 +I d ° �� a o � a N ^ < < o yW .G' QQQiii MO aa wqa a o o•w5 'o a.'t°. oc ^^ CQ 'o0 na y . I S "w C o 0 3 c o: m Sae w 5' ° � � w or w �. 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N O n w � y n (~D l4 w rG L O 'D ^i •mod `G O O i-.Owo to m m w ao n to ,1 n A W W w N N Y N ^] v� can -rl to v c Cb" V 00 5 �'' o _ � o �• � � o f° � o � C o S ci � l� yi pIn w --• •"-' tow to y# r. # # # O O .- �y . > Vi .a � ..y0 o � ? � � -ss •� " m O 0 qq R O a°o 7 w w w w w w w w n Mrf S � m R w n m S,dEn o o E E by o f Do- m y w' '� cn o tn0 O 00 y Atn y m x E 7 O = E 0 0 0 0 O II m 0, E2cG Y 'O m JC J W O = A t g w N O O O O 0000 O O vi O J U to O O O O C C 9 N oLit � 7 N w m 7 y O. m m o B v � d ay I n m w � 90 'q Uj � N N A xx� r % d r� N 2 X � z w � ORDINANCE NO. 964 AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA, AMENDING SECTION 25.68.620 RELATING TO POLITICAL SIGNS. CASE NO, ZOA 98-5 AMENDMENT #2 The City Council of the City of Palm Desert, California, does hereby ordain as follows: Section 1. That section 25.68.620 of the Code of the City of Palm Desert, California, being the same is hereby amended to read as follows: "25.68.620 Political Sign Regulations Applicants for political signs as defined in section 25.68.620, shall comply with the following requirements. A. All said signs shall not be located in the public right-of-way. B. No fee or permits shall be required for the right to erect political signs. Where the sign is proposed to be placed on private property, the applicant shall secure the permission of the property owner. C. Signs shall not be placed in any manner to create a hazard to public health or safety. D. Signs shall be removed within thirty (30) days following the election." Section 2. City Clerk shall certify the passage and adoption of this Ordinance shall cause same to be published once in a newspaper of general circulation printed within the City of Palm Desert, California. It shall be in full force and effect thirty (30) days after its adoption. PASSED, APPROVED AND ADOPTED by the Palm Desert City Council this 14th day of September 2000, by the following vote, to wit: AYES: KELLY, SPIEGEL, CRITES NOES: FERGUSON ABSENT: BENSON ABSTAIN: . NONE BUFO A. CRI 'S, Mayor A T T: SHEILA R. GIL IGAN, C CLERK APPROVED AS FORM: DAVID . ERWI , City Attorney City of Palm Desert, California II } CITY OF PALM DESERT i o >bVU/// DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT STAFF REPORT I. TO: Honorable Mayor and City Council II. REQUEST: Consideration of approval of amendments to the sign ordinance - political signs. III. APPLICANT: City of Palm Desert IV. CASE NO: ZOA 98-5 Amendment #2 V. DATE: August 24, 2000 FMEETINGVI. CONTENTS: OD READING__ A. Staff Recommendation --�_... B. Discussion C. Draft Ordinance No. 964 D. Planning Commission Minutes of July 18, 2000 E. Planning Commission Resolution No. 2002 F. Planning Commission Staff Report dated July 18, 2000 G. Related maps and/or exhibits ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- A. STAFF RECOMMENDATION: Waiver further reading and pass Ordinance No. 964 to second reading. B. DISCUSSION: In 1998 City Council held two public hearings on amending the regulations of political signs. The Council did not act on either amendment. The City Attorney has been working over the last few months to draft an acceptable amendment. The Planning Commission considered this amendment at its July 18, 2000 meeting and recommended its approval on a 3-0 vote (Commissioners Beaty and Jonathan absent), subject to the City Attorney adding language to require removal of these signs within a reasonable period of time after an election. CITY COUNCIL STAFF REPORT CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 AMENDMENT #2 AUGUST 24, 2000 CURRENT PROPOSAL: This current amendment will repeal the current provisions of Section 25.68.620 Political Signs and replace it with provisions prohibiting political signs in the public right-of-way, shall require property owner permission to locate them on private property, shall not require a fee and said signs shall not be placed in a manner to create a hazard to public health or safety. Pursuant to the request of Planning Commission the City Attorney has added subsection "D" which reads: "Signs shall be removed within thirty (30) days following the election." Prepared by: Reviewed and Approved: i an cu TEVE SMITH PHILIP DRY L CARLOS L. ORTE PLANNING MANAGER DIR. OF COMMUNITY DEV. CITY MANAGER/R EXEC. DIR. Am 2 "4 CITY OF PALM DESERT DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT STAFF REPORT I. TO: Honorable Mayor and City Council II. REQUEST: Consideration of approval of amendments to the sign ordinance - political signs. III. APPLICANT: City of Palm Desert IV. CASE NO: ZOA 98-5 Amendment #2 V. DATE: August 24, 2000 VI. CONTENTS: A. Staff Recommendation B. Discussion C. Draft Ordinance No. D. Planning Commission Minutes of July 18, 2000 E. Planning Commission Resolution No. 2002 F. Planning Commission Staff Report dated July 18; 2000 G. Related maps and/or exhibits ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- A. STAFF RECOMMENDATION: Waiver further reading and pass Ordinance No. to second reading. B. DISCUSSION: In 1998 City Council held two public hearings on amending the regulations of political signs. The Council did not act on either amendment. The City Attorney has been working over the last few months to draft an acceptable amendment. The Planning Commission considered this amendment at its July 18, 2000 meeting and recommended its approval on a 3-0 vote (Commissioners Beaty and Jonathan absent), subject to the City Attorney adding language to require removal of these signs within a reasonable period of time after an election. CITY COUNCIL STAFF REPORT CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 AMENDMENT #2 AUGUST 24, 2000 CURRENT PROPOSAL: This current amendment will repeal the current provisions of Section 25.68.620 Political Signs and replace it with provisions prohibiting political signs in the public right-of-way, shall require property owner permission to locate them on private property, shall not require a fee and said signs shall not be placed in a manner to create a hazard to public health or safety. Pursuant to the request of Planning Commission the City Attorney has added subsection "D" which reads: "Signs shall be removed within thirty (30) days following the election." Prepared by: Reviewed and Approved: Review and Concur: TEVE SMITH PHILIP DRELL CARLOS L. ORTEGA PLANNING MANAGER DIR. OF COMMUNITY DEV. CITY MANAGER/RDA EXEC. DIR. Am 2 ORDINANCE NO. AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA, AMENDING SECTION 25.68.620 RELATING TO POLITICAL SIGNS. CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 AMENDMENT #2 The City Council of the City of Palm Desert, California, does hereby ordain as follows: Section 1. That section 25.68.620 of the Code of the City of Palm Desert, California, being the same is hereby amended to read as follows: "25.68.620 Political Sign Regulations Applicants for political signs as defined in section 25.68.620, shall comply with the following requirements. A. All said signs shall not be located in the public right-of-way. B. No fee or permits shall be required for the right to erect political signs. Where the sign is proposed to be placed on private property, the applicant shall secure the permission of the property owner. . C. Signs shall not be placed in any manner to create a hazard to public health or safety. D. Signs shall be removed within thirty (30) days following the election." Section 2. City Clerk shall certify the passage and adoption of this Ordinance shall cause same to be published once in a newspaper of general circulation printed within the City of Palm Desert, California. It shall be in full force and effect thirty (30) days after its adoption. PASSED, APPROVED AND ADOPTED by the Palm Desert City Council this day of 2000, by the following vote, to wit: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: BUFORD A. CRITES, Mayor ATTEST: RACHELLE D. KLASSEN, Deputy City Clerk APPROVED AS TO FORM: DAVID J. ERWIN, City Attorney City of Palm Desert, California EXHIBIT "A" SECTION 1 That Section 25,68.620 of the Code of the City of Palm Desert, California, being the same and is hereby amended to read as follows: "25.68.620 Political Sign Regulations. Applicants for political signs as defined in Section 25.68.020 shall comply with the following requirements: A. All said signs shall not be located in the public right-of-way. B. No fee or permits shall be required for the right to erect political signs. When the sign is proposed to be placed on private property, the applicant shall secure the permission of the property owner. C. Signs shall not be placed in any manner to create a hazard to public health or safety. D. Signs shall be removed within thirty (30) days following the election." CITY Of P9 M 01 1R1 , P Z 73-510 FRED WARING DRIVE PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA 92260-2578 TEL: 760 346-061 I FAX: 760 341-7098 info@palm-deserr.org CITY OF PALM DESERT LEGAL NOTICE CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 AMENDMENT #2 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a public hearing will be held before the Palm Desert City Council to consider amendment to the Zoning Ordinance as it relates to political signs, Municipal Code Section 25.68. SAID public hearing will be held on Thursday, August 24, 2000, at 4:00 p.m. in the Council Chamber at the Palm Desert Civic Center, 73-510 Fred Waring Drive, Palm Desert, California, at which time and place all interested persons are invited to attend and be heard. Written comments concerning all items covered by this public hearing notice shall be accepted up to the date of the hearing. Information concerning the proposed project and/or negative declaration is available for review in the Department of Community Development at the above address between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. If you challenge the proposed actions in court, you may be limited to raising only those issues you or someone else raised at the public hearing described in this notice, or in written correspondence delivered to the City Council at, or prior to, the public hearing. PUBLISH: Desert Sun RACHELLE KLASSEN, Acting City Clerk August 7, 2000 City of Palm Desert, California I RECEIVED PROOF OF PUBLICATION .r i Uffe foTougfy�lIT F�i Stamp (2015.5.C.C.P) CITY CLERK'S OFFICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA County of Riverside I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of Proof of Publication of the County aforesaid; I am over the age of eighteen years,and not a party to or interested in the above-entitled matter. I am the principal clerk of a No.5620 CITY OF PALM DESERT rinter of the,DESERT SUN PUBLISHING LEGAL NOTICE I P CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 AMENDMENT R2 COMPANY a newspaper of general circulation, `:w�TbeEheldHbefoe the Palmt DeseQ cn Go���. printed and published in the city of Palm Springs, ;to consider amendment tothe zww 9 Pali code as it relates to p County of Riverside,and which newspaper has been -Section 25.68. SAID public hearing will m in the Council ham- adjudged anewspaper of general circulation by the &,tat 2000 at Desert P-ivic Center,73-510 Fred. Superior Court of the County of Riverside,State of Waring Drive, Palm Desert, California, at which Invited California raider the date of March 24, 1988.Case time and place all interested persons to attend and be heard. to Written comments con- Number 191236;that the notice,of which the earning all items covered by this public hearing notice shall be accepted up to the adate o frail'. the annexed is a printed copy(set in type not smaller hearing. Information concerning ra act and/or negative concerning Is supra le for than non portal,has been published In each regular review in the Department of Community Develop and entire issue of said newspaper and not in any ment at the above atltlress between the hours of a:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday.; supplement thereof on the following dates,to wit: if you challenge the Proposed actions a court, you may be limited to raisin only those issues you or someone else raised at the public hearing August 72h described in this notice.or in written o mespo, g dence delivered to the Ltity Council at, poor o. the public ------------------- hearing.- alo p Acting Ca m DeEN sert, California PUB: Augur(7, 2000 ... _ All in the year 2000 1 certify(or declare)under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 8th Dated at Palm Springs,California this day August of--------- 2000 Signature CITY 01 PI, LM DESERT 73-510 FRED WARING DRIVE PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA 92260-2578 TEL: 760 346—o6i a FAX: 760 341-7098 info@palm-deserc.org PLANNING COMMISSION MEETING NOTICE OF ACTION Date: July 21 , 2000 City of Palm Desert Re: ZOA 98-5 Amendment #2 The Planning Commission of the City of Palm Desert has considered your request and taken the following action at its meeting of July 18, 2000: PLANNING COMMISSION RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF ZOA 98-5 AMENDMENT #2 TO CITY COUNCIL BY ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION NO. 2002, WITH THE RECOMMENDATION THAT CITY COUNCIL ADD WORDING THAT WOULD ENCOURAGE THE REMOVAL OF SIGNS AFTER ELECTIONS. MOTION CARRIED 3-0 (CHAIRPERSON BEATY AND COMMISSIONER JONATHAN WERE ABSENT). Any appeal of the above action may be made in writing to the City Clerk, City of Palm Desert, within fifteen (15) days of the date of the decision. PHILIP DREL SECRETARY a" PALM DES ER PLANNING COMMISSION /tm cc: Coachella Valley Water District Public Works Department Building & Safety Department Fire Marshal �( PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. 2002 A RESOLUTION OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA, RECOMMENDING TO THE CITY COUNCIL APPROVAL OF A ZONING ORDINANCE AMENDMENT RELATING TO POLITICAL SIGNS. CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 AMENDMENT #2 WHEREAS, the Planning Commission of the City of Palm Desert, California, did on the 18th day of July, 2000, hold a duly noticed public hearing to consider the amendment of Zoning Ordinance Section 25.68 relating to political signs; and WHEREAS, said application has complied with the requirements of the "City of Palm Desert Procedure for Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act, Resolution No. 00-24," in that the Director of Community Development has determined the amendment to be a Class 5 Categorical Exemption; and WHEREAS, at said public hearing, upon hearing and considering all testimony and arguments, if any, of all interested persons desiring to be heard, said Planning Commission did find the following facts and reasons to exist to recommend approval of the Zoning Ordinance text amendment: 1 . The proposed amendment relating to non-commercial signs is consistent with the intent of the Zoning Ordinance and will protect the community health, safety and general welfare. NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Planning Commission of the City of Palm Desert, California, as follows: 1 . That the above recitations are true and correct and constitute the findings of the Commission in this case. 2. That it does hereby recommend approval to the City Council Case No. ZOA 98-5 Amendment #2 as provided in the attached exhibit labeled "A". PASSED, APPROVED and ADOPTED at a regular meeting of the Palm Desert Planning Commission, held on this 18th day of July, 2000, by the following vote, to wit: AYES: CAMPBELL, FINERTY, LOPEZ NOES: NONE ABSENT: BEATY, JONATHAN ABSTAIN: NONE 17 S LOPEZ, Tchairperson ATTEST: PHILIP DREL� Secretary Palm Desert tanning Commission 'u PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. 2002 EXHIBIT A SECTION 1 That Section 25.68.620 of the Code of the City of Palm Desert, California, being the same and is hereby amended to read as follows: "25.68.620 Political Sign Regulations. Applicants for political signs as defined in Section 25.68.020 shall comply with the following requirements: A. All said signs shall not be located in the public right-of-way. B. No fee or permits shall be required for the right to erect political signs. When the sign is proposed to be placed on private property, the applicant shall secure the permission of the property owner. C. Signs shall not be placed in any manner to create a hazard to public health or safety." 2 I -e MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION JULY 18, 2000 talking about what it would look like the first, second or third year, but in the years to come - to maintain the landscaping and be something that Mobil would also be very proud to have in Palm Desert as well as being an element when first entering and then leaving our community. That gateway or entrance and exit from the city was very popular and would get even more popular as development continued in that area. It would be a very busy intersection with high visibility. Overall he felt the project looked good and he would be in favor of it. Action: It was moved by Commissioner Campbell, seconded by Vice Chairperson Lopez, approving the findings as presented by staff. Motion carried 2-1 (Commissioner Finerty voted no). It was moved by Commissioner Campbell, seconded by Vice Chairperson Lopez, adopting Planning Commission Resolution No. 2001 , approving CUP 00-06, subject to conditions. Motion carried 2-1 (Commissioner Finerty voted no). E. Case No. ZOA 98-5 Amendment #2 - CITY OF PALM DESERT, Applicant ' Request for approval of amendments to the sign ordinance - political signs. . Mr. Smith informed commission that in 1998 Planning Commission sent the council two previous versions of a political sign ordinance. The council failed to act on either of those recommendations. Over the past few months the city attorney worked with council to draft an acceptable amendment. That was what was before the commission. It would basically repeal the current section 25.68.620 and replace it with provisions prohibiting political signs in the public right-of-way, requiring property owner permission to locate them on private property, did not require a fee and said signs would not be placed in a manner that would create a hazard to the public health or safety. Staff recommended that the commission forward the proposed amendment to the city council. Vice Chairperson Lopez asked for clarification with regard to taking the signs down and the time frame being difficult to enforce so it wasn't included in the ordinance. Mr. Smith said that was correct. Political free speech ran 365 17 ,1 MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION JULY 18, 2000 days of the year. Vice Chairperson Lopez asked if someone put up their sign, had an election, including general election, then they could just leave them up as long as they wished. Mr. Drell said that they could be running in the next four years and start now to advertise. Vice Chairperson Lopez said he had a problem with that. One of the things he has always had a difficult time with was when elections were over, and there were all kinds of signs including paper signs, cardboard signs, very nice wood signs which he helped put up, etc., but it was also difficult when they were blowing around in the wind and turned into debris. Commissioner Campbell asked if he removed the signs he put up after the election was over. Vice Chairperson Lopez said yes, the next day they got them down. Commissioner Finerty said she had a question for the City Attorney. She asked if the commission was correct in understanding that the city council didn't want a time frame for the signs to be removed. Mr. Hargreaves said he hadn't been involved in the loop so he wasn't sure what the city council wanted. He thought from a legal standpoint that there was a concern given the current case law that a requirement that they be removed within a particular timeframe would be unenforceable and would render the ordinance unconstitutional. He knew on the other hand that that requirement was frequently imposed by different cities. He cited a Riverside newspaper article talking about Fontana and they just enacted restrictions that required them to come down. He wasn't in that loop so he couldn't tell the commission what the council was looking for. Mr. Drell didn't think it was a result of City Council direction. From a technical point of view, free speech was free speech unless it impinged upon public health and safety. He said that they could enact an ordinance and probably 95% of the people would comply since most people obey ordinances and most people didn't sue cities regardless of how arbitrary and capricious they were. The City Attorney was simply saying that if they were to follow the constitution as interpreted by the courts, it was part of free speech. The rest of the sign ordinance regulated commercial speech. This was different and therefore there was great deference given to it other than in cases where it was creating a physical hazard to public health and safety. They could try and maybe forward on to council that the commission had that preference that that section be added. He asked if there was a severability clause they could build into the ordinance. Although in this case there was so little to the sign ordinance that even if they were to lose the entire thing through a case it was a minimal risk. Commissioner Finerty asked if she was understanding it correctly that if someone didn't take their sign down at some point Code Enforcement would 18 i MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION JULY 18, 2000 Mr. Drell said no. From a practical point of view most people contact them. p P P P would do it any way. Most property owners after an election would take down the signs. He questioned at what point an old sign became litter. Commissioner Finerty said that another concern was now they had the primaries in March and the general election in November and eight months was kind of a long time to keep a sign up. It appeared that with the current ordinance they had a pretty good success rate at getting people to take down their signs. Mr. Drell said that the city really hasn't enforced the ordinance. Commissioner Finerty asked if people came to the Planning Department counter asking for it. Mr. Drell replied that in the last 10 years there probably hasn't been any enforcement of the ordinance and most of what had happened, other than signage on public property, basically this was the ordinance that they have been enforcing over the last two or three elections. He said it was like anything else. Should they pass a law they thought they could get away with or should they pass a law that they knew conformed with case law. He said that the risks were probably relatively minor. If they had a very complicated ordinance that the city wanted to preserve and the chance of having it thrown out because of this, they could think about it, but if we were sued, they would probably win. Vice Chairperson Lopez pointed out that normally the people who didn't have a successful campaign left everything up. The successful ones took them down because they had somewhat of a sense of responsibility to take them down because they were now representing the city or at least had some responsibility to their constituents. He said he saw that at the last election where several people that ran still had signs up several weeks afterward. Mr. Drell didn't know, but would check with Code Enforcement, whether they have actually gone out in the past and contacted people. Typically the organization that put them up was gone, so there was no one to contact. Whether they could hold the candidate themselves liable he wasn't sure. Staff could find out whether Code Enforcement has ever gone out and tried to enforce that part of the ordinance in the past or whether ultimately they just disappeared by themselves. Commissioner Campbell asked about when signs were placed on private property and the applicant had to secure the permission of the property owner. She pointed out that a lot of times there were absentee owners. Mr. Drell said that staff could always check if permission was obtained, but it was superfluous because obviously the owner had the ability to enforce it themselves. If the property owner wanted to deny consent, they didn't need a city ordinance to take the signs down. He said that an important part of it 19 r Y MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION JULY 18, 2000 III was to remind people that they can't just put signs up on other people's property without their permission. It provided the property owner with a little bit more clout in getting rid of it. The more important part was that they couldn't put up signs on public property. Commissioner Finerty said that she liked the idea of reminding people that they ought to take them down ten days after the election, too. Mr. Hargreaves said that they could put in the ordinance something that was directory rather than mandatory like "City Council as a matter of policy requests that candidates remove their signs as part of their civic duty and to maintain the beauty of the community. Vice Chairperson Lopez thought there should be something so that they weren't just left up. Commissioner Finerty agreed and wanted the ordinance to so say something about it so that they weren't just silent on it. Because then it was like they didn't care and it wouldn't matter if they ever came down. Vice Chairperson Lopez asked where they went from here. Mr. Drell noted that the commission was making a recommendation to council and the recommendation was that the ordinance contain a provision requesting the removal of signs ten days after the election. They could let the City Attorney mull it over and think of a way to make it as inoffensive to the constitution as possible. Mr. Hargreaves recalled mulling this over several years ago and they came up with a plan that required permitting among other things and the city council didn't want to get that involved in it. The other alternative was to adopt the ordinance the way it is and run it through an election and see what happens and if there was a problem respond to it as best they could. Mr. Drell asked whether a finding could be made because typically these signs weren't maintained. At some point they became litter and at that point he questioned if they could be deemed a public nuisance. Mr. Hargreaves stated that as long as a person wanted to make a political statement and had that on property where they were entitled to do so, they could. The issue was that at some point after the election whoever was making the statement in reality didn't care any more and the sign became abandoned. There was a presumption that it was abandoned after the election. Mr. Drell said that if they said that they were running in advance for council four years from now, then there was no law that said when they could start their campaign. Vice Chairperson Lopez noted that when the wind starts blowing where some of the signs were, it didn't take long for them to become debris. Mr. Hargreaves recalled that they discussed a requirement that signs be brought in and some kind of a stamp be put on them that established that someone actually owned it and assumed responsibility for it and then if it ended up blowing away or becoming a 20 MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION JULY 18, 2000 nuisance; that they were responsible. That was a rather cumbersome process. Mr. Drell said that the city didn't want to look like they were approving people's signs. He suggested that the commission make the recommendation that there be a provision added relative to the removal of signs and then between now and the council meeting the City Attorney could include that as a suggested addition. Vice Chairperson Lopez stated that he would like to do that and make it part of the motion. Action: It was moved by Vice Chairperson Lopez, seconded by Commissioner Finerty, approving the findings as presented by staff. Motion carried 3-0. It was moved by Vice Chairperson Lopez, seconded by Commissioner Finerty, adopting Planning Commission Resolution No. 2002, recommending to City Council approval of ZOA 98-5 Amendment #2. Motion carried 3-0. IX. MISCELLANEOUS None. X. COMMITTEE MEETING UPDATES A. ART IN PUBLIC PLACES - (June 21 , 2000) Commissioner Campbell said the committee identified and prioritized sites for future Art in Public Places projects. B. CIVIC CENTER STEERING COMMITTEE - (No meeting) C. DESERT WILLOW COMMITTEE - (No meeting) D. LANDSCAPE COMMITTEE - (July 18, 2000) Commissioner Finerty indicated that there were no items that concerned the Planning Commission. E. PROJECT AREA 4 COMMITTEE - (No meeting) 21 CITY OF PALM DESERT ' DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT STAFF REPORT TO: Planning Commission DATE: July 18, 2000 CASE NO: ZOA 98-5 Amendment #2 REQUEST: Approval of amendments to the sign ordinance - political signs APPLICANT: City of Palm Desert I. BACKGROUND: In 1998 Planning Commission held two public hearings on amending the regulations of political signs and recommended the two ordinances to the City Council. The City Council did not act on either amendment. The City Attorney has been working with City Council over the last few months to draft an acceptable amendment. II. CURRENT PROPOSAL: This current amendment will repeal the current provisions of Section 25.68.620 Political Signs and replace it with provisions prohibiting political signs in the public right-of-way, shall require property owner permission to locate them on private property, shall not require a fee and said signs shall not be placed in a manner to create a hazard to public health or safety. III. RECOMMENDATION: That the Planning Commission recommend approval to the City Council of Case No. 98-5 Amendment #2. IV. ATTACHMENTS: A. Draft resolution B. Legal notice C. Comments from city departments and other agencies D. Plans and exhibits Prepared by e e Smith Reviewed and Approved by P 'I ell /tm PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. A RESOLUTION OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA, RECOMMENDING TO THE CITY COUNCIL APPROVAL OF A ZONING ORDINANCE AMENDMENT RELATING TO POLITICAL SIGNS. CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 AMENDMENT #2 WHEREAS, the Planning Commission of the City of Palm Desert, California, did on the 18th day of July, 2000, hold a duly noticed public hearing to consider the amendment of Zoning Ordinance Section 25.68 relating to political signs; and WHEREAS, said application has complied with the requirements of the "City of Palm Desert Procedure for Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act, Resolution No. 00-24," in that the Director of Community Development has determined the amendment to be a Class 5 Categorical Exemption; and WHEREAS, at said public hearing, upon hearing and considering all testimony and arguments, if any, of all interested persons desiring to be heard, said Planning Commission did find the following facts and reasons to exist to recommend approval of the Zoning Ordinance text amendment: 1 . The proposed amendment relating to non-commercial signs is consistent with the intent of the Zoning Ordinance and will protect the community health, safety and general welfare. NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Planning Commission of the City of Palm Desert, California, as follows: 1 . That the above recitations are true and correct and constitute the findings of the Commission in this case. 2. That it does hereby recommend approval to the City Council Case No. ZOA 98-5 Amendment #2 as provided in the attached exhibit labeled "A". PASSED, APPROVED and ADOPTED at a regular meeting of the Palm Desert Planning Commission, held on this 18th day of July, 2000, by the following vote, to wit: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: PAUL R. BEATY, Chairperson ATTEST: PHILIP DRELL, Secretary Palm Desert Planning Commission PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. EXHIBIT A SECTION 1 That Section 25.68.620 of the Code of the City of Palm Desert, California, being the same and is hereby amended to read as follows: "25.68.620 Political Sign Regulations. Applicants for political signs as defined in Section 25.68.020 shall comply with the following requirements: A. All said signs shall not be located in the public right-of-way. B. No fee or permits shall be required for the right to erect political signs. When the sign is proposed to be placed on private property, the applicant shall secure the permission of the property owner. C. Signs shall not be placed in any manner to create a hazard to public health or safety." 2 MEMORANDUM To: Buford A. Crites, Mayor Jim Ferguson, Mayor Pro-Tempore Jean M. Benson, Council Member Richard S. Kelly, Council Member Robert A. Spiegel, Council Member FROM: David J. Erwin DATE: June 6, 2000 RE: Political Signs We are entering another season of political signage now through November, 2000. We still have ordinances regarding political signs which because of questionable validity, have not been enforced in the past (Section 25.68.620). I have enclosed a copy of same for your reference. In order to remove any ambiguity, I recommend that we either(1)remove the regulation completely, or (2) modify to require that signs are out of the public right-of-way and, if on private property, to secure the consent of the property owner. The other regulation regarding size and location,removal dates (before and after the election) have substantial problems with enforceability. I ask the Council's direction with regard to this so we can eliminate some of the confusion that has existed in the past. If you have questions, please contact me. encl. cc: Carlos Ortega Sheila Gilligan Rachelle Klassen Phil Drell 25.68.607 New Years Day the above noted lights may be dis- C. Such signs shall not be located in the public played without review and approval by the city. (Ord. rightof-way; 587§2(Exhibit A§ 19), 1989) D. All political signs shall be removed within ten days after the election date,except that in the case of a 25.68.610 Signs on awnings,marquees,canopies, general election,political signs shall not be required to arcades or similar structures or be removed between the primary and general elections, attachments. but shall be removed within ten days after the general A All awnings or awnings with a sign(s) must be election date.The applicant shall agree in writing to be personally responsible for the removal of the political reviewed and approved by the architectural review signs; commission.The awning(sign)must be architecturally E. No political signs shall be posted earlier than compatible with the building and as a result an awning ninety days prior to an election; may not be appropriate for every building. F. No fee or permit shall be required for the right B. Pursuant to Section 25.68.470 "Proper mainte- to erect political signs. Where the sign is proposed to nance of signs" awnings must be kept in good repair be placed on private property,the applicant shall se- and be clean and nonfaded. cure the permission of the property owner. (Ord.422 C. Awnings must be substantially attached to the Exhibit A§ 1,1985:Ord.129§4(part),1977:Ord.98 main building structure. § I (part),1975:Exhibit A§2538-17.06) D. Awning lettering and numbers as well as style and colors must aesthetically blend with the building. 25.68.630 Signs for public or quasi-public uses. E. Letter height shall not exceed one-third of the awning height and in no event shall it exceed eight Directional and public convenience signs for public inches. and quasi public uses may be permitted on public F. Scalloping on awnings shall not be pronounced. property.The design must conform to standard direc- G. Where applicable, awnings shall contain street tional sign specifications promulgated by the director numbers four inches in height with the letter style of environmental services and approved by the design helvetica medium or equivalent. review board.The total number of signs allowed shall H. Awnings shall not contain phone numbers. be based on the minimum number necessary for ade- I. Street-drop type awnings(i.e.canvas-vinyl signs) quate public identification as determined by the direc- shall not be encouraged.(Ord.587§2(Exhibit A§17), for of environmental services. (Ord. 129 § 4 (part), 1989:Ord.129§4(part),1977:Ord.98§I(part),1975: 1977:Ord.98§1(part),1975:Exhibit A§25.38-17.07) Exhibit A§25.38-17.05) XI. ENFORCEMENT AND AMORTIZATION 25.68.615 Open summer signs. Between June 1st and October 1st,restaurants,re- 25.68.640 Lawful nonconforming signs. tail and personal service businesseswithin the commer- A. Lawful existing on-premises signs at the time of cial zone may display a sign in addition to a main sign, the adoption of the ordinance codified in this chapter not to exceed five square feet, indicating if they will on February 24, 1977,which do not comply with the remain open during the summer.The design and loca- requirements of this chapter, as amended, shall be tion of the sign shall be compatible with other signs on deemed lawful nonconforming uses and shall be made the building and must be approved by the department to comply,be removed or demolishedupon the transfer of environmental services.(Ord.272(part), 1981) of ownership of the business or upon the altering of sign,copy,size,color or the addition of new signage to 25.68.620 Political sign regulation. the site or structure upon which the nonconforming Applicants for political signs,as defined in Section sign is located. 25.68.020, shall comply with the following require- B. Nonconforming signs may not be expanded,ex- ments: tended, rebuilt, altered or reconstructed in any way, A. Each sign shall not exceed five square feet in except for normal maintenance or to protect public area: safety. B. The signs shall not be located closer together C. It shall be the express responsibility of the ven- than fifty feet; dor to advise the vendee of the provisions of this section 452 MEMORANDUM To: Phil Drell, City of Palm Desert FROM: David J. Erwin DATE: June 12, 2000 RE: Zoning Ordinance Modification The attached is a modification of the zoning ordinance and needs a public hearing before the Planning Commission and City Council. If you would, please start the process to amend this particular section at the earliest possible time. If you have questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me. cc: Robert W. Hargreaves, Esq. w/encl. RWUB\DJE\167609 ORDINANCE NO. AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA AMENDING SECTION 25.68.620 RELATING TO POLITICAL SIGNS. The City Council of the City of Palm Desert, California, does hereby ordain as follows: Section 1. That section 25.68.620 of the Code of the City of Palm Desert, California being the same is hereby amended to read as follows: "25.68.620 Political Sign Regulations. Applicants for political signs as defined in section 25.68.020, shall comply with the following requirements: A. All said signs shall not be located in the public right-of-way. B. No fee or permits shall be required for the right to erect political signs. Where the sign is proposed to be placed on private property, the applicant shall secure the permission of the property owner- C. Signs shall not be placed in any manner to create a hazard to public health or safety." Section 2. City clerk shall certify the passage and adoption of this Ordinance shall cause same to be published once in a newspaper of general circulation printed within the City of Palm Desert, California. It shall be in full force and effect thirty(30) days after its adoption. RMBUS\D7E\167608 6112100 PASSED, APPROVED AND ADOPTED this day of 2000, by the City Council of the City of Palm Desert, California, by the following vote, to wit: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: Buford A. Crites, Mayor City of Palm Desert, California ATTEST: By: SHEILA R. GILLIGAN, City Clerk APPROVED AS TO FORM: By: DAVID J. ERWIN, City Attorney City of Palm Desert, California RMBUSOJE\167605 6/12100 •� O&EOEWEft J U L 10 2000 t.wai»UNITYCElELOMENTDEPARTI ENT CITY OF PAW DESERT PROOF OF PUBLICATION This is space for County Clerk's Filing Starr (2015.5.C.C.P) FMCEIVED JUL 10 2000 0� comm1NITYCRELOPUENTDEPARIWIENT ` CITY OF PAW DESERT O STATE OF CALIFORNIA - v County of Riverside 1 am a citizen of the United States and a resident of Proof of Publication of the County aforesaid;I am over the age of eighteen { years,and not a party to or interested in the above-entitled matter.I am the principal clerk of a printer of the,DESERT SUN PUBLISHING COMPANY a newspaper of general circulation, printed and published in the city of Palm Springs, County of Riverside,and which newspaper has been adjudged a newspaper of general circulation by the Noszse T j Superior Court of the County of Riverside,State of CITY LEGAL PALM DE OF PALM DESERT Su P California under the date of March 24, 1988.Case CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 AMENDMENT 82 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a public hearing Number 191236;that the notice,of which the will be held before the Palm Desert Planning annexed is a printed copy(set in type not smaller Commission - consitler a amendment to the Zoning at n tnce as, It relates to political signs, than non oriel,has been published in each regular Municipal Code Section 2a a. P p SAID Public hearing will be he d on Tuesday,July and entire issue of said newspaper and not in any the Palm' at in t Desert cP is Center,is--5io Fred Warin9t supplement thereof on the following dates,to wit: Drive. Palm Desert, California, at which time and place all interested persons are invited to attend an be heard. Written comments concerning all I r - item covered by this public hearng notice sha JUll ly 3d s i>e accepted up to the tlate of the hSent, . Infor- ma concerning the proposetl project and/ors tio n '- negative declarant ofation Is ovayydeble for review in above address batween�the hours ofe9t00l a,u and 5:g0q0 V. Monday through FrU , out mau� beallimited ha propng onlyt�t a issues you or aisi Someone else raised at the public hearing tle- All In the year 2000 scribed in this notice, or in wntten comaspon-: tlence ning delivered to the Plan Commission aql or prior to, the public hearinq Secretary'' I certifyor declare under penalty of u that the Desert Planning Ding Commission ( P nY Ped ry Palm Desert Planning etary foregoing is true and correct pue_ July 3, 2000 - -—- 5th Dated at Palm Springs,California this.—dalY July of 2000 Signature �E 31f TR SM I SS I ON I;;_-ME r> 7 MBE>E JUN-21-00 08: 15 ID: 7603417098 CITY OF PALM DESERT -.T OS NUMBER 1 7 S I "FORMAT ION CODE OK TELEPHONE NUMBER 7784731 NAME( ID NUMBER) 7607784731 START TIME JUN-21-00 08: 15 PAGES TRANSMITTED 001 TRANSMISSION MODE G3 RESOLUTION STD REDIALING TIMES 00 SECURITY OFF MAILBOX OFF MACHINE ENGAGED 00 '45 THIS TRANSMISSION IS COMPLETED. LAST SUCCESSFUL PAGE 001 Y O F P A L M 0 E S E C I T RT T,`Q Yi onFwRo`W` ivoxw• vv Pw DRSF RT, Cn A 9va6o—ay7B t6o gq6—e6. CITY OF PALM oESERT LEGAL NOTICE CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 AMENDMENT 7!2 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a public hoaring will be "mid boforn tnm Palm ommart Planning Commisalon to consider amendment to the Zoning Ordinance as I% ralatas to political signs, Municipal Ccde Socmion 25.68. Puat-IC Fa%Nota 7BTt �^ ` a./ ceiom.. c�• 7 SAID public hearing will be held on Tuesday, July 18. 2000, at 7:00 p.m_ In the Councll Chamber at the Palm Oesart Civlo Canter, 73-61 O Fred Waring Oriva. Palm Deeart, Colifornle, at which time and plasm all intarasted parsons era invited to attap.1 and ba heard. Writtan commenta co ncarning all Imams ooverad by this public hearing notioe shall be e�N/�- r CIIY OE FLIM DESERT 73-510 FRED WARING DRIVE PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA 92260-2578 TEL: 760 346—o6L i FAX: 760 341-7098 info@palm-desert.org CITY OF PALM DESERT LEGAL NOTICE CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 AMENDMENT #2 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a public hearing will be held before the Palm Desert Planning Commission to consider amendment to the Zoning Ordinance as it relates to political signs, Municipal Code Section 25.68. SAID public hearing will be held on Tuesday, July 18, 2000, at 7:00 p.m. in the Council Chamber at the Palm Desert Civic Center, 73-510 Fred Waring Drive, Palm Desert, California, at which time and place all interested persons are invited to attend and be heard. Written comments concerning all items covered by this public hearing notice shall be accepted up to the date of the hearing. Information concerning the proposed project and/or negative declaration is available for review in the Department of Community Development at the above address between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. If you challenge the proposed actions in court, you may be limited to raising only those issues you or someone else raised at the public hearing described in this notice, or in written correspondence delivered to the Planning Commission at, or prior to, the public hearing. PUBLISH: Desert Sun PHILIP DRELL, Secretary July 3, 2000 Palm Desert Planning Commission MEMORANDUM To: Phil Drell, City of Palm Desert FROM: David J. Erwin DATE: June 12, 2000 RE: Zoning Ordinance Modification The attached is a modification of the zoning ordinance and needs a public hearing before the Planning Commission and City Council. If you would, please start the process to amend this particular section at the earliest possible time. If you have questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me. cc: Robert.W. Hargreaves, Esq. w/encl. IL,XiPL'B1DJE%167609 w ORDINANCE NO. AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA AMENDING SECTION 25.68.620 RELATING TO POLITICAL SIGNS. The City Council of the City of Palm Desert, California, does hereby ordain as follows: Section 1. That section 25.68.620 of the Code of the City of Palm Desert, California being the same is hereby amended to read as follows: "25.68.620 Political Sign Regulations Applicants for political signs as defined in section 25.68.020, shall comply with the following requirements: A. All said signs shall not be located in the public right-of-way. B. No fee or permits shall be required for the right to erect political signs. Where the sign is proposed to be placed on private property, the applicant shall secure the permission of the property owner. C. Signs shall not be placed in any manner to create a hazard to public health or safety." Section 2. City clerk shall certify the passage and adoption of this Ordinance shall cause same to be published once in a newspaper of general circulation printed within the City of Palm Desert, California. It shall be in full force and effect thirty (30) days after its adoption. RMBUSOM167608 - 6f17J00 • 1 PASSED, APPROVED AND ADOPTED this day of 2000, by the City Council of the City of Palm Desert, California, by the following vote, to wit: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: Buford A. Crites, Mayor City of Palm Desert, California ATTEST: By: SHEILA R. GILLIGAN, City Clerk APPROVED AS TO FORM: By: DAVID J. ERWIN, City Attorney City of Palm Desert, California RM13US\DSE\167608 6117J00 r. PROOF OFPUY 'ATION Thissi for County Clerk's Filing Sramp (2015.5C.C.P.) 4. r RECEIVED '• r STATE OFCALIFORNIA '98 JUL 20 Ail 11 .20 County of Riverside IamacidurkoftheUnitedStatesanda resident of CITY CLERICS OFFICE the County aforesaid;lam over the age of eighteen years,and and not a party to or interested in tlu above-entitled matter. 1 am the principal derk of a printer of the DESERT SUN PUBLISHING COMPANY&newspaper of general circulation, Proof of Publication of printed and published in the city of Palm Springs, County of Riverside,and which newspaper has been . ............................ .................. adjudged a newspaperof general circulation by the Superior Cowl of the County of Riverside,State of ................................................. Catifornk under the date of March 24,1988. Case Number m236,;that the notice,of which the arvtexed Is a printed copy(sel In type not smaller than nonpar4 has been published In each regular and entire issue of said newspaper and not In any su leurmt thereof on the Wowing dates,to-wit b.i12e Grtv OF qLM-DESERT pp $ LEG,gL�NOTICE OgSELLNO. ZOAIsa- u 1c heanng NOTIC S EREBY[GIVEN hat D willrbe?held before'the.P31m Desert><Plan^�uBnclpe Commission.to,lconsiderramencirnl nigr°isth0 Inn Ordinance!as t.relates•to•po a V Code Sec ion�25.8a ill a held on nee Chamber SAID�pub III cfhearin57 m*in 11 a Lthre4••Pa9m8De5artQ.eClPic'Genter. 73-�`�0'hrih,jjme ............. ....i...u........uu u.......• IngY.Dnve P°ImlDeip sert Casons a. nv Into laced interested ersons�arebnvited[torat- pp s� oncemin andip rittenlcomf t.... cc tendsa^d»be heardthis-public'heanng�otice".sha all:Rams-?oevderad tt etdatetose heoeerlot nd/o •�....nw....n...nn.. 944..86.... ......uu• be�acceP =uP the Pr°Posed P I matlonrconcern n he t pepaertment°ltof♦CommunitY�Da�e�opment In he bove eddress'betwhe ugh fridaY�a�f�'o Off-Menge M rom\Monde ♦ s7 17(ma baIll °P°s yath�oseplssuesfyouo`porisc eons=else tofralsin9 IYi descrlbed�W-11,1s'Sotice raised at the Public:hearin. he` ublic-h 4 ,`— oryln•wdtten�coEresP°^dence;:tleliveretl.toLthe.Plan I certify(or declare)under penalty Of perjury that Ilre nin99 rComm sslonraor t or o P PHILIPaDRELL'ASecretary PelmiDesert Pannmg•Comm °^ fOr%Oing is true and caned. Pub_F my ,5 1998 Dated at Palm Springs,Califoinlatlrb/L day of SIGNATURE BEST BEST & KRIEGER L?P 39700 Bob Hope Drive, Suite 312 P.O. Box 1555 Rancho Mirage, California 92270 Telephone: (760) 568-2611 Telecopier: (760) 340-6698 TELECOPIER TRANSMISSION DATE: February 17, 1998 Tom: To: NAME FAX NO. PHONE No. STEVE SMITH 340-0574 City of Palm Desert FROM: Helene P. Dreyer, Deputy City Attorney f� RE: ZORC - Review of Sign Ordinance 6 FILEN0,: 72500- USERNO.: NO. OF PAGES,INCLUDING COVER: MESSAGE: ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW: YES Per your request, attached is a chart summarizing proposed changes to zoning ordinance regulating signs. Also enclosed is a slightly revised copy of the Memorandum dated January 30, 1998, entitled C2- "Draft Proposed Revisions to Sign Ordinance" to incorporate changes you and/or Bob Hargreaves suggested. Therefore, your packet should now include: Cover memorandum Lengthy memorandum discussing legal issues in depth Memorandum - Summary of Law (shorter version of legal issues summary) Memorandum - Draft Proposed Revisions (revised copy attached) Chart w/Comparison of current and revised provisions [chart combines Memorandum - Summary and Memorandum - Draft Proposals] RWUB\nPD\1856 }, ,- DV pfflum DDT 73-510 FRED WARING DRIVE, PALM DESERT,CALIFORNIA 92260 TELEPHONE(619)346-0611 CITY OF PALM DESERT LEGAL NOTICE CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a public hearing will be held before the Palm Desert City Council to consider amendment to the Zoning Ordinance as it relates to political signs, Municipal Code Section 25.68. SAID public hearing will be held on Thursday, September 10, 1998, at 7:00 p.m. in the Council Chamber at the Palm Desert Civic Center, 73-510 Fred Waring Drive, Palm Desert, California, at which time and place all interested persons are invited to attend and be heard. Written comments concerning all items covered by this public hearing notice shall be accepted up to the date of the hearing. Information concerning the proposed project and/or negative declaration is available for review in the Department of Community Development at the above address between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. If you challenge the proposed actions in court, you may be limited to raising only those issues you or someone else raised at the public hearing described in this notice, or in written correspondence delivered to the City Council at, or prior to, the public hearing. PUBLISH: Desert Sun SHEILA R. GILLIGAN, City Clerk August 30, 1998 City of Palm Desert, California CITY OF PALM DESERT ID :619-341-7098 AUG 26 '98 13 : 37 TRANSMIT CONFIRMATION REPORT NO . 002 RECEIVER 7607784731 TRANSMITTER CITY OF PALM DESERT DATE AUG 26 '98 13 : 37 DURATION 01 ' 36 MODE STD PAGES 02 RESULT OK 2 Date �� Pa9ol es� 7671 post-ft'Fax Note From - To ` --0b CoJDept. Phona# ' phone# Fax /# Fax# ��� o./a p�s�✓ _ MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION AUGUST 4, 1998 Commissioner Beaty asked if, as was a concern of the residents, all of these parcels were going to be undevelopable as residential. Mr. Smith stated that he didn't believe that. He believed the properties to the north were developable as residential uses. Commissioner Beaty asked if the width, north and south of this parcel, was the same as the next parcels. Mr. Smith thought the parcel had 280 feet of depth north to south and was less than the others at 330 or 333 feet. Mr. Drell said they were about 50 feet narrower. Commissioner Beaty said he would be in concurrence with his fellow commissioners and was in favor a continuance so that the developer could at least discuss the issue with the homeowners and bring it back at a future date. Chairperson Campbell stated that she also concurred with her fellow commissioners. She said that initially she was in favor of changing the zone to office professional but she didn't like the buildings and felt they didn't go with the general plan. There was Kaufman and Broad to the west and a golf course and a very upscale community with fairway homes to the northeast that would be similar to Indian Ridge and the buildings that were shown to them did belong on Fred Waring and not in that location. From all of the opposition that she had heard, she would also be in favor of continuing this matter and have Mr. Baxley get together with the homeowners and see if any of their problems could be solved. She was in favor of a continuance. Commissioner Beaty stated that he would move for a continuance and asked the applicant if he would like two weeks or one month. Mr. Baxley felt that two weeks would be sufficient. Mr. Drell indicated that one month was probably what was needed. Commissioner concurred. Chairperson Campbell reopened the public hearing and asked for a motion. Action: It was moved by Commissioner Beaty, seconded by Commissioner Finerty, continuing GPA 98-4, C/Z 98-5 and PP 98-10 to September 1 , 1998. Motion carried 4-0. F. Case No. ZOA 98-5 - CITY OF PALM DESERT, Applicant Request for approval of amendments to the sign ordinance regarding political signs. 17 MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION AUGUST 4, 1998 Mr. Smith indicated that during the past election campaign there were some problems with regulating certain political signs and our ordinance was deemed to be unenforceable. The City Attorney's office and Zoning Ordinance Review Committee had been working on this matter. Essentially, if adopted, they would delete the current standards and establish a completely new section in the ordinance. It was a request from ZORC that they separate it from the sign ordinance itself. They were looking at a difference between commercial speech and noncommercial speech. This new code section, Section 112 of the Zoning Ordinance, would regulate noncommercial signs. It would create five categories of noncommercial signs based on the location. In the case of occupied single family homes, basically that was unregulated. A concern in the past has been signs on vacant residential lots and that would be covered under Category B which limits signage to 12 square feet total. Category C dealt with temporary noncommercial signs on developed lots in other residential zones like churches and day care facilities. "D" covered developed lots in the commercial and industrial zones. "E" covered vacant lots in commercial and industrial zones. He said that "F" was an interesting category in that if a commercial or industrial user has approved permanent signage, he/she could take it down and put up a noncommercial sign to that size. He felt the ordinance was reasonable and the City Attorney's office advised that it is enforceable. He noted that the ordinance requires that signs be taken down within seven days after an election and they could go up for a maximum of 90 days. All the uses except the occupied residential units required a permit that would be issued through the city and there would be some sort of approval affixed upon the sign. There would be no charge for the permits and they would be reapproved if the 90 days ran out. He thought they were reasonably protecting both sides of the issue and hoped they would be able to limit the number of signs on vacant lots which in his observation had been a problem in the past. Commissioner Finerty asked for clarification that if they wanted to put up a political sign on a vacant lot, this new ordinance said that they would have to obtain the permission of the owners of that vacant lot and bring that to the city. Mr. Smith said that was correct and it would be limited to 12 square feet on the lot so if there was already one there at eight square feet, they would be limited to four. 18 s i MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION AUGUST 4, 1998 Commissioner Fernandez asked who would police the signs after the seven days as far as making sure that they are removed from the lots. Mr. Smith stated that part of the requirement of the permit is that they sign a statement agreeing to take it down, but ultimately it would fall upon the Code Enforcement Department. Chairperson Campbell asked if they would be ticketed if the signs weren't removed. Mr. Smith said there is a provision for penalties as outlined on page 9 of the draft ordinance. It was an infraction and the fine wouldn't exceed $500. Chairperson Campbell opened the public hearing and asked if anyone wished to address the commission in FAVOR or OPPOSITION to the proposal. There was no one and the public hearing was closed: Chairperson Campbell asked for commission comments. Chairperson Campbell stated that she was in favor of the proposal and would move for approval. Commissioner Fernandez concurred and said he would second the motion. Action: It was moved by Chairperson Campbell, seconded by Commissioner Fernandez, approving the findings as presented by staff. Commissioner Finerty spoke to the motion and informed commission that this whole issue was initiated by Mr. Rick Post who had an objection during the last campaign which she felt was without merit a she disagreed with the registration requirement. Signs were part of the political process and part of running a campaign. She liked seeing signs during election time. She also felt that having to go through this process was going to be a disadvantage to any challenger and that one of the key issues in a race was name recognition and by imposing these restrictions she saw it as giving any incumbent an advantage and therefore she would be opposed to the political sign part of this ordinance. She felt it was a relatively short period of time and knew that with the campaign she was involved with, they took the signs down the next morning. She felt that was a very reasonable process. -She disagreed with the proposal. Commissioner �.. 'Beaty expressed his confidence in City Council and city staff and concurred with the motion. Chairperson Campbell called for the vote. Motion carried 3-1 (Commissioner Finerty voted no). 19 MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION AUGUST 4, 1998 It was moved by Chairperson Campbell, seconded by Commissioner Fernandez, adopting Planning Commission Resolution No. 1884, recommending to City Council approval of Case No. ZOA 98-5. Motion carried 3-1 (Commissioner Finerty voted no). IX. MISCELLANEOUS A. REQUEST FOR A DETERMINATION OF USE FOR THE RELOCATION OF AN EXISTING AUTOMOBILE REPAIR FACILITY TO 73-220 HIGHWAY 111 (THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF HIGHWAY 111 AND SAN MARCOS). Mr. Drell explained that basically an auto repair specialty shop, other than being listed as a definition in the zoning ordinance, wasn't a listed use in any zone in the city. Historically they have allowed them as a matter of right in the service industrial zone and they have been allowed in the commercial zone if they were associated with a gas station. The applicant operated one in association with a gas station. The general question was if it could be considered as a conditional use without a gas station in the general commercial zone and then was asking specifically for some feedback on a particular site, which he would ultimately have to come back and apply for, located at the old Texaco station with the self-serve car wash. The problem that was created was that it was proposed that the gasoline sales portion of that business be abandoned for various reasons. He said it has never been that successful as a gas station and the cost of replacing the tanks and everything else didn't warrant it. The applicant was being eased out by Chevron from his existing site and he wanted to locate and build a new project. Mr. Drell noted the site plan was on display and the applicant would have to ultimately apply for it depending upon the Commission's direction. He said the applicant would be upgrading the existing car wash site with simply a specialty auto repair. He indicated that question one was if the applicant should have the opportunity to apply for a conditional use in the C-1 zone for specialty auto repair without the association of a service station which primarily sells gasoline. Secondly, if it was deemed that the applicant could go ahead, he wanted to say for the applicant's future information that his plan was showing only five parking spaces and one handicapped space. Given staff's experience with auto repair, typically people come in the morning and there are two or three turn over of cars. Not everyone's got worked on eight hours a day, and there are 20 LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST S. KRIEGER -LP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE March 2 , 1998 MEMORANDUM TO: Steve Smith, City of Palm Desert FROM: Helene P. Dreyer, Deputy City Attorney RE : Sign Ordinance revisions (P.D. Mun. C. 25 . 68 . 010 et . seq. ) Attached are : (Revised) : * Comparison Table : summarizing current size limits and size changes * Proposed Revisions Table : summarizes changes to ordinance wording * Memorandum of Proposed Revisions : provides actual text for amended ordinance (Not Revised, but included for complete packet) : * Summation of Law Memorandum: summarizes lengthier memorandum of law re first amendment issues * Memorandum of Law: full length discussion of relevant first amendment issues and sign law decisions RMPUB\HPD2138 LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST 6 KRIEGER L.LP ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE January 30, 1998 MEMORANDUM TO: Steve Smith, City of Palm Desert FROM: Robert W. Hargreaves, Deputy City Attorney Helene P. Dreyer, Deputy City Attorney RE: Palm Desert Munic . C. 25 . 68 . 010 et . seq. (Signs) [referred to herein as "the sign ordinance" . ) In a memorandum to City Council dated October 17, 1997, City Attorney David J. Erwin outlined the concerns of this office that Municipal Code Section 25 . 68 . 620, which regulates political signs, may be unenforceable . Initial analysis indicated possible grounds of challenge included the restriction to 5 square feet of sign face and limitations on spacing of political signs . Since then, staff has been investigating a possible revision of the sign ordinance and this office has completed a more detailed analysis of the sign ordinance provisions respecting both political speech and non-commercial speech generally. In furtherance of the revision project, attached are several documents you may find useful : (a) a Memorandum of Law discussing the current state of the law as relates to these revision topics, and our general recommendations; (b) a Summary of that memorandum, providing an overview of the key legal considerations for quick reference; and (c) Suggested Revision Language for particular code sections . If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact us . CITY OF PALM DESERT DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT STAFF REPORT I. TO: Honorable Mayor and City Council II. REQUEST: Consideration of approval of amendment to the sign ordinance - political signs. III. APPLICANT: City of Palm Desert IV. CASE NO: ZOA 98-5 ' V. DATE: September 10, 1998 VI. CONTENTS: A. Staff Recommendation B. Discussion C. Draft Ordinance No. D. Planning Commission Minutes involving Case No. ZOA 98-5 E. Planning Commission Resolution No. 1884 F. Planning Commission Staff Report dated August 4, 1998 G. Related maps and/or exhibits ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- A. STAFF RECOMMENDATION: Waiver further reading and pass Ordinance No. to second reading. B. DISCUSSION: During the past city election campaign there was concern that the city's sign ordinance as it applied to political sign was not enforceable (i.e., five square feet limit was too restrictive). The city attorney's office, along with staff and ZORC (Zoning Ordinance Review Committee) has been working on writing political sign regulations which are equitable and enforceable. This ordinance was reviewed by Planning Commission August 4, 1998. The Commission voted 3-1 to recommend approval of the ordinance with Commissioner Finerty voting nay and Commissioner Jonathan absent. Commissioner Finerty felt that the proposed ordinance was overly restrictive considering that the political season is relatively short and that it would provide incumbents with an advantage due to name recognition (see Planning Commission minutes for expanded statement). STAFF REPORT CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 SEPTEMBER 10, 1998 1 . ANALYSIS: he current political sign The proposed amendments if enacted 'would delete t p g regulations as prescribed in Municipal Code Section 25.68.620 (copy attached) and replace it with new regulations. The new political sign regulations will be assigned to a new chapter of the zoning ordinance to provide an obvious distinction between commercial speech and non-commercial speech. The amendment will amend numerous existing definitions within the code. As is explained in the background material provided by the city attorney's office non commercial speech is afforded greater protection than is commercial speech, therefore, the city cannot regulate non commercial speech to the same degree as commercial speech. The new regulations will establish a no fee registration procedure, require consent of the property owner, prohibit non-commercial signs in the public right-of-way, prescribe a maximum duration of 90 days or seven days after the elections, whichever occurs first and provide penalties for violations. The registration process will not apply to occupied residential properties. The ordinance then establishes different criteria for non-commercial signs in various locations. Category "A" is developed residential lots. The owner/occupant is not subject to registration and may install one or more temporary non-commercial signs which meet the general criteria. Category "B" applies to vacant residential lots. This category requires registration and total signage not exceed 12 square feet. Category "C" applies to developed lots in other residential zones. This category requires registration and total signage not to exceed six square feet. Category "D" applies to developed lots in commercial or industrial zones. This category requires registration and total signage not to exceed six square feet. Category "E" applies to vacant lots in commercial or industrial zones. This category requires registration and limits signs to three square feet or 12 square feet depending on property frontage. 2 STAFF REPORT ZOA 98-5 AUGUST 4, 1998 Category "F" applies to commercial or industrial zones and permits tenants/owners to exchange permanent commercial sign copy for temporary non-commercial sign subject to registration. 2. CONCLUSION: i attorney feels that the sign regulations are required. The city atto e New politicalg g q Y Y ordinance as proposed herein is enforceable and would withstand challenge. Staff feels that while the registration process may at first be difficult it should be workable. Signs on vacant lots without proper registration can be abated. Prepared by: S�teve Smith Reviewed and Approved b P ilip Drell Am 3 ORDINANCE NO. AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA, APPROVING A ZONING ORDINANCE AMENDMENT RELATING TO NON-COMMERCIAL SIGNS. CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Palm Desert, California, did on the 10th day of September, 1998, hold a duly noticed public hearing to consider the amendment of Zoning Ordinance Section 25.68 relating to non-commercial signs; and WHEREAS, the Planning Commission by its Resolution No. 1884 has recommended approval of this case; and WHEREAS, said application has complied with the requirements of the "City of Palm Desert Procedure for Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act, Resolution No. 97-18," in that the Director of Community Development has determined the amendment to be a Class 5 Categorical Exemption; and WHEREAS, at said public hearing, upon hearing and considering all testimony and arguments, if any, of all interested persons desiring to be heard, said City Council did find the following facts and reasons to exist to approve the Zoning Ordinance text amendment: 1 . The proposed amendment relating to non-commercial signs is consistent with the intent of the General Plan and Zoning Ordinance and will protect the community health, safety and general welfare. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDAINED by the City Council of the City of Palm Desert, California, as follows: 1 . That the above recitations are true and correct and constitute the findings of the Council in this case. 2. That the City Council hereby approves Case No. ZOA 98-5 as provided in the attached exhibit labeled "A". PASSED, APPROVED and ADOPTED at a regular meeting of the Palm Desert City Council, held on this day of 1998, by the following vote, to wit: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: JEAN M. BENSON, Mayor ATTEST: SHEILA R. GILLIGAN, City Clerk City of Palm Desert, California -ORDINANCE NO. EXHIBIT "A" SECTION 1 That Section 25.04.750 be amended to read at the beginning: "Except as otherwise.provided, "sign" means..." SECTION 2 That Section 25.68.080 D is hereby deleted. SECTION 3 That Section 25.68.020 is hereby amended to add the following definitions: Y. "Non-commercial message" means a message which does not advertise, announce or attract attention to places or things offered for sale, lease or hire, or products, goods, businesses, or services. A non-commercial message includes a message expressing an opinion or ideology. Z. "Non-commercial sign" means a sign bearing a non- commercial message. AA. "Temporary sign" means a sign that is: painted upon a window, or constructed of cloth, canvas, cardboard, poster light board, plastic, light-weight aluminum or other g ht temporary p y materials, with or without a structural frame; and affixed or erected by means of a temporary method of erecting, hanging or affixing, such as by one or more ground stakes, tape, pins, tacks, staples, or other easily removable method; and intended for a temporary period of display. SECTION 4 That Section 25.68.020 P is hereby amended to read: P. "Political sign" means a non-commercial sign whose message relates to the election of one or more persons to public office, or one or more measures, initiatives or ballot proposals, on an election ballot to be voted on at an election called by a public body. SECTION 5 That Section 25.68.020 U is hereby amended to read: 2 ORDINANCE NO. U. "Sign" means anything of visual appearance, including but not limited to any word, numeral, letter model, banner, flag, pennant, poster, insignia, device, design or trademark which is affixed to, painted on, or represented upon a building, structure, window, piece of land or natural object, and which is in the nature of or used as an announcement, direction or advertisement by attracting attention to a topic, object, place, activity, person, product, institution, organization or business; together with all parts, materials, frame and background. A sign shall not mean displays of merchandise or products for sale on the premises, or signs inside buildings except when less than three feet behind a window and facing public view, or ornamentation, design, statuary, architecture, landscaping, pictures, paintings or other such art forms unless, in the case of any exceptions listed in this chapter, the attraction, because of location, size, use or the nature thereof, has the substantial effect of attracting attention for identification purposes when viewed from an outside public area. The basic intent behind this definition is not to discourage product displays, design or art forms epitomizing simplicity, good taste and compatibility with the community's desired image. SECTION 6 That Section 25.68.060 is amended to delete "department of environmental services" and replace same with "department of community development". SECTION 7 That the first sentence of Section 25.68.090 C (prohibited signs) is hereby amended to add at the beginning of the first sentence: • "Except for permanent non-commercial signs or non- commercial messages,..." SECTION 8 That Section 25.68.100 is amended as follows: First Paragraph: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". Third Paragraph, First Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". 3 ORDINANCE NO. Third Paragraph, Second Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". SECTION 9 ' That Section 25.68.130 ("realty signs") is amended to add the following at the end of that section: "Realty signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.112.070." SECTION 10 That Section 25.68.170 ("other signs" in single family zones) is amended as follows: Add to Beginning of First Sentence: "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter..." Last Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". SECTION 11 That Section 25.68.250 is amended as follows: Amend subsection B.: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with-"director of community development". Add subsection C: C. Sales and rental signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.1 12.070. SECTION 12 That Section 25.68.400 is amended to add subsection C as follows: C. Sales and rental signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.1 12.070. 4 -ORDINANCE NO. SECTION 13 That the first sentence of Section 25.68.420 ("signs generally") is amended to read: "The following general sign usage provisions and regulations shall apply for all signs, except that sections 25.68.430, 25.68.440 and 25.68.460 shall not apply to temporary non-commercial signs." SECTION 14 That the first phase of the first sentence of Section 25.68.440 ("Sign Review Criteria") is amended to read: "All signs which require a sign permit pursuant to this Chapter..." SECTION 15 That Section 25.68.450 ("signs facing private property prohibited") is hereby deleted. SECTION 16 That Section 25.68.620 ("Political Sign Regulation) is hereby deleted. SECTION 17 That Chapter 25.112 ("Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation") is hereby added as follows: 25.112.010 Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation. 25.112.010. General Provisions. A. Non-Commercial Messages. Any sign authorized pursuant to, and otherwise complying with, this Chapter may contain a non-commercial message. Temporary non-commercial signs shall comply with the provisions set forth in Section 25.1 12." B. Public right-of-way. Except as otherwise specifically authorized in this Chapter, no temporary sign may be displayed, erected or maintained in or upon public property or the public right-of-way, including but not limited to, any public utility pole, street sign, shelter, bench or trash receptacle. C. Free standing signs. The maximum height of freestanding temporary non-commercial signs shall be six feet from ground level unless topographic or other physical features 5 'ORDINANCE NO. exist necessitating a higher sign. In no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. D. Sign Categories. The following categories apply to all temporary non-commercial signs: J 1 . Category A. Temporary non-commercial signs in residential districts in areas developed with a dwelling. For purposes of this 25.112.010, "areas developed with a dwelling" means: the entire lot if any portion thereof is developed with a single family homes; the demised premises of any occupied residential leasehold interest, such as an occupied mobile home lot or apartment unit; the non-common areas of a condominium or timeshare unit intended for use as a dwelling. 2. Category B. Temporary non-commercial signs in residential districts on vacant lots. 3. Category C. Temporary non-commercial signs on developed lots in "Other Residential Zones" as provided in Part VI., Section 25.68.180 et. seq. 4. Category D. Temporary non-commercial signs on developed lots in commercial or industrial zones. 5. Category E. Temporary non-commercial signs on vacant lots in commercial or industrial zones. 6. Category F. Temporary non-commercial sign or sign copy erected in lieu of an authorized permanent sign or permanent sign copy. 25.112.020. Category A Signs. One or more Category A signs may be erected and maintained by, or with the consent of, the dwelling owner or occupant. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. 25.112.030. Category B Signs. Subject to the registration requirements set forth in 25.112.070, one or more Category B signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign face area shall not exceed 12 6 ORDINANCE NO. commercial messages. For each sign with a sign face area in excess of six square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed eight vertical inches. 25.112.040. Category C and Category D Signs. One or more Category C or Category D signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign face area shall not exceed six square feet. The maximum height of each sign shall be six feet unless topographic or other physical features exist necessitating a higher sign, but in no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. 25.112.050. Category E Signs. Subject to the registration requirements set forth in 25.1 12.070, one or more Category E signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign face area shall not exceed 12 square feet on lots with frontage on the public right-of-way greater than 200 lineal feet, and shall not exceed three square feet on lots with frontage on the public right-of-way of 200 lineal feet or less. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. For each sign with a sign face area in excess of six square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed eight vertical inches. 25.112.060. Category F Signs. The owner or user of any permanent sign authorized under this Chapter may erect Category F sign copy containing one or more non-commercial messages in lieu of part or all of, and subject to the same size restrictions as, the permanent sign copy authorized. Such "in lieu of" temporary sign copy shall be affixed to the permanent sign within the permanent sign face. 25.112.070. Registration of Category B and Category E Signs. A. Registration. Temporary non-commercial signs in Category B or Category E may only be erected upon submission of a completed registration form to be provided by the department of community development. Registration forms shall be signed by the registrant and shall include: 7 -ORDINANCE NO. (1 ) The name of the registrant and the mailing address to which any notices required by this Chapter 25.112 may be sent; (2) A general description of the sign and the location where it will be erected; (3) A statement affirming that the registrant is responsible for complying with this Chapter, including but not limited to sign maintenance and removal; (4) A statement affirming that the registrant has the permission of the property owner to erect the sign; and (5) A statement affirming, under penalty of perjury, that the registrant has read and understood the contents of the form. B. Registration Information Affixed to Sign. Upon submission of a completed registration form, the registrant shall be provided with a registration number. Each sign shall have the name of the maker, the date of erection, and the registration number clearly legible on the lower right hand corner of the fact of the sign. As an alternative, a decal may be issued by the city which shall be placed on the sign at a location visible and readable from the public right-of-way. Any sign that does not bear valid registration information shall be deemed non-complying and subject to all applicable penalties and abatement procedures. • C. Consent of Property Owner. No Category B or Category E temporary non-commercial sign may be erected without the prior consent of the property owner. Any sign erected or maintained without permission of the property owner may be summarily removed by the property owner, or his or her authorized representative. D. Duration. The registration shall expire ninety days following it's submission to the department of community development. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the registration for a temporary political sign expires ninety days following it's submission to the department of community development, or seven days after the election, whichever occurs first. 8 'ORDINANCE NO. E. Renewal or Removal Required. Upon expiration of the registration, the registrant must either remove the sign or complete a new registration form. Signs not removed or re- registered by the end of the next business day following the date of expiration shall be deemed non-complying signs and subject to all applicable penalties and abatement procedures. 25.112.080. Enforcement and Penalties. A. Violation - Infraction. Any person violating this Chapter 25.112 shall be guilty of an infraction, and upon conviction thereof shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500); and such person shall be deemed guilty of a separate offense for each day, or portion thereof, during which any violation of this chapter is committed or continued. B. Abatement. The director of community development shall not permit, and shall abate, any temporary non-commercial sign within the city which fails to meet the requirements of this Chapter 25.112 or other applicable law. In addition to the penalties set forth in 25.1 12.080(A), the director of community development, or his authorized representative, may remove any temporary non-commercial sign that is not in compliance. Prior to removal, the director of community development, or his authorized representative, shall give notice to the registrant, or the property owner if the sign is not registered, that the sign is not in compliance and is subject to removal. The notice shall specify the corrections necessary to restore compliance, including the option of voluntary removal of the sign; and shall warn the recipient that the sign will be removed if compliance is not restored within five days of the date of the notice, that such removal will be at the expense of the recipient, and that such removal shall be in addition to the penalties provided for in 25.1 12.080(A). Notwithstanding the foregoing, temporary signs found on public property or the public right-of-way will be summarily removed and stored at city hall. Notice shall be given to the registrant, if known, informing the registrant of the removal and reasonable costs incurred, and warning that the sign will be stored at city hall for only ten days from the date of the notice 9 ORDINANCE NO. and, if not claimed within that time, shall be destroyed. Prior to releasing such stored signs to the registrant, the registrant shall pay the reasonable removal and storage costs and any other penalty due pursuant to this chapter. a 10 o---T -City of Palm Desert Council Agenda Request Meeting of SEPTEMBER -10, 1998 To be considered under. ' Consent Calendar_ Resolutions_ Ordinances_ New Business_ Old Business Informational Items_ Public Hearings X Qther_ 2. Item Title: (Please provide the wording that should appear as the item's title on the agenda). CONSIDERATION OF APPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE SIGN ORDINANCE _ POLITICAL SIGNS *,5 - No zos} 9 3. Financial: (Complete if applicable) (a) Account/Project# (b) Amount Requested (c) In the Current Budget? (c) Appropriation Required? Approved by Director of Finance: 4. Submitted by: STEVE SMITH 5. Approvals: Department Ii n �� City Manager, r/ CITY OF PALM DESERT DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT STAFF REPORT TO: Planning Commission DATE: August 4, 1998 CASE NO: ZOA 98-5 REQUEST: Approval of amendments to the sign ordinance - political signs. APPLICANT: City of Palm Desert I. BACKGROUND: During the past city election campaign there was concern that the city's sign ordinance as it applied to political signs was not enforceable (i.e., five square feet limit was too restrictive). The city attorney's office along with staff and ZORC (Zoning Ordinance Review Committee) has been working on writing political sign regulations which are equitable and enforceable. II. ANALYSIS: The proposed amendments if enacted would delete the current political sign regulations as prescribed in Municipal Code Section 25.68.620 (copy attached) and replace it with new regulations. The new political sign regulations will be assigned to a new chapter of the zoning ordinance to provide an obvious distinction between commercial speech and non-commercial speech. The amendment will amend numerous existing definitions within the code. As is explained in the background material provided by the city attorney's office non commercial speech is afforded greater protection than is commercial speech, therefore, the city cannot regulate non commercial speech to the same degree as commercial speech. The new regulations will establish a no fee registration procedure, require consent of the property owner, prohibit non-commercial signs in the public right-of-way, prescribe a maximum duration of 90 days or seven days after the elections, whichever occurs first and provide penalties for violations. STAFF REPORT ' ZOA 98-5 AUGUST 4, 1998 The registration process will not apply to occupied residential properties. The ordinance then establishes different criteria for non-commercial signs in various locations. Category "A" is developed residential lots. The owner/occupant is not subject to registration and may install one or more temporary non-commercial signs which meet the general criteria. Category "B" applies to vacant residential lots. This category requires registration and total signage not exceed 12 square feet. Category "C" applies to developed lots in other residential zones. This category requires registration and total signage not to exceed six square feet. Category "D" applies to developed lots in commercial or industrial zones. This category requires registration and total signage not to exceed six square feet. Category "E" applies to vacant lots in commercial or industrial zones. This category requires registration and limits signs to three square feet or 12 square feet depending on property frontage. Category "F" applies to commercial or industrial zones and permits tenants/owners to exchange permanent commercial sign copy for temporary non-commercial sign subject to registration. Ill. CONCLUSION: New political sign regulations are required. The city attorney feels that the ordinance as proposed herein is enforceable and would withstand challenge. Staff feels that while the registration process may at first be difficult it should be workable. Signs on vacant lots without proper registration can be abated. IV. RECOMMENDATION: That the Planning Commission recommend approval to the City Council of Case No. ZOA 98-5. 2 STAFF REPORT ZOA 98-5 AUGUST 4, 1998 V. ATTACHMENTS: A. Draft resolution B. Legal notice C. Municipal Code Section 25.68.620 D. ZORC meeting minutes Prepared by St ve mith Reviewed and Approved by Phil Drell Itm 3 PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. A RESOLUTION OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA, RECOMMENDING TO THE CITY COUNCIL APPROVAL OF A ZONING ORDINANCE AMENDMENT RELATING TO NON-COMMERCIAL SIGNS. CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 WHEREAS, the Planning Commission of the City of Palm Desert, California, did on the 4th day of August, 1998, hold a duly noticed public hearing to consider the amendment of Zoning Ordinance Section 25.68 relating to non-commercial signs; and WHEREAS, said application has complied with the requirements of the "City of Palm Desert Procedure for Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act, Resolution No. 97-18," in that the Director of Community Development has determined the amendment to be a Class 5 Categorical Exemption; and WHEREAS, at said public hearing, upon hearing and considering all testimony and arguments, if any, of all interested persons desiring to be heard, said Planning Commission did find the following facts and reasons to exist to recommend approval of the Zoning Ordinance text amendment: 1 . The proposed amendment relating to non-commercial signs is consistent with the intent of the Zoning Ordinance and will protect the community health, safety and general welfare. NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Planning Commission of the City of Palm Desert, California, as follows: 1 . That the above recitations are true and correct and constitute the findings of the Commission in this case. 2. That it does hereby recommend approval to the City Council Case No. ZOA 98-5 as provided in the attached exhibit labeled "A". PASSED, APPROVED and ADOPTED at a regular meeting of the Palm Desert Planning Commission, held on this 4th day of August, 1998, by the following vote, to wit: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: SONIA M. CAMPBELL, Chairperson ATTEST: PHILIP DRELL, Secretary Palm Desert Planning Commission PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. EXHIBIT "A" SECTION 1 That Section 25.04.750 be amended to read at the beginning: "Except as otherwise provided, "sign" means..." SECTION 2 That Section 25.68.080 D is hereby deleted. SECTION 3 That Section 25.68.020 is hereby amended to add the following definitions: Y. "Non-commercial message" means a message which does not advertise, announce or attract attention to places or things offered for sale, lease or hire, or products, goods, businesses, or services. A non-commercial message includes a message expressing an opinion or ideology. Z. "Non-commercial sign" means a sign bearing a non- commercial message. AA. "Temporary sign" means a sign that is: painted upon a window, or constructed of cloth, canvas, cardboard, poster board, plastic, light-weight aluminum, or other light temporary materials, with or without a structural frame; and affixed or erected by means of a temporary method of erecting, hanging or affixing, such as by one or more ground stakes, tape, pins, tacks, staples, or other easily removable method; and intended for a temporary period of display. SECTION 4 That Section 25.68.020 P is hereby amended to read: P. "Political sign" means a non-commercial sign whose message relates to the election of one or more persons to public office, or one or more measures, initiatives or ballot proposals, on an election ballot to be voted on at an election called by a public body. SECTION 5 That Section 25.68.020 U is hereby amended to read: 2 PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. U. "Sign" means any thing of visual appearance, including but not limited to any word, numeral, letter model, banner, flag, pennant, poster, insignia, device, design or trademark which is affixed to, painted on, or represented upon a building, structure, window, piece of land or natural object, and which is in the nature of or used as an announcement, direction or advertisement by attracting attention to a topic, object, place, activity, person, product, institution, organization or business; together with all parts, materials, frame and background. A sign shall not mean displays of merchandise or products for sale on the premises, or signs inside buildings except when less than three feet behind a window and facing public view, or ornamentation, design, statuary, architecture, landscaping, pictures, paintings or other such art forms unless, in the case of any exceptions listed in this chapter, the attraction, because of location, size, use or the nature thereof, has the substantial effect of attracting attention for identification purposes when viewed from an outside public area. The basic intent behind this definition is not to discourage product displays, design or art forms epitomizing simplicity, good taste and compatibility with the community's desired image. SECTION 6 That Section 25.68.060 is amended to delete "department of environmental services" and replace same with "department of community development". SECTION 7 That the first sentence of Section 25.68.090 C (prohibited signs) is hereby amended to add at the beginning of the first sentence: "Except for permanent non-commercial signs or non- commercial messages,..." SECTION 8 That Section 25.68.100 is amended as follows: First Paragraph: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". Third Paragraph, First Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". 3 PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. Third Paragraph, Second Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". SECTION 9 That Section 25.68.130 ("realty signs") is amended to add the following at the end of that section: "Realty signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.1 12.070." SECTION 10 That Section 25.68.170 ("other signs" in single family zones) is amended as follows: Add to Beginning of First Sentence: "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter..." Last Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". SECTION 11 That Section 25.68.250 is amended as follows: Amend subsection B.: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". Add subsection C: C. Sales and rental signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.1 12.070. SECTION 12 That Section 25.68.400 is amended to add subsection C as follows: C. Sales and rental signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.112.070. 4 PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. SECTION 13 That the first sentence of Section 25.68.420 ("signs generally") is amended to read: "The following general sign usage provisions and regulations shall apply for all signs, except that sections 25.68.430, 25.68.440 and 25.68.460 shall not apply to temporary non-commercial signs." SECTION 14 That the first phase of the first sentence of Section 25.68.440 ("Sign Review Criteria") is amended to read: "All signs which require a sign permit pursuant to this Chapter..." SECTION 15 That Section 25.68.450 ("signs facing private property prohibited") is hereby deleted. SECTION 16 That Section 25.68.620 ("Political Sign Regulation) is hereby deleted. SECTION 17 That Chapter 25.112 ("Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation") is hereby added as follows: 25.112.010 Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation. 25.112.010. General Provisions. A. Non-Commercial Messages. Any sign authorized pursuant to, and otherwise complying with, this Chapter may contain a non-commercial message. Temporary non-commercial signs shall comply with the provisions set forth in Section 25.1 12." B. Public right-of-way. Except as otherwise specifically authorized in this Chapter, no temporary sign may be displayed, erected or maintained in or upon public property or the public right-of-way, including but not limited to, any public utility pole, street sign, shelter, bench or trash receptacle. C. Free standing signs. The maximum height of freestanding temporary non-commercial signs shall be six feet from ground level unless topographic or other physical features 5 PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. exist necessitating a higher sign. In no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. D. Sign Categories. The following categories apply to all temporary non-commercial signs: 1 . Category A. Temporary non-commercial signs in residential districts in areas developed with a dwelling. For purposes of this 25.112.010, "areas developed with a dwelling" means: the entire lot if any portion thereof is developed with a single family homes; the demised premises of any occupied residential leasehold interest, such as an occupied mobile home lot or apartment unit; the non-common areas of a condominium or timeshare unit intended for use as a dwelling. 2. Category B. Temporary non-commercial signs in residential districts on vacant lots. 3. Category C. Temporary non-commercial signs on developed lots in "Other Residential Zones" as provided in Part VI., Section 25.68.180 et. seq. 4. Category D. Temporary non-commercial signs on developed lots in commercial or industrial zones. 5. Category E. Temporary non-commercial signs on vacant lots in commercial or industrial zones. 6. Category F. Temporary non-commercial sign or sign copy erected in lieu of an authorized permanent sign or permanent sign copy. 25.112.020. Category A Signs. One or more Category A signs may be erected and maintained by, or with the consent of, the dwelling owner or occupant. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. 25.112.030. Category B Signs. Subject to the registration requirements set forth in 25.112.070, one or more Category B signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign face area 'shall not exceed 12 6 PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. commercial messages. For each sign with a sign face area in excess of six square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed eight vertical inches. 25.112.040. Category C and Category D Signs. One or more Category C or Category D signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign .face area shall not exceed six square feet. The maximum height of each sign shall be six feet unless topographic or other physical features exist necessitating a higher sign, but in no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. 25.112.050. Category E Signs. Subject to the registration requirements set forth in 25.1 12.070, one or more Category E signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign face area shall not exceed 12 square feet on lots with frontage on the public right-of-way greater than 200 lineal feet, and shall not exceed three square feet on lots with frontage on the public right-of-way of 200 lineal feet or less. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. For each sign with a sign face area in excess of six square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed eight vertical inches. 25.112.060. Category F Signs. The owner or user of any permanent sign authorized under this Chapter may erect Category F sign copy containing one or more non-commercial messages in lieu of part or all of, and subject to the same size restrictions as, the permanent sign copy authorized. Such "in lieu of" temporary sign copy shall be affixed to the permanent sign within the permanent sign face. 25.112.070. Registration of Category B and Category E Signs. A. Registration. Temporary non-commercial signs in Category B or Category E may only be erected upon submission of a completed registration form to be provided by the department of community development. Registration forms shall be signed by the registrant and shall include: 7 PLANNING COMMISSION RtSOLUTION NO. (1 ) The name of the registrant and the mailing address to which any notices required by this Chapter 25.112 may be sent; (2) A general description of the sign and the location where it will be erected; (3) A statement affirming that the registrant is responsible for complying with this Chapter, including but not limited to sign maintenance and removal; (4) A statement affirming that the registrant has the permission of the property owner to erect the sign; and (5) A statement affirming, under penalty of perjury, that the registrant has read and understood the contents of the form. B. Registration Information Affixed to Sign. Upon submission of a completed registration form, the registrant shall be provided with a registration number. Each sign shall have the name of the maker, the date of erection, and the registration number clearly legible on the lower right hand corner of the fact of the sign. As an alternative, a decal may be issued by the city which shall be placed on the sign at a location visible and readable from the public right-of-way. Any sign that does not bear valid registration information shall be deemed non-complying and subject to all applicable penalties and abatement procedures. C. Consent of Property Owner. No Category B or Category E temporary non-commercial sign may be erected without the prior consent of the property owner. Any sign erected or maintained without permission of the property owner may be summarily removed by the property owner, or his or her authorized representative. D. Duration. The registration shall expire ninety days following it's submission to the department of community development. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the registration for a temporary political sign expires ninety days following it's submission to the department of community development, or seven days after the election, whichever occurs first. 8 PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. E. Renewal or Removal Required. Upon expiration of the registration, the registrant must either remove the sign or complete a new registration form. Signs not removed or re- registered by the end of the next business day following the date of expiration shall be deemed non-complying signs and subject to all applicable penalties and abatement procedures. 25.112.080. Enforcement and Penalties. A. Violation - Infraction. Any person violating this Chapter 25.112 shall be guilty of an infraction, and upon conviction thereof shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500); and such person shall be deemed guilty of a separate offense for each day, or portion thereof, during which any violation of this chapter is committed or continued. B. Abatement. The director of community development shall not permit, and shall abate, any temporary non-commercial sign within the city which fails to meet the requirements of this Chapter 25.112 or other applicable law. In addition to the penalties set forth in 25.1 12.080(A), the director of community development, or his authorized representative, may remove any temporary non-commercial sign that is not in compliance. Prior to removal, the director of community development, or his authorized representative, shall give notice to the registrant, or the property owner if the sign is not registered, that the sign is not in compliance and is subject to removal. The notice shall specify the corrections necessary to restore compliance, including the option of voluntary removal of the sign; and shall warn the recipient that the sign will be removed if compliance is not restored within five days of the date of the notice, that such removal will be at the expense of the recipient, and that such removal shall be in addition to the penalties provided for in 25.112.080(A). Notwithstanding the foregoing, temporary signs found on public property or the public right-of-way will be summarily removed and stored at city hall. Notice shall be given to the registrant, if known, informing the registrant of the removal and reasonable costs incurred, and warning that the sign will be stored at city hall for only ten days from the date of the notice 9 1 PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. and, if not claimed within that time, shall be destroyed. Prior to releasing such stored signs to the registrant, the registrant shall pay the reasonable removal and storage costs and any other penalty due pursuant to this chapter. 10 25.68.607 0 New Years Day the above noted lights may be dis- C. Such signs shall not be located in the public played without review and approval by the city. (Ord. right-of-way; 587§2(Exhibit A§ 19),1989) D. All political signs shall be removed within ten days after the election date,except that in the case of a 25.68.610 Signs on awnings,marquees,canopies, general election,political signs shall not be required to arcades or similar structures or be removedbetween the primary and general elections, attachments but shall be removed within ten days after the general election date.The applicant shall agree in writing to be A. All awnings or awnings with a sign(s) must be personally responsible for the removal of the political reviewed and approved by the architectural review signs; commission.The awning(sign)must be architecturally E. No political signs shall be posted earlier than compatible with the building and as a result an awning ninety,days prior to an election; may not be appropriate for every building. F. No fee or permit shall be required for the right B. Pursuant to Section 25.68.470 "Proper mainte- to erect political signs.Where the sign is proposed to nance of signs" awnings must be kept in good repair be placed on private property, the applicant shall se- and be clean and nonfaded. cure the permission of the property owner. (Ord.422 G Awnings must be substantially attached to the Exhibit A§ 1,1985:Ord. 129§4(part), 1977: Ord.98 main building structure. §i(part),1975:Exhibit A§2538-17.06) D. Awning lettering and numbers as well as style and colors must aesthetically blend with the building. 25.68.630 Signs for public or quasi-public uses. E. Letter height shall not exceed one-third of the Directional and public convenience signs for public awning height and in no event shall it exceed eight and quasi public uses may be permitted on public F.inches. �Scalloping awnings shall not property.The design must conform to standard direc- li shall contain street G pronounced. tional sign specifications promulgated by the director G. Where applicable, awnings shall of environmental services and approved by the design numbers four inches in height with the letter style review board.The total number of signs allowed shall helvetica medium or equivalent. be based on the minimum number necessary for ade- . I-L Awnings shall not contain phone numbers. quate public identification as determined by the direc- L Street-drop type awnings(i.e.canvas-vinyl signs) for of environmental services. (Ord. 129 § 4 (part), shall not be encouraged.(Ord.587§2(Exhibit A§17), 1977:Ord.98§1 (part),1975:Exhibit A§25.38-17.07) 1989:Ord 129§4(part),1977:Ord.98§1(part),1975: Exhibit A§2539-17.05) XL ENFORCEMENT AND AMORTIZATION 25.68.615 Open summer signs. Between June 1st and October 1st,restaurants,re- 25.68 640 Lawful nonconforming signs. tail andpersonal service businesses within the commer- A. Lawful existing on-premises signs at the time of cial zone may display a sign in addition to a main sign, the adoption of the ordinance codified in this chapter not to exceed five square feet, indicating if they will on February 24, 1977,which do not comply with the remain open during the summer.The design and loca- requirements of this chapter, as amended, shall be lion of the sign shall be compatible with other signs on deemed lawful nonconforming uses and shall be made the building and must be approved by the department to comply,be removed or demolished upon the transfer of environmental services(Ord 272(part),1981) of ownership of the business or upon the altering of sign,copy,size,color or the addition of new signage to 25.68.620 Political sign regulation. the site or structure upon which the nonconforming Applicants for political signs,as defined in Section sign is located. 25.68.020, shall comply with the following require- B. Nonconforming signs may not be expanded,ex- ments: tended, rebuilt, altered or reconstructed in any way, A. Each sign shall not exceed five square feet in except for normal maintenance or to protect public area; safety. B. The signs shall not be located closer together C. It shall be the express responsibility of the ven- than fifty feet; dorto advise the vendee of the provisions of this section 452 MINUTES ZONING ORDINANCE REVIEW COMMITTEE DECEMBER 17, 1997 w:w*.t*rrr,�tfraa,H.w�.,k++�ewi.,rkwintkttrweeaw*rr+tR��wwwtrftr:rwa*w�+wwr+r�tr:�+���xa*+nef.w�.r�ww�rwww���w*t�,tw�xfr,H. I. CALL TO ORDER The meeting was called to order at 3:10 p.m. Present: Tim Bartlett, Jean Benson, Sonja Campbell, Jim Foxx, Bob Hargreaves, Bob Leo, Steve Smith, Frank Urrutia I. CONTINUED REVIEW OF SIGN ORDINANCE Mr. Smith reported that there is a desire to change the section of the sign ordinance pertaining to political signs; so the Committee has sought advice from the City Attorney's office. Mr. Hargreaves reported that the City cannot make any laws which abridge people's right to speak unless there is an important governmental interest for doing so, and the courts have indicated that signs can be regulated to promote aesthetics and traffic safety, but any regulation should go no further than necessary. The Committee should be aware of providing alternative avenues of communication, and the idea is to promote as much free expression as possible while meeting the objectives. Commercial speech can be regulated more than non-commercial speech, and regulations pertaining to non-commercial speech should be content neutral. The Committee should keep in mind that if any part of an ordinance is rendered unconstitutional, then the whole ordinance can be thrown out. Member Benson asked if the City can develop regulations to prevent traffic accidents at certain locations, to which Mr. Hargreaves responded affirmatively. Member Bartlett asked if it would be preferable to regulate the size of all signs based on the lot area, to which Mr. Hargreaves responded that the Committee may want to consider regulating the size of letters, since a candidate wouldn't want to create a sign which is too wordy as it would be difficult for passersby to read; so in effect, limiting the size of the letters would limit the size of the sign. Member Bartlett asked if there are commercial retail monument sign regulations for the Palms to Pines shopping center, to which Mr. Hargreaves responded that commercial signs can be regulated more than non-commercial signs. 1 ZONING ORDINANCE REVIEW COMMITTEE DECEMBER 17, 1997 MINUTES Member Foxx suggested having separate ordinances for commercial signs and non- commercial signs so that in the event the non-commercial sign ordinance faces a legal challenge and is rendered unconstitutional, the commercial sign ordinance would not be wiped out. Member Leo asked if there would be any problems with developing separate commercial sign ordinances for both El Paseo and Cook Street, to which Mr. Hargreaves replied that it would be necessary to show that there are differences in traffic and aesthetics in those districts. Mr. Hargreaves noted that for non-commercial signs, distinctions can be drawn between vacant and occupied residential properties, but pointed out that residential areas, i.e., front lawns, are particularly protected. Member Benson expressed concern about political signs on vacant lots, and Member Leo asked if the City can require written proof that the owner of a vacant lot has given permission for the posting of a political sign, to which Mr. Hargreaves responded that it would be considered prior restraint. Member Leo preferred to err on the side of caution and just "hang loose" since the election season is rather short. Member Foxx expressed support for having separate ordinances for commercial and political signs. Member Benson requested that staff obtain copies of ordinances regarding political signs from other cities. Member Leo asked if the City can limit the time period in which political signs may be posted, to which Mr. Hargreaves replied that there would be more latitude for the period following the election, but the City cannot limit the time period prior to the election. Mr. Hargreaves noted that there is a problem with the existing five square foot size restriction, and suggested that the size of letters be limited instead. Mr. Hargreaves noted that there is a problem with the existing restriction of placing signs closer together than 50 feet, although it may be possible to impose this type of restriction on commercial property. Mr. Hargreaves indicated that he believes the City can restrict political signs on vacant residential and commercial lots. Member Foxx preferred that the Committee not put too much work into this, and suggested that the ordinance be broad in order to avoid legal challenge. 2 J ZONING ORDINANCE REVIEW COMMITTEE DECEMBER 17, 1997 MINUTES Mr. Hargreaves indicated that he will research case law and develop a proposal for the Committee's consideration. Member Benson stated that she would be more interested in something that will cover the City without opening it up to legal challenge, and indicated she would be interested in establishing a maximum size. Member Bartlett indicated that he would like some legal guidelines regarding regulating commercial signs, to which Mr. Hargreaves replied that there hasn't been much of a problem, but he will look into some general parameters. Mr. Smith referenced Page 446 regarding freestanding signs, and asked if the Committee would be interested in allowing more than one monument sign on each street frontage of a center, to which Member Foxx responded that there could be problems if the center has more than one owner. Member Bartlett noted that Palms to Pines has 15 owners from Highway 74 to El Paseo, and suggested that the City encourage aesthetically pleasing monument signs rather than limiting the number of monument signs. Mr. Smith noted the consensus is there is no need to change this section. II. CONTINUED REVIEW OF PLANNED OFFICE/INDUSTRIAL ZONE STANDARDS that the Committee provide clarification regarding Page 2 Section B.3, Mr. Smith requestedp 9 9 9 which states, "Ancillary commercial uses (not exceeding a maximum of 10% of total floor area in buildings exceeding 40,000 gross square feet and 15% of total floor area in buildings less than 40,000 gross square feet). The consensus of the Committee was to rewrite that section to state, "Ancillary commercial uses" without imposing other restrictions or limits. III. ADJOURNED The Committee adjourned at 4:25 p.m. STEVE SMITH PLANNING MANAGER 3 ZONING ORDINANCE REVIEW COMMITTEE MARCH 4, 1998 MINUTES Member Leo commented that even though there are nice, wide sidewalks in the commercial area on San Pablo north of Highway 111, the area is underdeveloped, and suggested that a special redevelopment district be created. Member Benson felt that it would be a wonderful area for an art colony and suggested the name "Old San Pablo." E. Monument Signs Mr. Smith stated that shopping centers are limited to center identification signage on each street frontage, and the Committee has already discussed that matter. F. Real Estate Signs Mr. Smith reported that the Enterprise building on Highway 111 is limited to three square feet of real estate signage because it has frontage of less than 200 feet. There has been a problem in leasing out the spaces in the building, and the owner has requested replacing the "Enterprise" Plexiglas face on the can sign with "For Lease." Staff feels that the building may have greater success with leasing space if additional "For Lease" signage is allowed. Members Bartlett and Urrutia felt that additional signage would not be helpful in this case. Mr. Smith asked about allowing 20 square feet of real estate signage for this particular instance, to which Member Benson replied that she would make it contingent on a 60-day time limit and a report from the owner on the number of inquiries about available space. G. Political Signs Mr. Smith reported that the City Attorney's office has advised that political signs cannot be restricted any more than any other type of commercial sign. With regard to developed residential lots, the rule of thumb is the home is a person's castle, and there are no restrictions on signage; however, vacant residential lots can be restricted to a maximum of 12 square feet of total sign area, and the owner's permission and a City permit can also be required. Other residential zones, i.e., 3 •1 . ZONING ORDINANCE REVIEW COMMITTEE MARCH 4, 1998 MINUTES churches, can be restricted to six square feet of total sign area. Developed industrial/commercial lots can be limited to six square feet of total sign area, and if the property owner is willing, approved permanent signage can be traded for additional political sign area. Undeveloped commercial lots can be limited to 12 square feet of total sign area, since that is the current limit. Mr. Smith noted that the City Attorney's office has also outlined a registration process. Mr. Smith recalled that Member Foxx had suggested a separate ordinance for political signs, and Member Benson concurred with that idea. III. PARKING STANDARDS A. Two Covered Spaces R-1 Zone Mr. Smith suggested that the Committee consider reducing the requirement for two covered parking spaces in the R-1 zone, to which Member Benson replied that she does not want to force residents to park in the street. Members Bartlett and Benson felt that the requirement should not be changed. Member Urrutia indicated that he would be in favor of allowing some relief if there was a way to address the setback issue, to which Member Bartlett replied that he would not be supportive of making exceptions to the setback requirements. Member Leo suggested that each case be reviewed on an individual basis by staff as an adjustment application, to which Member Benson replied that she would prefer that each case be placed on the consent calendar of the Planning Commission agenda. Member Urrutia hoped that each case would not be automatically approved, because then there would be too many. Member Bartlett felt that property values would be negatively impacted if a lot of people extend their carports or garages out to the street. 4 w • ` 73-510 FRED WARING DRIVE,PALM DESERT,CALIFORNIA 92260 TELEPHONE(619)346-0611 CITY OF PALM DESERT LEGAL NOTICE CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a public hearing will be held before the Palm Desert Planning Commission to consider amendment to the Zoning Ordinance as it relates to political signs, Municipal Code Section 25.68. SAID public hearing will be held on Tuesday, August 4, 1998, at 7:00 p.m. in the Council Chamber at the Palm Desert Civic Center, 73-510 Fred Waring Drive, Palm Desert, California, at which time and place all interested persons are invited to attend and be heard. Written comments concerning all items covered by this public hearing notice shall be accepted up to the date of the hearing. Information concerning the proposed project and/or negative declaration is available for review in the Department of Community Development at the above address between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. If you challenge the proposed actions in court, you may be limited to raising only those issues you or someone else raised at the public hearing described in this,notice, or in written correspondence delivered to the Planning Commission at, or prior to, the public hearing. PUBLISH: Desert Post PHILIP DRELL, Secretary July 16, 1998 Palm Desert Planning Commission City of Palm Desert 73-510 FRED WARING DRIVE, PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA 92260-2578 TELEPHONE(760)346-0611 •FAX(760)341-7096•http://www.paim-desert.org PLANNING COMMISSION MEETING NOTICE OF ACTION Date: August 5, 1998 CITY OF PALM DESERT Re: ZOA 98-5 The Planning Commission of the City of Palm Desert has considered your request and taken the following action at its meeting of August 4, 1998: PLANNING COMMISSION RECOMMENDED TO CITY COUNCIL APPROVAL OF ZOA 98-5 BY ADOPTION OF PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. 1884. CARRIED 3-1 (COMMISSIONER FINERTY VOTED NO, COMMISSIONER JONATHAN WAS ABSENT). Any appeal of the above action may be made in writing to the Director of Community Development, City of Palm Desert, within fifteen (15) days of the date of the decision. PHILIP DRELL, ECRETARY PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION PD/tm cc: Coachella Valley Water District Public Works Department Building & Safety Department Fire Marshal Pepe PLANIGG COMMISSION RESOLUTION 10 1884 .A RESOLUTION OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA, RECOMMENDING TO THE CITY COUNCIL APPROVAL OF A ZONING ORDINANCE AMENDMENT RELATING TO NON-COMMERCIAL SIGNS. CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 WHEREAS, the Planning Commission of the City of Palm Desert, California, did on the 4th day of August, 1998, hold a duly noticed public hearing to consider the amendment of Zoning Ordinance Section 25.68 relating to non-commercial signs; and WHEREAS, said application has complied with the requirements of the "City of Palm Desert Procedure for Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act, Resolution No. 97-18," in that the Director of Community Development has determined the amendment to be a Class 5 Categorical Exemption; and WHEREAS, at said public hearing, upon hearing and considering all testimony and arguments, if any, of all interested persons desiring to be heard, said Planning Commission did find the following .facts and reasons to exist to recommend approval of the Zoning Ordinance text amendment: 1 . The proposed amendment relating to non-commercial signs is consistent with the intent of the Zoning Ordinance and will protect the community health, safety and general welfare. NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Planning Commission of the City of Palm Desert, California, as follows: 1 . That the above recitations are true and correct and constitute the findings of the Commission in this case. 2. That it does hereby recommend approval to the City Council Case No. ZOA 98-5 as provided in the attached exhibit labeled "A". PASSED, APPROVED and ADOPTED at a regular meeting of the Palm Desert Planning Commission, held on this 4th day of August, .1998, by the following vote, to wit: AYES: BEATY, FERNANDEZ, CAMPBELL NOES: FINERTY ABSENT: JONATHAN ABSTAIN: NONE U SONIA M. CAMPBELL, Chairperson ATTEST: PHILIP DRELL, cretary� Palm Desert Pla ping Commission PLANNING COMMISSION ..ESOLUTION NO. 1884 EXHIBIT "A" SECTION 1 That Section 25.04.750 be amended to read at the beginning: "Except as otherwise provided, "sign" means..." SECTION 2 That Section 25.68.080 D is hereby deleted. SECTION 3 That Section 25.68.020 is hereby amended to add the following definitions: Y. "Non-commercial message" means a message which does not advertise, announce or attract attention to places or things offered for sale, lease or hire, or products, goods, businesses, or services. A non-commercial message includes a message expressing an opinion or ideology. Z. "Non-commercial sign" means a sign bearing a non- commercial message. AA. "Temporary sign" means a sign that is: painted upon a window, or constructed of cloth, canvas, cardboard, poster board, plastic, light-weight aluminum, or other light temporary materials, with or without a structural frame; and affixed or erected by means of a temporary method of erecting, hanging or affixing, such as by one or more ground stakes, tape, pins, tacks, staples, or other easily removable method; and intended for a temporary period of display. SECTION 4 That Section 25.68.020 P is hereby amended to read: P. "Political sign" means a non-commercial sign whose message relates to the election of one or more persons to public office, or one or more measures, initiatives or ballot proposals, on an election ballot to be voted on at an election called by a public body. SECTION 5 That Section 25.68.020 U is hereby amended to read: 2 PLANNING COMMISSION .iESOLUTION NO. 1884 U. "Sign" means anything of visual appearance, including but not limited to any word, numeral, letter model, banner, flag, pennant, poster, insignia, device, design or trademark which is affixed to, painted on, or represented upon a building, structure, window, piece of land or natural object, and which is in the nature of or used as an announcement, direction or advertisement by attracting attention to a topic, object, place, activity, person, product, institution, organization or business; together with all parts, materials, frame and background. A sign shall not mean displays of merchandise or products for sale on the premises, or signs inside buildings except when less than three feet behind a window and facing public view, or ornamentation, design, statuary, architecture, landscaping, pictures, paintings or other such art forms unless, in the case of any exceptions listed in this chapter, the attraction, because of location, size, use or the nature thereof, has the substantial effect of attracting attention for identification purposes when viewed from an outside public area. The basic intent behind this definition is not to discourage product displays, design or art forms epitomizing simplicity, good taste and compatibility with the community's desired image. SECTION 6 That Section 25.68.060 is amended to delete "department of environmental services" and replace same with "department of community development". SECTION 7 That the first sentence of Section 25.68.090 C (prohibited signs) is hereby amended to add at the beginning of the first sentence: "Except for permanent non-commercial signs or non- commercial messages,..... SECTION 8 That Section 25.68.100 is amended as follows: First Paragraph: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". Third Paragraph, First Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". 3 PLANNING COMMISSION .iESOLUTION NO. 1884 Third Paragraph, Second Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development'. SECTION 9 That Section 25.68.130 ("realty signs") is amended to add the following at the end of that section: "Realty signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.1 12.070." SECTION 10 That Section 25.68.170 ("other signs" in single family zones) is amended as follows: Add to Beginning of First Sentence: "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter..." Last Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". SECTION 11 That Section 25.68.250 is amended as follows: Amend subsection B.: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development'. Add subsection C: C. Sales and rental signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.1 12.070. SECTION 12 That Section 25.68.400 is amended to add subsection C as follows: C. Sales and rental signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.1 12.070. 4 PLANNING COMMISSION rtESOLUTION NO. 1884 SECTION 13 That the first sentence of Section 25.68.420 ("signs generally") is amended to read: "The following general sign usage provisions and regulations shall apply for all signs, except that sections 25.68.430, 25.68.440 and 25.68.460 shall not apply to temporary non-commercial signs." SECTION 14 That the first phase of the first sentence of Section 25.68.440 ("Sign Review Criteria") is amended to read: "All signs which require a sign permit pursuant to this Chapter..." SECTION 15 That Section 25.68.450 ("signs facing private property prohibited") is hereby deleted. SECTION 16 That Section 25.68.620 ("Political Sign Regulation) is hereby deleted. SECTION 17 That Chapter 25.112 ("Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation") is hereby added as follows: 25.112.010 Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation. 25.112.010. General Provisions. A. Non-Commercial Messages. Any sign authorized pursuant to, and otherwise complying with, this Chapter may contain a non-commercial message. Temporary non-commercial signs shall comply with the provisions set forth in Section 25.1 12." B. Public right-of-way. Except as otherwise specifically authorized in this Chapter, no temporary sign may be displayed, erected or maintained in or upon public property or the public right-of-way, including but not limited to, any public utility pole, street sign, shelter, bench or trash receptacle. C. Free standing signs. The maximum height of freestanding temporary non-commercial signs shall be six feet from ground level unless topographic or other physical features 5 PLANNING COMMISSION r1ESOLUTION NO. 1884 exist necessitating a higher sign. In no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. D. Sign Categories. The following categories apply to all temporary non-commercial signs: 1 . Category A. Temporary non-commercial signs in residential districts in areas developed with a dwelling. For purposes of this 25.112.010, "areas developed with a dwelling" means: the entire lot if any portion thereof is developed with a single family homes; the demised premises of any occupied residential leasehold interest, such as an occupied mobile home lot or apartment unit; the non-common areas of a condominium or timeshare unit intended for use as a dwelling. 2. Category B. Temporary non-commercial signs in residential districts on vacant lots. 3. Category C. Temporary non-commercial signs on developed lots in "Other Residential Zones" as provided in Part VI., Section 25.68.180 et. seq. 4. Category D. Temporary non-commercial signs on developed lots in commercial or industrial zones. 5. Category E. Temporary non-commercial signs on vacant lots in commercial or industrial zones. 6. Category F. Temporary non-commercial sign or sign copy erected in lieu of an authorized permanent sign or permanent sign copy. 25.112.020. Category A Signs. One or more Category A signs may be erected and maintained by, or with the consent of, the dwelling owner or occupant. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. 25.112.030. Category B Signs. Subject to the registration requirements set forth in 25.112.070, one or more Category B signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign face area shall not exceed 12 6 PLANNING COMMISSION riESOLUTION NO. 1884 commercial messages. For each sign with a sign face area in excess of six square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed eight vertical inches. 25.112.040. Category C and Category D Signs. One or more Category C or Category D signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign face area shall not exceed six square feet. The maximum height of each sign shall be six feet unless topographic or other physical features exist necessitating a higher sign, but in no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. 25.112.050. Category E Signs. Subject to the registration requirements set forth in 25.1 12.070, one or more Category E signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign face area shall not exceed 12 square feet on lots with frontage on the public right-of-way greater than 200 lineal feet, and shall not exceed three square feet on lots with frontage on the public right-of-way of 200 lineal feet or less. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. For each sign with a sign face area in excess of six square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed eight vertical inches. 25.112.060. Category F Signs. The owner or user of any permanent sign authorized under this Chapter may erect Category F sign copy containing one or more non-commercial messages in lieu of part or all of, and subject to the same size restrictions as, the permanent sign copy authorized. Such "in lieu of" temporary sign copy shall be affixed to the permanent sign within the permanent sign face. 25.112.070. Registration of Category B and Category E Signs. A. Registration. Temporary non-commercial signs in Category B or Category E may only be erected upon submission of a completed registration form to be provided by the department of community development. Registration forms shall be signed by the registrant and shall include: 7 PLANNING COMMISSION FIESOLUTION NO. 1884 (1 ) The name of the registrant and the mailing address to which any notices required by this Chapter 25.112 may be sent; (2) A general description of the sign and the location where it will be erected; (3) A statement affirming that the registrant is responsible for complying with this Chapter, including but not limited to sign maintenance and removal; (4) A statement affirming that the registrant has the permission of the property owner to erect the sign; and (5) A statement affirming, under penalty of perjury, that the registrant has read and understood the contents of the form. B. Registration Information Affixed to Sign. Upon submission of a completed registration form, the registrant shall be provided with a registration number. Each sign shall have the name of the maker, the date of erection, and the registration number clearly legible on the lower right hand corner of the fact of the sign. As an alternative, a decal may be issued by the city which shall be placed on the sign at a location visible and readable from the public right-of-way. Any sign that does not bear valid registration information shall be deemed non-complying and subject to all applicable penalties and abatement procedures. C. Consent of Property Owner. No Category B or Category E temporary non-commercial sign may be erected without the prior consent of the property owner. Any sign erected or maintained without permission of the property owner may be summarily removed by the property owner, or his or her authorized representative. D. Duration. The registration shall expire ninety days following it's submission to the department of community development. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the registration for a temporary political sign expires ninety days following it's submission to the department of community development, or seven days after the election, whichever occurs first. 8 PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. 1884 E. Renewal or Removal Required. Upon expiration of the registration, the registrant must either remove the sign or complete a new registration form. Signs not removed or re- registered by the end of the next business day following the date of expiration shall be deemed non-complying signs and subject to all applicable penalties and abatement procedures. 25.112.080. Enforcement and Penalties. A. Violation - Infraction. Any person violating this Chapter 25.112 shall be guilty of an infraction, and upon conviction thereof shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500); and such person shall be deemed guilty of a separate offense for each day, or portion thereof, during which any violation of this chapter is committed or continued. B. Abatement. The director of community development shall not permit, and shall abate, any temporary non-commercial sign within the city which fails to meet the requirements of this Chapter 25.112 or other applicable law. In addition to the penalties set forth in 25.1 12.080(A), the director of community development, or his authorized representative, may remove any temporary non-commercial sign that is not in compliance. Prior to removal, the director of community development, or his authorized representative, shall give notice to the registrant, or the property owner if the sign is not registered, that the sign is not in compliance and is subject to removal. The notice shall specify the corrections necessary to restore compliance, including the option of voluntary removal of the sign; and shall warn the recipient that the sign will be removed if compliance is not restored within five days of the date of the notice, that such removal will be at the expense of the recipient, and that such removal shall be in addition to the penalties provided for in 25.112.080(A). Notwithstanding the foregoing, temporary signs found on public property or the public right-of-way will be summarily removed and stored at city hall. Notice shall be given to the registrant, if known, informing the registrant of the removal and reasonable costs incurred, and warning that the sign will be stored at city hall for only ten days from the date of the notice 9 PLANNING COMMISSION rsESOLLITION NO. 1884 and, if not claimed within that time, shall be destroyed. Prior to releasing such stored signs to the registrant, the registrant shall pay the reasonable removal and storage costs and any other penalty due pursuant to this chapter. t 10 MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION AUGUST 4, 1998 Commissioner Beaty asked if, as was a concern of the residents, all of these parcels were going to be undevelopable as residential. Mr. Smith stated that he didn't believe that. He believed the properties to the north were developable as residential uses. Commissioner Beaty asked if the width, north and south of this parcel, was the same as the next parcels. Mr. Smith thought the parcel had 280 feet of depth north to south and was less than the others at 330 or 333 feet. Mr. Drell said they were about 50 feet narrower. Commissioner Beaty said he would be in concurrence with his fellow commissioners and was in favor a continuance so that the developer could at least discuss the issue with the homeowners and bring it back at a future date. Chairperson Campbell stated that she also concurred with her fellow commissioners. She said that initially she was in favor of changing the zone to office professional but she didn't like the buildings and felt they didn't go with the general plan. There was Kaufman and Broad to the west and a golf course and a very upscale community with fairway homes to the northeast that would be similar to Indian Ridge and the buildings that were shown to them did belong on Fred Waring and not in that location. From all of the opposition that she had heard, she would also be in favor of continuing this matter and have Mr. Baxley get together with the homeowners and see if any of their problems could be solved. She was in favor of a continuance. Commissioner Beaty stated that he would move for a continuance and asked the applicant if he would like two weeks or one month. Mr. Baxley felt that two weeks would be sufficient. Mr. Drell indicated that one month was probably what was needed. Commissioner concurred. Chairperson Campbell reopened the public hearing and asked for a motion. Action: It was moved by Commissioner Beaty, seconded by Commissioner Finerty, continuing GPA 98-4, C/Z 98-5 and PP 98-10 to September 1 , 1998. Motion carried 4-0. F. Case No. ZOA 98-5 - CITY OF PALM DESERT, Applicant Request for approval of amendments to the sign ordinance regarding political signs. 17 MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION AUGUST 4, 1998 Mr. Smith indicated that during the past election campaign there were some problems with regulating certain political signs and our ordinance was deemed to be unenforceable. The City Attorney's office and Zoning Ordinance Review Committee had been working on this matter. Essentially, if adopted, they would delete the current standards and establish a completely new section in the ordinance. It was a request from ZORC that they separate it from the sign ordinance itself. They were looking at a. difference between commercial speech and noncommercial speech. This new code section, Section 112 of the Zoning Ordinance, would regulate noncommercial signs. It would create five categories of noncommercial signs based on the location. In the case of occupied single family homes, basically that was unregulated. A concern in the past has been signs on vacant residential lots and that would be covered under Category B which limits signage to 12 square feet total. Category C dealt with temporary noncommercial signs on developed lots in other residential zones like churches and day care facilities. "D" covered developed lots in the commercial and industrial zones. "E" covered vacant lots in commercial and industrial zones. He said that "F" was an interesting category in that if a commercial or industrial user has approved permanent signage, he/she could take it down and put up a noncommercial sign to that size. He felt the ordinance was reasonable and the City Attorney's office advised that it is enforceable. He noted that the ordinance requires that signs be taken down within seven days after an election and they could go up for a maximum of 90 days. All the uses except the occupied residential units required a permit that would be issued through the city and there would be some sort of approval affixed upon the sign. There would be no charge for the permits and they would be reapproved if the 90 days ran out. He thought they were reasonably protecting both sides of the issue and hoped they would be able to limit the number of signs on vacant lots which in his observation had been a problem in the past. Commissioner Finerty asked for clarification that if they wanted to put up a political sign on a vacant lot, this new ordinance said that they would have to obtain the permission of the owners of that vacant lot and bring that to the city. Mr. Smith said that was correct and it would be limited to 12 square feet on the lot so if there was already one there at eight square feet, they would be limited to four. 18 i MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION AUGUST 4, 1998 Commissioner Fernandez asked who would police the signs after the seven days as far as making sure that they are removed from the lots. Mr. Smith stated that part of the requirement of the permit is that they sign a statement agreeing to take it down, but ultimately it would fall upon the Code Enforcement Department. Chairperson Campbell asked if they would be ticketed if the signs weren't removed. Mr. Smith said there is a provision for penalties as outlined on page 9 of the draft ordinance. It was an infraction and the fine wouldn't exceed $500. Chairperson Campbell opened the public hearing and asked if anyone wished to address the commission in FAVOR or OPPOSITION to the proposal. There was no one and the public hearing was closed. Chairperson Campbell asked for commission comments. Chairperson Campbell stated that she was in favor of the proposal and would move for approval. Commissioner Fernandez concurred and said he would second the motion. Action: It was moved by Chairperson Campbell, seconded by Commissioner Fernandez, approving the findings as presented by staff. Commissioner Finerty spoke to the motion and informed commission that this whole issue was initiated by Mr. Rick Post who had an objection during the last campaign which she felt was without merit and she disagreed with the registration requirement. Signs were part of the political process and part of running a campaign. She liked seeing signs during election time. She also felt that having to go through this process was going to be a disadvantage to any challenger and that one of the key issues in a race was name recognition and by imposing these restrictions she saw it as giving any incumbent an advantage and therefore she would be opposed to the political sign part of this ordinance. She felt it was a relatively short period of time and knew that with the campaign she was involved with, they took the signs down the next morning. She felt that was a very reasonable process. She disagreed with the proposal. Commissioner Beaty expressed his confidence in City Council and city staff and concurred with the motion. Chairperson Campbell called for the vote. Motion carried 3-1 (Commissioner Finerty voted no). 19 MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION AUGUST 4, 1998 It was moved by Chairperson Campbell, seconded by Commissioner Fernandez, adopting Planning Commission Resolution No. 1884, recommending to City Council approval of Case No. ZOA 98-5. Motion carried 3-1 (Commissioner Finerty voted no). IX. MISCELLANEOUS A. REQUEST FOR A DETERMINATION OF USE FOR THE RELOCATION OF AN EXISTING AUTOMOBILE REPAIR FACILITY TO 73-220 HIGHWAY 111 (THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF HIGHWAY 111 AND SAN MARCOS). Mr. Drell explained that basically an auto repair specialty shop, other than being listed as a definition in the zoning ordinance, wasn't a listed use in any zone in the city. Historically they have allowed them as a matter of right in the service industrial zone and they have been allowed in the commercial zone if they were associated with a gas station. The applicant operated one in association with a gas station. The general question was if it could be considered as a conditional use without a gas station in the general commercial zone and then was asking specifically for some feedback on a particular site, which he would ultimately have to come back and apply for, located at the old Texaco station with the self-serve car wash. The problem that was created was that it was proposed that the gasoline sales portion of that business be abandoned for various reasons. He said it has never been that successful as a gas station and the cost of replacing the tanks and everything else didn't warrant it. The applicant was being eased out by Chevron from his existing site and he wanted to locate and build a new project. Mr. Drell noted the site plan was on display and the applicant would have to ultimately apply for it depending upon the Commission's direction. He said the applicant would be upgrading the existing car wash site with simply a specialty auto repair. He indicated that question one was if the applicant should have the opportunity to apply for a conditional use in the C-1 zone for specialty auto repair without the association of a service station which primarily sells gasoline. Secondly, if it was deemed that the applicant could go ahead, he wanted to say for the applicant's future information that his plan was showing only five parking spaces and one handicapped space. Given staff's experience with auto repair, typically people come in the morning and there are two or three turn over of cars. Not everyone's got worked on eight hours a day, and there are 20 I CITY OF PALM DESERT DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT STAFF REPORT TO: Planning Commission DATE: August 4, 1998 CASE NO: ZOA 98-5 REQUEST: Approval of amendments to the sign ordinance - political signs. APPLICANT: City of Palm Desert I. BACKGROUND: During the past city election campaign there was concern that the city's sign ordinance as it applied to political signs was not enforceable (i.e., five square feet limit was too restrictive)• The city attorney's office along with staff and ZORC (Zoning Ordinance Review Committee) has been working on writing political sign regulations which are equitable and enforceable. II. ANALYSIS: The proposed amendments if enacted would delete the current political sign regulations as prescribed in Municipal Code Section 25.68.620 (copy attached) and replace it with new regulations. The new political sign regulations will be assigned to a new chapter of the zoning ordinance to provide an obvious distinction between commercial speech and non-commercial speech. The amendment will amend numerous existing definitions within the code. As is explained in the background material provided by the city attorney's office non commercial speech is afforded greater protection than is commercial speech, therefore, the city cannot regulate non commercial speech to the same degree as commercial speech. The new regulations will establish a no fee registration procedure, require consent of the property owner, prohibit non-commercial signs in the public right-of-way, prescribe a maximum duration of 90 days or seven days after the elections, whichever occurs first and provide penalties for violations. i STAFF REPORT ZOA 98-5 AUGUST 4, 1998 The registration process will not apply to occupied residential properties. The ordinance then establishes different criteria for non-commercial signs in various locations. Category "A" is developed residential lots. The owner/occupant is not subject to registration and may install one or more temporary non-commercial signs which meet the general criteria. Category "B" applies to vacant residential lots. This category requires registration and total signage not exceed 12 square feet. Category "C" applies to developed lots in other residential zones. This category requires registration and total signage not to exceed six square feet. Category "D" applies to developed lots in commercial or industrial zones. This category requires registration and total signage not to exceed six square feet. Category "E" applies to vacant lots in commercial or industrial zones. This category requires registration and limits signs to three square feet or 12 square feet depending on property frontage. Category "F" applies to commercial or industrial zones and permits tenants/owners to exchange permanent commercial sign copy for temporary non-commercial sign subject to registration. III. CONCLUSION: New political sign regulations are required. The city attorney feels that the ordinance as proposed herein is enforceable and would withstand challenge. Staff feels that while the registration process may at first be difficult it should be workable. Signs on vacant lots without proper registration can be abated. IV. RECOMMENDATION: That the Planning Commission recommend approval to the City Council of Case No. ZOA 98-5. 2 STAFF REPORT ZOA 98-5 AUGUST 4, 1998 V. ATTACHMENTS: A. Draft resolution B. Legal notice C. Municipal Code Section 25.68.620 D. ZORC meeting minutes Prepared by St ve �ith Reviewed and Approved by Phil Drell Am 3 PLANNiAG COMMISSION RESOLUTION NU. A RESOLUTION OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA, RECOMMENDING TO THE CITY COUNCIL APPROVAL OF A ZONING ORDINANCE AMENDMENT RELATING TO NON-COMMERCIAL SIGNS. CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 WHEREAS, the Planning Commission of the City of Palm Desert, California, did on the 4th day of August, 1998, hold a duly noticed public hearing to consider the amendment of Zoning Ordinance Section 25.68 relating to non-commercial signs; and WHEREAS, said application has complied with the requirements of the "City of Palm Desert Procedure for Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act, Resolution No. 97-18," in that the Director of Community Development has determined the amendment to be a Class 5 Categorical Exemption; and WHEREAS, at said public hearing, upon hearing and considering all testimony and arguments, if any, of all interested persons desiring to be heard, said Planning Commission did find the following facts and reasons to exist to recommend approval of the Zoning Ordinance text amendment: 1 . The proposed amendment relating to non-commercial signs is consistent with the intent of the Zoning Ordinance and will protect the community health, safety and general welfare. NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Planning Commission of the City of Palm Desert, California, as follows: 1 . That the above recitations are true and correct and constitute the findings of the Commission in this case. 2. That it does hereby recommend approval to the City Council Case No. ZOA 98-5 as provided in the attached exhibit labeled "A". PASSED, APPROVED and ADOPTED at a regular meeting of the Palm Desert Planning Commission, held on this 4th day of August, 1998, by the following vote, to wit: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: SONIA M. CAMPBELL, Chairperson ATTEST: PHILIP DRELL, Secretary Palm Desert Planning Commission 'PLANNING COMMISSION riESOLUTION NO. EXHIBIT "A" SECTION 1 That Section 25.04.750 be amended to read at the beginning: "Except as otherwise provided, "sign" means..." SECTION 2 That Section 25.68.080 D is hereby deleted. SECTION 3 That Section 25.68.020 is hereby amended to add the following definitions: Y. "Non-commercial message" means a message which does not advertise, announce or attract attention to places or things offered for sale, lease or hire, or products, goods, businesses, or services. A non-commercial message includes a message expressing an opinion or ideology. Z. "Non-commercial sign" means a sign bearing a non- commercial message. AA. "Temporary sign" means a sign that is: painted upon a window, or constructed of cloth, canvas, cardboard, poster board, plastic, light-weight aluminum, or other light temporary materials, with or without a structural frame; and affixed or erected by means of a temporary method of erecting, hanging or affixing, such as by one or more ground stakes, tape, pins, tacks, staples, or other easily removable method; and intended for a temporary period of display. SECTION 4 That Section 25.68.020 P is hereby amended to read: P. "Political sign" means a non-commercial sign whose message relates to the election of one or more persons to public office, or one or more measures, initiatives or ballot proposals, on an election ballot to be voted on at an election called by a public body. SECTION 5 That Section 25.68.020 U is hereby amended to read: 2 PLANNING COMMISSION r(ESOLUTION NO. U. "Sign" means any thing of visual appearance, including but not limited to any word, numeral, letter model, banner, flag, pennant, poster, insignia, device, design or trademark which is affixed to, painted on, or represented upon a building, structure, window, piece of land or natural object, and which is in the nature of or used as an announcement, direction or advertisement by attracting attention to a topic, object, place, activity, person, product, institution, organization or business; together with all parts, materials, frame and background. A sign shall not mean displays of merchandise or products for sale on the premises, or signs inside buildings except when less than three feet behind a window and facing public view, or ornamentation, design, statuary, architecture, landscaping, pictures, paintings or other such art forms unless, in the case of any exceptions listed in this chapter, the attraction, because of location, size, use or the nature thereof, has the substantial effect of attracting attention for identification purposes when viewed from an outside public area. The basic intent behind this definition is not to discourage product displays, design or art forms epitomizing simplicity, good taste and compatibility with the community's desired image. SECTION 6 That Section 25.68.060 is amended to delete "department of environmental services" and replace same with "department of community development". SECTION 7 That the first sentence of Section 25.68.090 C (prohibited signs) is hereby amended to add at the beginning of the first sentence: "Except for permanent non-commercial signs or non- commercial messages,..." SECTION 8 That Section 25.68.100 is amended as follows: First Paragraph: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". Third Paragraph, First Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". 3 PLANNING COMMISSIOi*j riESOLUTION NO. Third Paragraph, Second Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". SECTION 9 That Section 25.68.130 ("realty signs") is amended to add the following at the end of that section: "Realty signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.1 12.070." SECTION 10 That Section 25.68.170 ("other signs" in single family zones) is amended as follows: Add to Beginning of First Sentence: "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter..." Last Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". SECTION 11 That Section 25.68.250 is amended as follows: Amend subsection B.: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". Add subsection C: C. Sales and rental signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.1 12.070. SECTION 12 That Section 25.68.400 is amended to add subsection C as follows: C. Sales and rental signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.112.070. 4 ,PLANNING COMMISSION r(ESOLUTION NO. SECTION 13 That the first sentence of Section 25.68.420 ("signs generally") is amended to read: "The following general sign usage provisions and regulations shall apply for all signs, except that sections 25.68.430, 25.68.440 and 25.68.460 shall not apply to temporary non-commercial signs." SECTION 14 That the first phase of the first sentence of Section 25.68.440 ("Sign Review Criteria") is amended to read: "All signs which require a sign permit pursuant to this Chapter..." SECTION 15 That Section 25.68.450 ("signs facing private property prohibited") is hereby deleted. SECTION 16 That Section 25.68.620 ("Political Sign Regulation) is hereby deleted. SECTION 17 That Chapter 25.112 ("Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation") is hereby added as follows: 25.112.010 Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation. 25.112.010. General Provisions. A. Non-Commercial Messages. Any sign authorized pursuant to, and otherwise complying with, this Chapter may contain a non-commercial message. Temporary non-commercial signs shall comply with the provisions set forth in Section 25.112." B. Public right-of-way. Except as otherwise specifically authorized in this Chapter, no temporary sign may be displayed, erected or maintained in or upon public property or the public right-of-way, including but not limited to, any public utility pole, street sign, shelter, bench or trash receptacle. C. Free standing signs. The maximum height of freestanding temporary non-commercial signs shall be six feet from ground level unless topographic or other physical features 5 PLANNING COMMISSION .iESOLUTION NO. exist necessitating a higher sign. In no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. D. Sign Categories. The following categories apply to all temporary non-commercial signs: 1 . Category A. Temporary non-commercial signs in residential districts in areas developed with a dwelling. For purposes of this 25.112.010, "areas developed with a dwelling" means: the entire lot if any portion thereof is developed with a single family homes; the demised premises of any occupied residential leasehold interest, such as an occupied mobile home lot or apartment unit; the non-common areas of a condominium or timeshare unit intended for use as a dwelling. 2. Category B. Temporary non-commercial signs in residential districts on vacant lots. 3. Category C. Temporary non-commercial signs on developed lots in "Other Residential Zones" as provided in Part VI., Section 25.68.180 et. seq. 4. Category D. Temporary non-commercial signs on developed lots in commercial or industrial zones. 5. Category E. Temporary non-commercial signs on vacant lots in commercial or industrial zones. 6. Category F. Temporary non-commercial sign or sign copy erected in lieu of an authorized permanent sign or permanent sign copy. 25.112.020. Category A Signs. One or more Category A signs may be erected and maintained by, or with the consent of, the dwelling owner or occupant. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. 25.112.030. Category B Signs. Subject to the registration requirements set forth in 25.112.070, one or more Category B signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign face area shall not exceed 12 6 PLANNING COMMISSION IESOLUTION NO. commercial messages. For each sign with a sign face area in excess of six square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed eight vertical inches. 25.112.040. Category C and Category D Signs. One or more Category C or Category D signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign face area shall not exceed six square feet. The maximum height of each sign shall be six feet unless topographic or other physical features exist necessitating a higher sign, but in no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. 25.112.050. Category E Signs. Subject to the registration requirements set forth in 25.112.070, one or more Category E signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign face area shall not exceed 12 square feet on lots with frontage on the public right-of-way greater than 200 lineal feet, and shall not exceed three square feet on lots with frontage on the public right-of-way of 200 lineal feet or less. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. For each sign with a sign face area in excess of six square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed eight vertical inches. 25.112.060. Category F Signs. The owner or user of any permanent sign authorized under this Chapter may erect Category F sign copy containing one or more non-commercial messages in lieu of part or all of, and subject to the same size restrictions as, the permanent sign copy authorized. Such "in lieu of" temporary sign copy shall be affixed to the permanent sign within the permanent sign face. 25.112.070. Registration of Category B and Category E Signs. A. Registration. Temporary non-commercial signs in Category B or Category E may only be erected upon submission of a completed registration form to be provided by the department of community development. Registration forms shall be signed by the registrant and shall include: 7 PLANNING COMMISSIOINESOLLITION NO. (11 The name of the registrant and the mailing address to which any notices required by this Chapter 25.112 may be sent; (2) A general description of the sign and the location where it will be erected; (3) A statement affirming that the registrant is responsible for complying with this Chapter, including but not limited to sign maintenance and removal; (4) A statement affirming that the registrant has the permission of the property owner to erect the sign; and (5) A statement affirming, under penalty of perjury, that the registrant has read and understood the contents of the form. B. Registration Information Affixed to Sign. Upon submission of a completed registration form, the registrant shall be provided with a registration number. Each sign shall have the name of the maker, the date of erection, and the registration number clearly legible on the lower right hand corner of the fact of the sign. As an alternative, a decal may be issued by the city which shall be placed on the sign at a location visible and readable from the public right-of-way. Any sign that does not bear valid registration information shall be deemed non-complying and subject to all applicable penalties and abatement procedures. C. Consent of Property Owner. No Category B or Category E temporary non-commercial sign may be erected without the prior consent of the property owner. Any sign erected or maintained without permission of the property owner may be summarily removed by the property owner, or his or her authorized representative. D. Duration. The registration shall expire ninety days following it's submission to the department of community development. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the registration for a temporary political sign expires ninety days following it's submission to the department of community development, or seven days after the election, whichever occurs first. 8 PLANNING COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. E. Renewal or Removal Required. Upon expiration of the registration, the registrant must either remove the sign or complete a new registration form. Signs not removed or re- registered by the end of the next business day following the date of expiration shall be deemed non-complying signs and subject to all applicable penalties and abatement procedures. 25.112.080. Enforcement and Penalties. A. Violation - Infraction. Any person violating this Chapter 25.112 shall be guilty of an infraction, and upon conviction thereof shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500); and such person shall be deemed guilty of a separate offense for each day, or portion thereof, during which any violation of this chapter is committed or continued. B. Abatement. The director of community development shall not permit, and shall abate, any temporary non-commercial sign within the city which fails to meet the requirements of this Chapter 25.112 or other applicable law. In addition to the penalties set forth in 25.1 12.080(A), the director of community development, or his authorized representative, may remove any temporary non-commercial sign that is not in compliance. Prior to removal, the director of community development, or his authorized representative, shall give notice to the registrant, or the property owner if the sign is not registered, that the sign is not in compliance and is subject to removal. The notice shall specify the corrections necessary to restore compliance, including the option of voluntary removal of the sign; and shall warn the recipient that the sign will be removed if compliance is not restored within five days of the date of the notice, that such removal will be at the expense of the recipient, and that such removal shall be in addition to the penalties provided for in 25.112.080(A). Notwithstanding the foregoing, temporary signs found on public property or the public right-of-way will be summarily removed and stored at city hall. Notice shall be given to the registrant, if known, informing the registrant of the removal and reasonable costs incurred, and warning that the sign will be stored at city hall for only ten days from the date of the notice 9 i • PLANNING COMMISSION rcESOLUTION NO. and, if not claimed within that time, shall be destroyed. Prior to releasing such stored signs to the registrant, the registrant shall pay the reasonable removal and storage costs and any other penalty due pursuant to this chapter. 10 25.68.607 New Years Day the above noted lights may be dis- C. Such signs shall not be located in the public played without review and approval by the city. (Ord. right-of-way; 587§2(Exhibit A§ 19),1989) D. All political signs shall be removed within ten , days after the election date,except that in the case of a 25.68.610 Signs on awnings,marquees,canopies, general election,political signs shall not be required to be removed between the primary and general elections, arcades or similar structures or but shall be removed within ten days after the general attachments. election date.The applicant shall agree in writing to be A. Ail awnings or awnings with a sign(s) must be personally responsible for the removal of the political reviewed and approved by the architectural review signs; commission.The awning(sign)must be architecturally E. No political signs shall be posted earlier than f compatble with the building and as a result an awning ninety days prior to an election; may not be appropriate for every building. F. No fee or permit shall be required for the right • B. Pursuant to Section 25.68.470 "Proper mainte- to erect political signs.Where the sign is proposed to nance of signs" awnings must be kept in good repair be placed on private property,the applicant shall se- and be clean and nonfaded. cure the permission of the property owner. (Ord. 422 _ C. Awnings must be substantially attached to the Exhibit A§ 1,1985:Ord. 129§4(part),1977:Ord.98 4 main building structure. §I (part),1975:Exhibit A§2538-17.06) I D. Awning lettering and numbers as well as style and colors must aesthetically blend with the building.i_ 25 68.630 Signs for public or quasi-public uses. E. Letter height shall not exceed one-third of the Directional and public convenience signs for public awning height and in no event shall it exceed eight and quasi public uses may be permitted on public inches. property,The design must conform to standard direc F.G. - Scalloping awnings shall not tional sign specifications promulgated by the director G. Where applicable, awnings shall pronounced.contain street of environmental services and approved by the design numbers four inches in height with the letter style review board.The total number of signs allowed shall helvetica medium or equivalent be based on the minimum number necessary for ade- L Awnings shall not contain phone numbers. quate public identification as determined by the direc- Street drop type awnings(i.e.canvas-vinyl signs) for of environmental services. (Ord. 129 § 4 (part), shall not be encouraged.(Ord.597§2(Exhibit A§17), 1977:Ord.98§1(part),1975:Exhibit A§25.38-17.07) 1989:Ord.129§4(part),1977:Ord.98§1(part),1975: Exhibit A§2538-17.05) XL ENFORCEMENT AND AMORTIZATION ' 25.68.615 Open summer signs. Between June 1st and October 1st,restaurants,re- 25.68.640 Lawful nonconforming signs. tail and personal service businesses within the commer- A Lawful existing on-premises signs at the time of cial zone may display a sign in addition to a main sign, the adoption of the ordinance codified in this chapter not to exceed five square feet, indicating if they will on February 24, 1977,which do not comply with the remain open during the summer.The design and loca- requirements of this chapter, as amended, shall be tion of the sign shall be compatible with other signs on deemed lawful nonconforming uses and shall be made the building and must be approved by the department to comply,be removed or demolished upon the transfer of environmental services.(Ord.272(part), 1981) of ownership of the business or upon the altering of sign,copy,size,color or the addition of new signage to 25.68.620 Political sign regulation. the site or structure upon which the nonconforming Applicants for political signs,as defined in Section sign is located. B. Nonconforming signs may not be expanded,ex- 25.68.020, shall comply with the following require- tended, rebuilt, altered or reconstructed in any way, ments A. Each sign shall not exceed five square feet in except for normal maintenance or to protect public area; safety. nsibility of the ven- B. The signs shall not be located closer together do Itshadviall be a the expendee ress reshe posionsofthissection than fifty feet 452 MINUTES ZONING ORDINANCE REVIEW COMMITTEE DECEMBER 17, 1997 I. CALL TO ORDER The meeting was called to order at 3:10 p.m. Present: Tim Bartlett, Jean Benson, Sonja Campbell, Jim Foxx, Bob Hargreaves, Bob Leo, Steve Smith, Frank Urrutia I. CONTINUED REVIEW OF SIGN ORDINANCE Mr. Smith reported that there is a desire to change the section of the sign ordinance pertaining to political signs; so the Committee has sought advice from the City Attorney's office. Mr. Hargreaves reported that the City cannot make any laws which abridge people's right to speak unless there is an important governmental interest for doing so, and the courts have indicated that signs can be regulated to promote aesthetics and traffic safety, but any regulation should go no further than necessary. The Committee should be aware of providing alternative avenues of communication, and the idea is to promote as much free expression as possible while meeting the objectives. Commercial speech can be regulated more than non-commercial speech, and regulations pertaining to non-commercial speech should be content neutral. The Committee should keep in mind that if any part of an ordinance is rendered unconstitutional, then the whole ordinance can be thrown out. Member Benson asked if the City can develop regulations to prevent traffic accidents at certain locations, to which Mr. Hargreaves responded affirmatively. Member Bartlett asked if it would be preferable to regulate the size of all signs based on the lot area, to which Mr. Hargreaves responded that the Committee may want to consider regulating the size of letters,-since a candidate wouldn't want to create a sign which is too wordy as it would be difficult for passersby to read; so in effect, limiting the size of the letters would limit the size of the sign. Member Bartlett asked if there are commercial retail monument sign regulations for the Palms to Pines shopping center, to which Mr. Hargreaves responded that commercial signs can be regulated more than non-commercial signs. 1 ZONING ORDINANCE REVIEW COMMITTEE DECEMBER 17, 1997 MINUTES Member Foxx suggested having separate ordinances for commercial signs and non- commercial signs so that in the event the non-commercial sign ordinance faces a legal challenge and is rendered unconstitutional, the commercial sign ordinance would not be wiped out. Member Leo asked if there would be any problems with developing separate commercial sign ordinances for both El Paseo and Cook Street, to which Mr. Hargreaves replied that it would be necessary to show that there are differences in traffic and aesthetics in those districts. Mr. Hargreaves noted that for non-commercial signs, distinctions can be drawn between vacant and occupied residential properties, but pointed out that residential areas, i.e., front lawns, are particularly protected. Member Benson expressed concern about political signs on vacant lots, and Member Leo asked if the City can require written proof that the owner of a vacant lot has given permission for the posting of a political sign, to which Mr. Hargreaves responded that it would be considered prior restraint. Member Leo preferred to err on the side of caution and just "hang loose" since the election season is rather short. Member Foxx expressed support for having separate ordinances for commercial and political signs. Member Benson requested that staff obtain copies of ordinances regarding political signs from other cities. Member Leo asked if the City can limit the time period in which political signs may be posted, to which Mr. Hargreaves replied that there would be more latitude for the period following the election, but the City cannot limit the time period prior to the election. Mr. Hargreaves noted that there is a problem with the existing five square foot size restriction, and suggested that the size of letters be limited instead. Mr. Hargreaves noted that there is a problem with the existing restriction of placing signs closer together than 50 feet, although it may be possible to impose this type of restriction on commercial property. Mr. Hargreaves indicated that he believes the City can restrict political signs on vacant residential and commercial lots. Member Foxx preferred that the Committee not put too much work into this, and suggested that the ordinance be broad in order to avoid legal challenge. 2 ZONING ORDINANCE REVIEW COMMITTEE DECEMBER 17, 1997 MINUTES Mr. Hargreaves indicated that he will research case law and develop a proposal for the Committee's consideration. Member Benson stated that she would be more interested in something that will cover the City without opening it up to legal challenge, and indicated she would be interested in establishing a maximum size. Member Bartlett indicated that he would like some legal guidelines regarding regulating commercial signs, to which Mr. Hargreaves replied that there hasn't been much of a problem, but he will look into some general parameters. Mr. Smith referenced Page 446 regarding freestanding signs, and asked if the Committee would be interested in allowing more than one monument sign on each street frontage of a center, to which Member Foxx responded that there could be problems if the center has more than one owner. Member Bartlett noted that Palms to Pines has 15 owners from Highway 74 to El Paseo, and suggested that the City encourage aesthetically pleasing monument signs rather than limiting the number of monument signs. Mr. Smith noted the consensus is there is no need to change this section. II. CONTINUED REVIEW OF PLANNED OFFICE/INDUSTRIAL ZONE STANDARDS Mr. Smith requested that the Committee provide clarification regarding Page 2, Section 13.3, which states, "Ancillary commercial uses (not exceeding a maximum of 10% of total floor area in buildings exceeding 40,000 gross square feet and 15% of total floor area in buildings less than 40,000 gross square feet). The consensus of the Committee was to rewrite that section to state, "Ancillary commercial uses" without imposing other restrictions or limits. III. ADJOURNED The Committee adjourned at 4:25 p.m. STEVE SMITH PLANNING MANAGER 3 ZONING ORDINANCE REVIEW COMMITTEE MARCH 4, 1998 MINUTES Member Leo commented that even though there are nice, wide sidewalks in the commercial area on San Pablo north of Highway 111, the area is underdeveloped, and suggested that a special redevelopment district be created. Member Benson felt that it would be a wonderful area for an art colony and suggested the name "Old San Pablo." E. Monument Signs Mr. Smith stated that shopping centers are limited to center identification signage on each street frontage, and the Committee has already discussed that matter. F. Real Estate Signs Mr. Smith reported that the Enterprise building on Highway 111 is limited to three square feet of real estate signage because it has frontage of less than 200 feet. There has been a problem in leasing out the spaces in the building, and the owner has requested replacing the "Enterprise" Plexiglas face on the can sign with "For Lease." Staff feels that the building may have greater success with leasing space if additional "For Lease" signage is allowed. Members Bartlett and Urrutia felt that additional signage would not be helpful in this case. Mr. Smith asked about allowing 20 square feet of real estate signage for this particular instance, to which Member Benson replied that she would make it contingent on a 60-day time limit and a report from the owner on the number of inquiries about available space. G. Political Signs Mr. Smith reported that the City Attorney's office has advised that political signs cannot be restricted any more than any other type of commercial sign. With regard to developed residential lots, the rule of thumb is the home is a person's castle, and there are no restrictions on signage; however, vacant residential lots can be restricted to a maximum of 12 square feet of total sign area, and the owner's permission and a City permit can also be required. Other residential zones, i.e., 3 ZONING ORDINANCE REVIEW COMMITTEE MARCH 4, 1998 MINUTES churches, can be restricted to six square feet of total sign area. Developed industrial/commercial lots can be limited to six square feet of total sign area, and if the property owner is willing, approved permanent signage can be traded for additional political sign area. Undeveloped commercial lots can be limited to 12 square feet of total sign area, since that is the current limit. Mr. Smith noted that the City Attorney's office has also outlined a registration process. Mr. Smith recalled that Member Foxx had suggested a separate ordinance for political signs, and Member Benson concurred with that idea. III. PARKING STANDARDS A. Two Covered Spaces R-1 Zone Mr. Smith suggested that the Committee consider reducing the requirement for two covered parking spaces in the R-1 zone, to which Member Benson replied that she does not want to force residents to park in the street. Members Bartlett and Benson felt that the requirement should not be changed. Member Urrutia indicated that he would be in favor of allowing some relief if there was a way to address the setback issue, to which Member Bartlett replied that he would not be supportive of making exceptions to the setback requirements. Member Leo suggested that each case be reviewed on an individual basis by staff as an adjustment application, to which Member Benson replied that she would prefer that each case be placed on the consent calendar of the Planning Commission agenda. Member Urrutia hoped that each case would not be automatically approved, because then there would be too many. Member Bartlett felt that property values would be negatively impacted if a lot of people extend their carports or garages out to the street. 4 73-510 FRED WARING DRIVE,PALM DESERT,CALIFORNIA 92260 TELEPHONE(619)346-0611 CITY OF PALM DESERT LEGAL NOTICE CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a public hearing will be held before the Palm Desert Planning Commission to consider amendment to the Zoning Ordinance as it relates to political signs, Municipal Code Section 25.68. SAID public hearing will be held on Tuesday, August 4, 1998, at 7:00 p.m. in the Council Chamber at the Palm Desert Civic Center, 73-510 Fred Waring Drive, Palm Desert, California, at which time and place all interested persons are invited to attend and be heard. Written comments concerning all items covered by this public hearing notice shall be accepted up to the date of the hearing. Information concerning the proposed project and/or negative declaration is available for review in the Department of Community Development at the above address between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. If you challenge the proposed actions in court, you may be limited to raising only those issues you or someone else raised at the public hearing described in this notice, or in written correspondence delivered to the Planning Commission at, or prior to, the public hearing. PUBLISH: Desert Post PHILIP DRELL, Secretary July 16, 1998 Palm Desert Planning Commission r CITY OF PALM DESERT 3 DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT STAFF REPORT I. TO: Honorable Mayor and City Council II. REQUEST: Consideration of approval of amendment to the sign ordinance, noncommercial signs revis R MFETING DATE_, 11,� J a 4 III. APPLICANT: City of Palm Desert � >� z)NTINUEO TO�� a ro—�o�-� IV.. CASE NO: ZOA 98-5 (Modification No. 1 ) ; SED TO 2ND NEAOINB V. DATE: October 22, 1998 .!. MEETING DATE VI. CONTENTS: 0�kONTINUEOTO� A. Staff Recommendation [] PASSED TO 2N0 READING B. Background C. Analysis D. Draft Ordinance No. 897 E. Planning Commission Minutes involving Case No. ZOA 98-5 (Revision No. 1) F. Planning Commission Staff Report dated October 6, 1998 G. Related maps and/or exhibits MEETING DATE ------------------------------------------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------- --------- MMNTMUED TO I - A. STAFF RECOMMENDATION: PAD TO 2Mp READING Waive further reading and pass Ordina _ j4CKGROUND: S iptember 10, 1998 staff presented a first draft of the ordinance to City Council. C uncil rejected the ordinance as recommended because it contained too many _- o s c egories and was too convoluted. Council directed staff to modify the ordinance o m ; t prohibit noncommercial signs in the public right-of-way and to require their removal z thin seven (7) days of the election (see City Council minutes of September 10, 1 98 attached). T e revised amendment was reviewed by ZORC September 7, 1998 and it agreed °' �t at the first version of the ordinance would afford greater regulatory control but n ted that the City Council can and should adopt an ordinance with which it is i, c mfortable. ctober 6, 1998 the modified amendment was presented to Planning Commission. a anning Commission by minute motion endorsed the revised amendment on a 5-0 I '' CITY COUNCIL STAFF RtPORT CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 (MODIFICATION NO. 1) OCTOBER 22, 1998 C. ANALYSIS: The public hearing on this matter was held September 10, 1998. Pursuant to Municipal Code Section 25.82.060 this modification was referred to Planning Commission by Council for a report on the modified ordinance. The modified ordinance still contains 15 housekeeping sections to create the noncommercial sign section. Section 16 deletes the existing political sign regulations. Section 17 creates a new chapter to the zoning title, Chapter 112 "Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation" which prohibits noncommercial signs in the public right-of-way and requires removal of such signs within seven (7) days of the election for which they were erected. Prepared by: S ve Smith Reviewed and Approved by: Philip Drell /tm 2 CITY OF PALM DESERT DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT STAFF REPORT I. TO: Honorable Mayor and City Council If. REQUEST: Consideration of approval of amendment to the sign ordinance - political signs. COUNCIL ACTION.- III. APPLICANT: City of Palm Desert"ROVED--. DENIED ,7EIVED ..� �,:,_ _. ',mrFr X Referre ack to IV. CASE NO: ZOA 98-5 s ~'gym=' 9/10/98 Crites, Ferguson, Kelly, 'SpY V. DATE: September 10, 1998: : ' ENT.__,.._... VI. CONTENTS: A. Staff Recommendation C to Clerk's Office B. Discussion C. Draft Ordinance No. 889 rt o o o 0 0 W I w D. Planning Commission Minutes involving Case No. ZOA 98 5 o ro o M E. Planning Commission Resolution No. 1884 0 ` E n o' n F. Planning Commission Staff Report dated August 4, 1998 G. Related maps and/or exhibits o a r c� rt G K N n av o p m N 0 b rr H. O 1-� O A. STAFF RECOMMENDATION: a a w m w n n n r ,v ro w 9 E rr O 'D r{ Waiver further reading and pass Ordinance No. 889 to second reading. F rt P. N (0 • w E 5 N• r• B. DISCUSSION: n O O o c n During the past city election campaign there was concern that the city's sign o µ ordinance as it applied to political sign was not enforceable (i.e., five square feet limit �. was too restrictive). w + ° rr N fD fC i'• N H 3 The city attorney's office, along with staff and ZORC (Zoning Ordinance Review Committee) has been working on writing political sign regulations which are equitable o 2 14 and enforceable. This ordinance was reviewed by Planning Commission August 4, w 1998. The Commission voted 3-1 to recommend approval of the ordinance with a' 7 a Commissioner Finerty voting nay and Commissioner Jonathan absent. Commissioner Finerty felt that the proposed ordinance was overly restrictive considering that the c F- to political season is relatively short and that it would provide incumbents with an 7 advantage due to name recognition (see Planning Commission minutes for expanded . r. ,m n statement). ° R M N STAFF REPORT CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 SEPTEMBER 10, 1998 1 . ANALYSIS: The proposed amendments if enacted would delete the current political sign regulations as prescribed in Municipal Code Section 25.68.620 (copy attached) and replace it with new regulations. The new political sign regulations will be assigned to a new chapter of the zoning ordinance to provide an obvious distinction between commercial speech and non-commercial speech. The amendment will amend numerous existing definitions within the code. As is explained in the background material provided by the city attorney's office non commercial speech is afforded greater protection than is commercial speech, therefore, the city cannot regulate non commercial speech to the same degree as commercial speech. The new regulations will establish a no fee registration procedure, require consent of the property owner, prohibit non-commercial signs in the public right-of-way, prescribe a maximum duration of 90 days or seven days after the elections, whichever occurs first and provide penalties for violations. The registration process will not apply to occupied residential properties. The ordinance then establishes different criteria for non-commercial signs in various locations. Category "A" is developed residential lots. The owner/occupant is not subject to registration and may install one or more temporary non-commercial signs which meet the general criteria. Category "B" applies to vacant residential lots. This category requires registration and total signage not exceed 12 square feet. Category "C" applies to developed lots in other residential zones. This category requires registration and total signage not to exceed six square feet. Category "D" applies to developed lots in commercial or industrial zones. This category requires registration and total signage not to exceed six square feet. Category "E" applies to vacant lots in commercial or industrial zones. This category requires registration and limits signs to three square feet or 12 square feet depending on property frontage. 2 I STAFF REPORT ZOA 98-5 AUGUST 4, 1998 Category "F" applies to commercial or industrial zones and permits tenants/owners to exchange permanent commercial sign copy for temporary non-commercial sign subject to registration. 2. CONCLUSION: New political sign regulations are required. The city attorney feels that the ordinance as proposed herein is enforceable and would withstand challenge. Staff feels that while the registration process may at first be difficult it should be workable. Signs on vacant lots without proper registration can be abated. Prepared by: S eve Smith Reviewed and Approved b P ilip Drell /tm 3 ORDINANCE NO. 889 AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA, APPROVING A ZONING ORDINANCE AMENDMENT RELATING TO NON-COMMERCIAL SIGNS. CASE NO, ZOA 98-5 WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Palm Desert, California, did on the 10th day of September, 1998, hold a duly noticed public hearing to consider the amendment of Zoning Ordinance Section 25.68 relating to non-commercial signs; and WHEREAS, the Planning Commission by its Resolution No. 1884 has recommended approval of this case; and WHEREAS, said application has complied with the requirements of the "City of Palm Desert Procedure for Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act, Resolution No. 97-18," in that the Director of Community Development has determined the amendment to be a Class 5 Categorical Exemption; and WHEREAS, at said public hearing, upon hearing and considering all testimony and arguments, if any, of all interested persons desiring to be heard, said City Council did find the following facts and reasons to exist to approve the Zoning Ordinance text amendment: 1 . The proposed amendment relating to non-commercial signs is consistent with the intent of the General Plan and Zoning Ordinance and will protect the community health, safety and general welfare. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDAINED by the City Council of the City of Palm Desert, California, as follows: 1 . That the above recitations are true and correct and constitute the findings of the Council in this case. 2. That the City Council hereby approves Case No. ZOA 98-5 as provided in the attached exhibit labeled "A". PASSED, APPROVED and ADOPTED at a regular meeting of the Palm Desert City Council, held on this day of 1998, by the following vote, to wit: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: JEAN M. BENSON, Mayor ATTEST: SHEILA R. GILLIGAN, City Clerk City of Palm Desert, California ORDINANCE NO. 989 EXHIBIT "A" SECTION 1 That Section 25.04.750 be amended to read at the beginning: "Except as otherwise provided, "sign" means..." SECTION 2 That Section 25.68.080 D is hereby deleted. SECTION 3 That Section 25.68.020 is hereby amended to add the following definitions: Y. "Non-commercial message" means a message which does not advertise, announce or attract attention to places or things offered for sale, lease or hire, or products, goods, businesses, or services. A non-commercial message includes a message expressing an opinion or ideology. Z. "Non-commercial sign" means a sign bearing a non- commercial message. AA. "Temporary sign" means a sign that is: painted upon a window, or constructed of cloth, canvas, cardboard, poster board, plastic, light-weight aluminum, or other light temporary materials, with or without a structural frame; and affixed or erected by means of a temporary method of erecting, hanging or affixing, such as by one or more ground stakes, tape, pins, tacks, staples, or other easily removable method; and intended for a temporary period of display. SECTION 4 That Section 25.68.020 P is hereby amended to read: P. "Political sign" means a non-commercial sign whose message relates to the election of one or more persons to public office, or one or more measures, initiatives or ballot proposals, on an election ballot to be voted on at an election called by a public body. SECTION 5 That Section 25.68.020 U is hereby amended to read: 2 ORDINANCE NO. 889 U. "Sign" means anything of visual appearance, including but not limited to any word, numeral, letter model, banner, flag, pennant, poster, insignia, device, design or trademark which is affixed to, painted on, or represented upon a building, structure, window, piece of land or natural object, and which is in the nature of or used as an announcement, direction or advertisement by attracting attention to a topic, object, place, activity, person, product, institution, organization or business; together with all parts, materials, frame and background. A sign shall not mean displays of merchandise or products for sale on the premises, or signs inside buildings except when less than three feet behind a window and facing public view, or ornamentation, design, statuary, architecture, landscaping, pictures, paintings or other such art forms unless, in the case of any exceptions listed in this chapter, the attraction, because of location, size, use or the nature thereof, has the substantial effect of attracting attention for identification purposes when viewed from an outside public area. The basic intent behind this definition is not to discourage product displays, design or art forms epitomizing simplicity, good taste and compatibility with the community's desired image. SECTION 6 That Section 25.68.060 is amended to delete "department of environmental services" and replace same with "department of community development". SECTION 7 That the first sentence of Section 25.68.090 C (prohibited signs) is hereby amended to add at the beginning of the first sentence: "Except for permanent non-commercial signs or non- commercial messages,..." SECTION 8 That Section 25.68.100 is amended as follows: First Paragraph: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". Third Paragraph, First Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". 3 ORDINANCE NO. 889 Third Paragraph, Second Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". SECTION 9 That Section 25.68.130 ("realty signs") is amended to add the following at the end of that section: "Realty signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.112.070." SECTION 10 That Section 25.68.170 ("other signs" in single family zones) is amended as follows: Add to Beginning of First Sentence: "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter..." Last Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". SECTION 11 That Section 25.68.250 is amended as follows: Amend subsection B.: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". Add subsection C: C. Sales and rental signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.112.070. SECTION 12 That Section 25.68.400 is amended to add subsection C as follows: C. Sales and rental signs on vacant property shall comply with the registration requirements of 25.1 12.070. 4 ORDINANCE NO. 889 SECTION 13 That the first sentence of Section 25.68.420 ("signs generally") is amended to read: "The following general sign usage provisions and regulations shall apply for all signs, except that sections 25.68.430, 25.68.440 and 25.68.460 shall not apply to temporary non-commercial signs." SECTION 14 That the first phase of the first sentence of Section 25.68.440 ("Sign Review Criteria") is amended to read: "All signs which require a sign permit pursuant to this Chapter..." SECTION 15 That Section 25.68.450 ("signs facing private property prohibited") is hereby deleted. SECTION 16 That Section 25.68.620 ("Political Sign Regulation) is hereby deleted. SECTION 17 That Chapter 25.112 ("Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation") is hereby added as follows: 25.112.010 Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation. 25.112.010. General Provisions. A. Non-Commercial Messages. Any sign authorized pursuant to, and otherwise complying with, this Chapter may contain a non-commercial message. Temporary non-commercial signs shall comply with the provisions set forth in Section 25.1 12." B. Public right-of-way. Except as otherwise specifically authorized in this Chapter, no temporary sign may be displayed, erected or maintained in or upon public property or the public right-of-way, including but not limited to, any public utility pole, street sign, shelter, bench or trash receptacle. C. Free standing signs. The maximum height of freestanding temporary non-commercial signs shall be six feet from ground level unless topographic or other physical features 5 ORDINANCE NO. 889 exist necessitating a higher sign. In no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. D. Sign Categories. The following categories apply to all temporary non-commercial signs: 1 . Category A. Temporary non-commercial signs in residential districts in areas developed with a dwelling. For purposes of this 25.112.010, "areas developed with a dwelling" means: the entire lot if any portion thereof is developed with a single family homes; the demised premises of any occupied residential leasehold interest, such as an occupied mobile home lot or apartment unit; the non-common areas of a condominium or timeshare unit intended for use as a dwelling. 2. Category B. Temporary non-commercial signs in residential districts on vacant lots. 3. Category C. Temporary non-commercial signs on developed lots in "Other Residential Zones" as provided in Part VI., Section 25.68.180 et. seq. 4. Category D. Temporary non-commercial signs on developed lots in commercial or industrial zones. 5. Category E. Temporary non-commercial signs on vacant lots in commercial or industrial zones. 6. Category F. Temporary non-commercial sign or sign copy erected in lieu of an authorized permanent sign or permanent sign copy. 25.112.020. Category A Signs. One or more Category A signs may be erected and maintained by, or with the consent of, the dwelling owner or occupant. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. 25.112.030. Category B Signs. Subject to the registration requirements set forth in 25.1 12.070, one or more Category B signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign face area shall not exceed 12 6 ORDINANCE NO. 889 commercial messages. For each sign with a sign face area in excess of six square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed eight vertical inches. 25.112.040. Category C and Category D Signs. One or more Category C or Category D signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign face area shall not exceed six square feet. The maximum height of each sign shall be six feet unless topographic or other physical features exist necessitating a higher sign, but in no event shall the total sign structure height exceed ten feet from the ground. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. 25.112.050. Category E Signs. Subject to the registration requirements set forth in 25.112.070, one or more Category E signs may be maintained, but the total aggregate sign face area shall not exceed 12 square feet on lots with frontage on the public right-of-way greater than 200 lineal feet, and shall not exceed three square feet on lots with frontage on the public right-of-way of 200 lineal feet or less. Each sign may contain any number of non-commercial messages. For each sign with a sign face area in excess of six square feet, the size of the individual text characters shall not exceed eight vertical inches. 25.112.060. Category F Signs. The owner or user of any permanent sign authorized under this Chapter may erect Category F sign copy containing one or more non-commercial messages in lieu of part or all of, and subject to the same size restrictions as, the permanent sign copy authorized. Such "in lieu of" temporary sign copy shall be affixed to the permanent sign within the permanent sign face. 25.112.070. Registration of Category B and Category E Signs. A. Registration. Temporary non-commercial signs in Category B or Category E may only be erected upon submission of a completed registration form to be provided by the department of community development. Registration forms shall be signed by the registrant and shall include: 7 ORDINANCE NO. 889 (1 ) The name of the registrant and the mailing address to which any notices required by this Chapter 25.112 may be sent; (2) A general description of the sign and the location where it will be erected; (3) A statement affirming that the registrant is responsible for complying with this Chapter, including but not limited to sign maintenance and removal; (4) A statement affirming that the registrant has the permission of the property owner to erect the sign; and (5) A statement affirming, under penalty of perjury, that the registrant has read and understood the contents of the form. B. Registration Information Affixed to Sign. Upon submission of a completed registration form, the registrant shall be provided with a registration number. Each sign shall have the name of the maker, the date of erection, and the registration number clearly legible on the lower right hand corner of the fact of the sign. As an alternative, a decal may be issued by the city which shall be placed on the sign at a location visible and readable from the public right-of-way. Any sign that does not bear valid registration information shall be deemed non-complying and subject to all applicable penalties and abatement procedures. C. Consent of Property Owner. No Category B or Category E temporary non-commercial sign may be erected without the prior consent of the property owner. Any sign erected or maintained without permission of the property owner may be summarily removed by the property owner, or his or her authorized representative. D. Duration. The registration shall expire ninety days following it's submission to the department of community development. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the registration for a temporary political sign expires ninety days following it's submission to the department of community development, or seven days after the election, whichever occurs first. 8 ORDINANCE NO. 889 E. Renewal or Removal Required. Upon expiration of the registration, the registrant must either remove the sign or complete a new registration form. Signs not removed or re- registered by the end of the next business day following the date of expiration shall be deemed non-complying signs and subject to all applicable penalties and abatement procedures. 25.112.080. Enforcement and Penalties. A. Violation - Infraction. Any person violating this Chapter 25.112 shall be guilty of an infraction, and upon conviction thereof shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500); and such person shall be deemed guilty of a separate offense for each day, or portion thereof, during which any violation of this chapter is committed or continued. B. Abatement. The director of community development shall not permit, and shall abate, any temporary non-commercial sign within the city which fails to meet the requirements of this Chapter 25.112 or other applicable law. In addition to the penalties set forth in 25.1 12.080(A), the director of community development, or his authorized representative, may remove any temporary non-commercial sign that is not in compliance. Prior to removal, the director of community development, or his authorized representative, shall give notice to the registrant, or the property owner if the sign is not registered, that the sign is not in compliance and is subject to removal. The notice shall specify the corrections necessary to restore compliance, including the option of voluntary removal of the sign; and shall warn the recipient that the sign will be removed if compliance is not restored within five days of the date of the notice, that such removal will be at the expense of the recipient, and that such removal shall be in addition to the penalties provided for in 25.112.080(A). Notwithstanding the foregoing, temporary signs found on public property or the public right-of-way will be summarily removed and stored at city hall. Notice shall be given to the registrant, if known, informing the registrant of the removal and reasonable costs incurred, and warning that the sign will be stored at city hall for only ten days from the date of the notice 9 ORDINANCE NO. 889 and, if not claimed within that time, shall be destroyed. Prior to releasing such stored signs to the registrant, the registrant shall pay the reasonable removal and storage costs and any other penalty due pursuant to this chapter. 10 MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION OCTOBER 6, 1998 It was moved by Commissioner Finerty, seconded by Commissioner Fernandez, continuing PP/CUP 98-16 to October 20, 1998 by minute motion. Motion carried 5-0. IX. MISCELLANEOUS A. Case No. ZOA 98-5 `- CITY OF PALM DESERT, Applicant Request for approval of amendment to the sign ordinance noncommercial signs. Mr. Smith recalled that on August 4, 1998, the Planning Commission held a public hearing on amendments to the sign ordinance to create a separate noncommercial sign section. The Planning Commission recommended approval of the draft as presented. That matter was submitted to City Council on September 10. A copy of the council minutes of that meeting was attached to the staff report given to Commission. Basically the council felt there were too many categories and that it was too convoluted. The council referred the matter back to staff and Planning Commission with the direction that the ordinance be amended to prohibit noncommercial signs in the public right-of- way and to require removal within seven days of an election. They ran this revised amendment past Zoning Ordinance Review Committee at its meeting of September 17 and they agreed that the first version of the ordinance would have afforded greater regulatory control but noted that council should be comfortable with whatever ordinance it adopts. The modified ordinance still contained what Mr. Smith described as 15 housekeeping sections which would allow them to create the noncommercial sign section. Section 16 would then delete the existing political sign regulations. Section 17 would create a new title called Temporary Noncommercial Sign Regulation which would prohibit noncommercial signs in the public right-of-way and require their removal within seven days. Mr. Smith noted this was not a noticed public hearing in that the matter was a public hearing in August. This was a referral by Council to this commission pursuant to Municipal Code Section 25.82.060. Staff's recommendation was for Planning Commission to recommend approval of this version of the ordinance to the Council. He asked for any questions. Action: 26 l •MINUTES PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION OCTOBER 6, 1998 It was moved by Commissioner Finerty, seconded by Commissioner Fernandez, recommending to City Council approval of ZOA 98-5 as modified by minute motion. Motion carried 5-0. B. REQUEST BY COACHELLA VALLEY WATER DISTRICT FOR DETERMINATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PALM DESERT GENERAL PLAN THE FOLLOWING PROJECTS: WELL 5675 AND PALM DESERT WATER RECLAMATION PLANT NO. 10 (WRP10) SEWER FORCE MAIN. Mr. Drell explained that these projects were part of CVWD's obligation to provide the city with needed water and facilities. He recommended that Commission make the finding that the projects are in conformity with the City's General Plan. Action: It was moved by Commissioner Beaty, seconded by Commissioner Finerty, determining by minute motion that Well 5675 and Palm Desert Water Reclamation Plan No. 10 (WRP10) Sewer Force Main are in compliance with the Palm Desert General Plan. Motion carried 5-0. C. AN ORAL REPORT WILL BE GIVEN BY PHIL DRELL REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE LANDSCAPING AT THE DESERT CROSSING SHOPPING CENTER. Mr. Drell explained that the city has with Desert Crossing, as with all new major projects, a landscape maintenance agreement. Unfortunately, this project was landscaped using a particular tree which everyone at the time thought was wonderful, which the City thought was wonderful, which the city planted in the civic center parking lot and throughout the park, which has turned out not to be wonderful. In certain situations where it has been grown in a completely open area and has the opportunity for its roots to spread out unimpeded it might be okay, but not in a confined parking well. Another thing the city required was a root guard which was to protect the integrity of the curb around the tree well and the way they were installed prevented any expansion of roots. As the City and everyone else have found in this situation, the only thing that keeps those trees vertical are the posts, no matter how old 27 CITY OF PALM DESERT DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT STAFF REPORT TO: Planning Commission DATE: October 6, 1998 CASE NO: ZOA 98-5. REQUEST: Approval of amendments to the sign ordinance - noncommercial signs. APPLICANT: City of Palm Desert I. BACKGROUND: August 4, 1998 Commission held a public hearing on proposed amendments to the sign ordinance, specifically noncommercial (political) signs. Commission recommended approval of the amendments as prepared by staff, the city attorney and Zoning Ordinance Review Committee. September 10, 1998 staff presented the recommended amendment to City Council. Council rejected the ordinance as recommended because it contained too many categories and was too convoluted. Council directed staff to modify the amendment to prohibit noncommercial signs in the public right-of-way and to require their removal within seven (7) days of the election (see City Council minutes of September 10, 1998 attached). The revised amendment was reviewed by ZORC September 7, 1998 and it agreed that the first version of the ordinance would afford greater regulatory control but noted that the City Council can and should adopt an ordinance with which it is comfortable. II. ANALYSIS: Pursuant to Municipal Code Section 25.82.060 this modification was referred to Planning Commission by Council for a report on the modified ordinance. The modified ordinance still contains 15 housekeeping sections to create the noncommercial sign section. Section 16 deletes the existing political sign regulations. Section 17 creates a new chapter to the zoning title, Chapter 112 "Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation" which prohibits noncommercial signs in the public right-of-way and requires removal of such signs within seven (7) days of the election for which they were erected. STAFF REPORT ZOA 98-5 (MODIFIED) OCTOBER 6, 1998 III. RECOMMENDATION: That the Planning Commission report to the City Council that it has reviewed the modified ordinance and recommends approval of same. Prepared by teve Smith Reviewed and Approved b rel I Am 2 EXHIBIT "A" SECTION 1 That Section 25.04.750 be amended to read at the beginning: "Except as otherwise provided, "sign" means..." SECTION 2 That Section 25.68.080 D is hereby deleted. SECTION 3 That Section 25.68.020 is hereby amended to add the following definitions: Y. "Non-commercial message" means a message which does not advertise, announce or attract attention to places or things offered for sale, lease or hire, or products, goods, businesses, or services. A non-commercial message includes a message expressing an opinion or ideology. Z. "Non-commercial sign" means a sign bearing a non- commercial message. AA. 'Temporary sign" means a sign that is: painted upon a window, or constructed of cloth, canvas, cardboard, poster board, plastic, light-weight aluminum, or other light temporary materials, with or without a structural frame; and affixed or erected by means of a temporary method of erecting, hanging or affixing, such as by one or more ground stakes, tape, pins, tacks, staples, or other easily removable method; and intended for a temporary period of display. SECTION 4 That Section 25.68.020 P is hereby amended to read: P. "Political sign" means a non-commercial sign whose message relates to the election of one or more persons to public office, or one or more measures, initiatives or ballot proposals, on an election ballot to be voted on at an election called by a public body. SECTION 5 That Section 25.68.020 U is hereby amended to read: U. "Sign" means anything of visual appearance, including but not limited to any word, numeral, letter model, banner, flag, pennant, poster, insignia, device, design or trademark which is affixed to, painted on, or represented upon a building, structure, window, piece of land or natural object, and which is in the nature of or used as an announcement, direction or advertisement by attracting attention to a topic, object, place, activity, person, product, institution, organization or business; together with all parts, materials, frame and background. A sign shall not mean displays of merchandise or products for sale on the premises, or signs inside buildings except when less than three feet behind a window and facing public view, or ornamentation, design, statuary, architecture, landscaping, pictures, paintings or other such art forms unless, in the case of any exceptions listed in this chapter, the attraction, because of location, size, use or the nature thereof, has the substantial effect of attracting attention for identification purposes when viewed from an outside public area. The basic intent behind this definition is not to discourage product displays, design or art forms epitomizing simplicity, good taste and compatibility with the community's desired image. SECTION 6 That Section 25.68.060 is amended to delete "department of environmental services" and replace same with "department of community development". SECTION 7 That the first sentence of Section 25.68.090 C (prohibited signs) is hereby amended to add at the beginning of the first sentence: "Except for permanent non-commercial signs or non- commercial messages,..." SECTION 8 That Section 25.68.100 is amended as follows: First Paragraph: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". Third Paragraph, First Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". Third Paragraph, Second Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". 2 SECTION 10 That Section-25.68.170 ("other signs" in single family zones) is amended as follows: Add to Beginning of First Sentence: "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter..." Last Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". SECTION 11 That Section 25.68.250 is amended as follows: Amend subsection B.: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". SECTION 13 That the first sentence of Section 25.68.420 ("signs generally") is amended to read: "The following general sign usage provisions and regulations shall apply for all signs, except that sections 25.68.430, 25.68.440 and 25.68.460 shall not apply to temporary non-commercial signs." SECTION 14 That the first phrase of the first sentence of Section 25.68.440 ("Sign Review Criteria") is amended to read: "All signs which require a sign permit pursuant to this Chapter..." SECTION 15 That Section 25.68.450 ("signs facing private property prohibited") is hereby deleted. 3 SECTION 16 That Section-25.68.620 ("Political Sign Regulation) is hereby deleted. SECTION 17 That Chapter 25.112 ("Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation") is hereby added as follows: 25.112.010 Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation. 25.112.010. General Provisions. i A. Non-Commercial Messages. Any sign authorized pursuant to, and otherwise complying.. with, this Chapter may contain a non-commercial message. Temporary non-commercial signs shall comply with the provisions set forth in Section 25.112." B. Public right-of-way. Except as otherwise specifically authorized in this Chapter, no temporary sign may be displayed, erected or maintained in or upon public property or the public right-of-way, including but not limited to, any public utility pole, street sign, shelter, bench or trash receptacle. C. That all non-commercial signs shall be removed within seven (7) days of the election for which they were erected. 4 25.82.010 Chapter 25.82 adopted general plan, and shall recommend that the proposal be adopted, adopted in modified form, or AMENDMENTS—ZONING ORDINANCE rejected. (Ord.99§ 1 (part),,1975: Exhibit A §25.39- 7.05) Sections: 25.82.060 Action by the city council. 25.82.010 Purpose. The city council shall hold at least one public hearing 25.82.020 Initiation. on the proposal within forty days after receipt of the 25.82.030 Public hearing. report of the planning commission.The hearing shall 25.82.040 Investigation and report be set and notice given as prescribed in Section 25.82.050 Action by the planning commission. 25.86.010.Within twenty-one days following the clos- ing of the public hearing, the council shall make a 25.82.070 New proposal following denial. specific finding as to whether the change is consistent with the objectives of this title.If the council finds that the change is consistent,it shall introduce an ordinance 25.82.010 Purpose. amending the zoning ordinance text.If the council shall The text of this title may be amended by changing find that the proposal is not consistent,it shall deny the the district regulations or any other provision of this application or reject the proposal.The council shall not title in accord with the procedure described in this modify a decision of the planning commission recom- chapter. (Ord 99 § 1 (part), 1975: Exhibit A § 25.39- mending adoption of the text amendment until it has 7.01) requested and considered a report of the commission on the modification,unless the modification had been 25.82.020 Initiation. considered by the planning commission during its pub- The planning commission may initiate proceeding lic hearing on the matter.Failure of the commission to by motion and then hold public hearings and make a report within forty days after receipt of the council recommendation as provided in this chapter, request shall be deemed concurrence. (Ord. 99 § 1 The city council may initiate proceedings by motion (part), 1975:Exhibit A§25.39-7.06) and then submit the matter to the planning commission for public hearings.(Ord.99§1(part),1975:Exhibit A 25.82.070 New proposal following denial. §25.39-7.02) Following the denial for an amendment to the zon- ing ordinance text,a.request for the same or substan- tially the same change shall not be filed within one year g of the date of denial.(Ord.99§ 1 (part), 1975:Exhibit The planning commission shall hold at least one A§25.39-7.07) public hearing on each proposal for text amendment. The hearing shall be set and notice given as prescribed in Section 25.86.010. (Ord.99§ 1 (part), 1975:Exhibit A§25.39-7.03) 25.82.040 Investigation and report The planning division shall make a review of the proposal and shall prepare a report thereon which shall be submitted to the planning commission prior to the public hearing. (Ord. 99 § 1 (part), 1975: Exhibit A § 25.39-7.04) 25.92.050 Action by the planning commission. Within twenty-one days following the closing of the public hearing, the planning commission shall make a specific finding as to whether the text amendment is consistent with the objectives of this title and the 473 MINUTES REGULAR PALM DESERT CITY COUNCIL MEETING SEPTEMBER 10, 1998 # s # a # a a # s # a s a s s a # a # # a # s # s # # # s # s JMB Second. Please vote. RE Thank you. SRG The motion carries by unanimous vote. For purposes of clarification, Mayor Pro-Tempore Spiegel moved to continue this public hearing item to the meeting of October 8, 1998. Motion was seconded by Ferguson and carried by unanimous vote. B. CONSIDERATION OF APPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE SIGN ORDINANCE - POLITICAL SIGNS. Case No. ZOA 98-5 (City of Palm Desert, Applicant). Mayor Pro-Tempore stated the subject ordinance was difficult to understand and he quipped about the sections referring back to other sections and then forward other sections, etc. Council concurred. Mayor Benson suggested continuing the item for clarification. Mayor Benson declared the public hearing o= and invited testimony in FAVOR of or OPPOSED to the subject item of business. With no testimony offered, she declared the public hearing closed. Councilman Kelly noted that candidates ran under the existing political sign ordinance during the last two elections, there were violations, and no action was taken against the ordinance.' He said staff was placed in a difficult position regarding enforcement of the ordinance since they could end up working for the candidate. He went on to say that the Council did not want to enforce the matter because it would appear that they were interfering with a candidate. He quoted from the subject ordinance, pointing out its technical tone and thought it would put off potential candidates. Council concurred. Councilman Crites commented that the issues of concern were: 1) Assurance that political signs were removed in a timely manner following the election; 2) no placement of signage on the public right-of-way; 3) placement on private property contingent upon the property owners' permission with some kind of sticker, etc. verifying this fact. Councilman Kelly suggested a simple procedure be put into place where candidates were asked to consider the aesthetics of the City and agreed to only utilize such reasonable political signage that would not compromise this principle. He thought that enacting an ordinance with the idea of possible prosecution would be ineffective. Mayor Pro-Tempore Spiegel suggested assignment of two Council members to work with staff to develop a plan for political signs. 47 MINUTES REGULAR PALM DESERT CITY COUNCIL MEETING SEPTEMBER 10, 1998 * s * * * s * s * * s * * * * * * * s s * * s * * * * s * s * Mayor Benson responded the subject matter had come out of the Zoning Ordinance Review Committee(ZORC), and it was reviewed thoroughly with input from the City Attorney's office. She said if the Council wished to send it back to ZORC, it could be done. Mayor Pro-Tempore Spiegel stated he would recommend this. Councilman Ferguson said he did not see any hope by way of returning to ZORC, as the subject ordinance was wonderfully crafted; however, it made no sense in political reality. He said he took a "free market" approach to this issue and felt that constituents who saw a lot of signs would not vote for the candidate--people who did not care for signage took note of this fact and would take note of those candidates who were environmentally sensitive in their use of signs. He noted candidates who used larger signs (4 x 8), such as he, Mayor Pro-Tempore Spiegel, Roy Wilson, and Jim Battin, did so judiciously. He commented that he did not receive a single complaint; whereas, past candidates who had blanketed the City with signage lost their bid for a Council post rather handily. He said the Council's legitimate concerns were that signs be picked up within a certain period of time following the election, and that they did not interfere with the public right-of-way. He said beyond that, if they wanted to trespass and stick them on somebody's property, it was between the candidate, his or her campaign people, and the private property owner. Mr. Diaz stated staff would agree with Councilman Ferguson's suggestion. He said the one concern of staff was placement of these signs in the public right-of-way, a threat to public health and safety. Mayor Pro-Tempore Spiegel moved to, by Minute Motion, return the subject ordinance to staff with direction that it be rewritten in order to simplify it and address the concerns of political sign placement such that it did not interfere with the public right-of-way and for timely removal of same following the election, and return same to Council for its consideration. Motion was seconded by Ferguson and carried by unanimous vote. C. CONSIDERATION OF AN APPEAL BY THE PALM SPRINGS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT TO A DECISION OF THE CITY OF PALM DESERT PLANNING COMMISSION APPROVING TENTATIVE TRACT 26562 AMENDMENT #1 WHICH ADDED DEVELOPMENT PHASING TO A 420-ACRE PREVIOUSLY APPROVED PROJECT LOCATED EAST OF PORTOLA AVENUE, NORTH OF FRANK SINATRA DRIVE, AND WEST OF COOK STREET. Case No. IT 26562 Amendment #1 (Palm Springs Unified School District, Appellant). Mr. Diaz noted that the Palm Springs Unified School District had withdrawn its appeal. The Council noted the Appellant's request for withdrawal; therefore, it took no action on the subject appeal. 48 EXHIBIT "A" SECTION 1 That Section 25.04.750 be amended to read at the beginning: "Except as otherwise provided, "sign" means..." SECTION 2 That Section 25.68.080 D is hereby deleted. SECTION 3 That Section 25.68.020 is hereby amended to add the following definitions: Y. "Non-commercial message" means a message which does not advertise, announce or attract attention to places or things offered for sale, lease or hire, or products, goods, businesses, or services. A non-commercial message includes a message expressing an opinion or ideology. Z. "Non-commercial sign" means a sign bearing a non- commercial message. AA. "Temporary sign" means a sign that is: painted upon a window, or constructed of cloth, canvas, cardboard, poster board, plastic, light-weight aluminum, or other light temporary materials, with or without a structural frame; and affixed or erected by means of a temporary method of erecting, hanging or affixing, such as by one or more ground stakes, tape, pins, tacks, staples, or other easily removable method; and intended for a temporary period of display. SECTION 4 That Section 25.68.020 P is hereby amended to read: P. "Political sign" means a non-commercial sign whose message relates to the election of one or more persons to public office, or one or more measures, initiatives or ballot proposals, on an election ballot to be voted on at an election called by a public body. SECTION 5 That Section 25.68.020 U is hereby amended to read: U. "Sign" means anything of visual appearance, including but not limited to any word, numeral, letter model, banner, flag, pennant, poster, insignia, device, design or • trademark which is affixed to, painted on, or represented upon a building, structure, window, piece of land or natural object, and which is in the nature of or used as an announcement, direction or advertisement by attracting attention to a topic, object, place, activity, person, product, institution, organization or business; together with all parts, materials, frame and background. A sign shall not mean displays of merchandise or products for sale on the premises, or signs inside buildings except when less than three feet behind a window and facing public view, or ornamentation, design, statuary, architecture, landscaping, pictures, paintings or other such art forms unless, in the case of any exceptions listed in this chapter, the attraction, because of location, size, use or the nature thereof, has the substantial effect of attracting attention for identification purposes when viewed from an outside public area. The basic intent behind this definition is not to discourage product displays, design or art forms epitomizing simplicity, good taste and compatibility with the community's desired image. SECTION 6 That Section 25.68.060 is amended to delete "department of environmental services" and replace same with "department of community development". SECTION 7 That the first sentence of Section 25.68.090 C (prohibited signs) is hereby amended to add at the beginning of the first sentence: "Except for permanent non-commercial signs or non- commercial messages,..." SECTION 8 That Section 25.68.100 is amended as follows: First Paragraph: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". Third Paragraph, First Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". Third Paragraph, Second Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". 2 SECTION 10 That Section 25.68.170 ("other signs" in single family zones) is amended as follows: Add to Beginning of First Sentence: "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter..." Last Sentence: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". SECTION 11 That Section 25.68.250 is amended as follows: Amend subsection B.: Delete "director of environmental services" and replace it with "director of community development". SECTION 13 That the first sentence of Section 25.68.420 ("signs generally") is amended to read: "The following general sign usage provisions and regulations shall apply for all signs, except that sections 25.68.430, 25.68.440 and 25.68.460 shall not apply to temporary non-commercial signs." SECTION 14 That the first phrase of the first sentence of Section 25.68.440 ("Sign Review Criteria") is amended to read: "All signs which require a sign permit pursuant to this Chapter..." SECTION 15 That Section 25.68.450 ("signs facing private property prohibited") is hereby deleted. 3 SECTION 16 That Section 25.68.620 ("Political Sign Regulation) is hereby deleted. SECTION 17 That Chapter 25.112 ("Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation") is hereby added as follows: 25.112.010 Temporary Non-Commercial Sign Regulation. 25.112.010. General Provisions. A. Non-Commercial Messages. Any sign authorized pursuant to, and otherwise complying with, this Chapter may contain a non-commercial message. Temporary non-commercial signs shall comply with the provisions set forth in Section 25.112." B. Public right-of-way. Except as otherwise specifically authorized in this Chapter, no temporary sign may be displayed, erected or maintained in or upon public property or the public right-of-way, including but not limited to, any public utility pole, street sign, shelter, bench or trash receptacle. C. That all non-commercial signs shall be removed within seven (7) days of the election for which they were erected. 4 _ h 73-510 FRED WARING DRIVE, PALM DESERT,CALIFORNIA 92260 TELEPHONE(619)346-0611 CITY OF PALM DESERT LEGAL NOTICE CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a public hearing will be held before the Palm Desert Planning Commission to consider amendment to the Zoning Ordinance as it relates to political signs, Municipal Code Section 25.68. SAID public hearing will be held on Tuesday, August 4, 1998, at 7:00 p.m. in the Council Chamber at the Palm Desert Civic Center, 73-510 Fred Waring Drive, Palm Desert, California, at which time and place all interested persons are invited to attend and be heard. Written comments concerning all items covered by this public hearing notice shall be accepted up to the date of the hearing. Information concerning the proposed project and/or negative declaration is available for review in the Department of Community Development at the above address between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. If you challenge the proposed actions in court, you may be limited to raising only those issues you or someone else raised at the public hearing described in this notice, or in written correspondence delivered to the Planning Commission at, or prior to, the public hearing. PUBLISH: Desert Post PHILIP DRELL, Secretary July 16, 1998 Palm Desert Planning Commission 9E SS I OI-I REP[ :'S' 34 31.f 34 JUL-10-SB 15:04 ID: 76034170S9 CITY OF PALM DESERT -T CZ)8 III iJMSEFt 348 I "FC3 Ft MJN 71r I C3IV COLT I= OK TELEPHONE NUMBER 7784731 NAME(ID NUMBER) 7607784731 START TIME JUL-10-SS 15:03 PAGES TRANSMITTED 001 TRANSMISSION MODE G3 RESOLUTION STD REDIALING TIMES 00 SECURITY OFF MAILBOX OFF MACHINE ENGAGED 00.44 THIS TRANSMISSION IS COMPLETED_ LAST SUCCESSFUL PAGE 001 73-610 FREE WARING DRIVE, PALM DESERT,CALIFORNIA 92260 TELEPHONE(619)34B-0611 CITY OF PALM DESERT LEGAL NOTICE CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a publio "..ring will bo held before the Palm Desert Planning Commission to consider amendment to The Zoning Ordinance es it relates to political signs, Municipal Coda Section 25.458. 7o TRH P�w� - Go. VMIpP �Q SA11D public hearing will be held on Tuesday, August 4, 1998, at 7:00 p_rn. In the Council Chamber at the Palm Oes.rt Civic Canter, 7a-510 Frad Waring Oriva, Palm Oasart, Calffornia, at which time and place all interestacl parsons are invited to attand and be hoard. Written commanta concerning all hams covarad by this public hearing notice ahail be accaptecl up to The date of the hearing. Information concerninn the Iarooeaed oroiact ar:clror 73-510 FRED WARING DRIVE, PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA92260 TELEPHONE(619)346-0611 CITY OF PALM DESERT LEGAL NOTICE CASE NO. ZOA 98-5 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a public hearing will be held before the Palm Desert Planning Commission to consider amendment to the Zoning Ordinance as it relates to political signs, Municipal Code Section 25.68. SAID public hearing will be held on Tuesday, August 4, 1998, at 7:00 p.m. in the Council Chamber at the Palm Desert Civic Center, 73-510 Fred Waring Drive, Palm Desert, California, at which time and place all interested persons are invited to attend and be heard. Written comments concerning all items covered by this public hearing notice shall be accepted up to the date of the hearing. Information concerning the proposed project and/or negative declaration is available for review in the Department of Community Development at the above address between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. If you challenge the proposed actions in court, you may be limited to raising only those issues you or someone else raised at the public hearing described in this notice, or in written correspondence delivered to the Planning Commission at, or prior to, the public hearing. PUBLISH: Desert Sun PHILIP DRELL, Secretary July 15, 1998 Palm Desert Planning Commission I